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Traditionally, the methods of public policy analysis have been
thought to be neutral and apolitical. This dissertation demonstrates
that policy analysis can often be politically biased. In Part I, it
is shown that the assumptions built into much of policy analysis (assump-
tions based largely on the presumed validity of the logical-positivist
approach to social science) tend to distort our perspective on public
policy issues and problems. Furthermore, these distortions are found
to favor certain identifiable interests and ideological positions. Ex-
amples from U.S. energy policy are used to illustrate these points. Part
II of the dissertation attempts to construct a non-positivist approach to
policy analysis (based largely on the assumptions rooted in the inter-
pretive approach to social science) that not only avoids the kinds of
problems described in Part I, but also encourages a more imaginative and
democratic approach to our pressing policy problems.
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CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF POLICY ANALYSIS
The purpose of this study is to identify and explore the polit-
ical biases in public policy analysis — an activity that is convention-
ally thought to be politically neutral. I will investigate the source
and nature of these biases and explain why they are an inherent part
of current analytical approaches. I will also advance some suggestions
for how these biases can be transcended.
The subject of biases in public policy analysis is not, of course,
an entirely original one. For example, this study is similar in spirit
to some of the work done by Guy Benveniste in The Politics of Expertise
—a book concerned with the political role of the expert planner in the
modern state. ^ I share with Benveniste a concern for piercing the mask
of neutrality which obscures the political dimension of the work done
by professional policy analysts. However, this study differs from his
in that it is less concerned with the biases resulting from the polit-
ical role the policy analyst is put into in the planning process and
more concerned with those political biases that are founded in the fun-
damental analytic assumptions and methods that inform the analyst's
work.
Given these theoretical concerns, this study is much closer to
the work done by observers of policy analysis like Brian Fay and Laurence
2
Tribe. Both of these scholars probe the basic philosophical and meth-
1
odological theories which help to constitute public policy analysis and
seek to demonstrate how these theories interconnect and support various
contemporary political ideologies. Although my general approach is
similar, I hope to add a more substantive dimension to this kind of
theoretical analysis. Throughout this work I shall focus on the area
of National Energy Policy and will be continually exploring how the
political biases in policy analysis have affected the way we in the
U.S. have approached our national energy problems.
The reader may also note some resemblance between this study
and some of the work done by Martin Rein in Social Science and Public
3Policy
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for we are both concerned with the problems caused by the
positivist underpinnings in policy analysis and are both aware of the
need to develop an approach to analysis which explicitly addresses the
nonnative and political dimensions of policy questions — subjects that
have been traditionally considered out-of-bounds in policy analysis.
Rein however fails to present a well worked out scheme for approaching
those questions and this is a gap I will be filling with this present
study. I shall set out a detailed and systematic alternative to the
positivist perspective — an alternative that is based on recent work
in the philosophy of social science and moral philosophy.
The Field of Public Policy Analysis
Let us stipulate what is meant by public policy analysis, who
practices it, and what the data-base will be for this investigation.
The question of what policy analysis actually is will be one of the
continuing themes of this work, but for now it can be defined most
simply as the systematic study of public policy issues for the purpose
of producing recommendations which will affect the decisions of policy-
makers. Policy analysis is not only an intellectual endeavor, it is
also a growing profession with a large number of practitioners. For
the purpose of description, these practitioners can be divided into
three rough categories:
1. Government Policy Analysts: those who work for government
policy-makers in local, state and federal policy-making and
implementing institutions. Alice Rivlin and her colleagues
at the Congressional Budget Office would be typical examples.
2. Private Policy Analysts: examples are those who work in pri-
vate think-tanks like the Rand Corporation, Brookings Institu-
tion, or the American Enterprise Institute, and who engage in
both independent and government sponsored policy studies.
3. University-Based Policy Analysts: those analysts like Robert
Dorfman and James Coleman who are based in colleges and univ-
ersities and engage in contract research and/or work occasion-
ally in think-tanks or directly with the government. Often
these university-based analysts also take part in the training
of new professional policy analysts.
Much of what now allows members of these three different groups
to fit into the category of policy analyst is the fact that they have
often gone through similar professional training and often use the
same basic analytic approaches. This statement might not have been
true in the 1950 's and early sixties, when practically anyone dealing
with policy issues could call themselves policy analysts. But in the
41970' s, public policy analysis began to emerge as a specific profession,
complete with its own professional organizations, professional journals,
and most importantly, its own professional schools of policy analysis
—
like the LBJ School at the University of Texas in Austin, The Public
Policy Program at the JFK School of Government at Harvard, and the In-
stitute of Public Policy Studies at the University of Michigan. These
graduate programs of Policy Analysis, Public Management, Public Admini-
stration, Economics, etc. have provided a training ground for the anal-
ysts going into the three areas of employment described above, In
these programs, part of learning to be a professional involves learning
the systematic methods that are characteristic of the profession: cost
benefit analysis, mathematical modeling, systems analysis, and so on.
In this sense, much of what now defines a policy analyst is the formal
approach he or she takes to understanding policy issues and choices.
In my investigation of public policy analysis I will be using
three basic kinds of literature as my data base.
1. Policy Studies. I will rely extensively on the actual reports
produced by various professional policy analysts. In order to
lend some consistency and focus to the investigation, I will be
concentrating primarily on policy studies done in the area of
National Energy Policy, although studies from other policy
areas will be used when they are particularly good illustra-
tions of a point being made.
2. Textbooks. I will also be relying on works intended to help
in the training of public policy analysts. These works are
particularly helpful in investigating the fundamental assump-
tions underlying policy analysis, for they tend to address
those assumptions in a much more explicit way than the pol-
icy studies themselves. Works by Edith Stokey and Richard
Zeckhauser,^ Larry Wade,^ E.S.Quade,^ and Thomas Dye^ are
examples of books in this category.
3. Overblew Books. By overviews books I mean those scholarly
works which describe the state of the art and /or critically
discuss the field of public policy analysis. Examples would
include books by Martin Rein,^ Alice Rivlin,^^ Richard Nelson,"'""'"
and others. Those works also tend to address the basic con-
cepts and presuppositions underlying policy analysis, and
they will be used to both express and support judgements and
conclusions that will be made about the field as a whole.
The Neutrality of Policy Analysis
A major defining characteristic of the practice of policy anal-
ysis is the conviction, frequently stressed, that such work is apolit-
ical . The image of policy analysis as a neutral, technical activity
has been present ever since the early days of the profession. For in-
stances, in the halcyon days of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting move-
ment (PPB) in the sixties, it was confidently declared that "The pro-
12
gram budget is a neutral too. It has no politics." And today it is
still often claimed that even though policy analysis are in the polit-
ical system, they are not of^ it — they are not partison political actors
Charles Schultz is one of those who acknowledges that analysts are
participants in the political process, but insists that they are par-
6tisan only in the sense of being "partisan efficiency advocates. At
each level of the decision process, these participants become parti-
cular champions of efficiency and effectiveness as criteria in deci-
,13
sion-making." It is of course very much in the interests of policy
analysts to reassure policymakers that they are not a political threat,
that they are simply there to help the policymaker better achieve his
or her goals — a beneficial, but essentially neutral role. As Guy
Benveniste has observed, policy analysts often go out of their way
to point out that "experts will not alter the political process,
lAthey will only enhance it."
This apolitical image projected by many analysts is reinforced
by the political realities of their roles in the policymaking pro-
cess. Their role is not political in the sense that they wield any
direct or significant power in the political system. Analysts do not
make policy; they are primarily advisors and their advice can be ac-
cepted or rejected. It is widely understood — and often resented by
the policy analysis community— that policymakers will not hesitate to
reject a perfectly sound policy study if it is politically expedient
for them to do so.'''^ In this sense, then, policy analysts could hard-
ly be thought of as significant or powerful political actors.
Finally, this neutral image of policy analysis is also preferred
by policymakers themselves. Studies have shown that policymakers in-
sist that studies be objective, and that a lack of objectivity is one
1
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of the primary reasons for the rejection of analytic findings. Im-
portantly, this lack of objectivity is usually thought not to be the
fault of policy analysis itself, but the fault of particular analysts
7who introduce their own personal biases, or who fail to develop an
adequate study design. It is also acknowledged that policy research
can be biases by the actions of policymakers themselves. They might,
for instance, direct policy research away from certain kinds of so-
cial problems, or toward some political goals but not others. James
Schlesinger has noted that political pressures can sometimes bias ana-
lyses in the following way:
The judgement of the decisionmaker regarding major objectives
and what is or is not important is likely to feed back and in-
fluence the analysis. .. Specif ic terms of reference may indicate
which scenarios are acceptable, which unacceptable, and which
contingencies should or should not be considered. It is per-
fectly appropriate, if not obligatory, for the analysts to point
out deficiencies in study assumptions or terms of reference.
Yet, many will lack the perception or the inclination while
others would regard such actions as personally imprudent. In
these cases the analysis will only play back to the decision-
maker a more sharply defined version of what was already impli-
cit in his assumptions. The role of analysis then becomes not
so much to sharpen the intuitions of the decisionmaker as to
confirm them. 17
But again, in these cases, it is crucial to note that this bias is
caused by the abuse of policy analysis by particular individuals,
and is not caused by anything in the analytic techniques themselves,
which are thought to be politically neutral. When used properly,
policy analysis remains apolitical.
However, it will be shown in this study that this conventional
view of policy analysis as apolitical is mistaken and misleading.
There are political biases in public policy analysis, and it can be
considered a political activity. To be clear, the bias in policy
analysis is not the personal kind alluded to above. My interest is
not in the well known fact that the personal biases of the analyst
8(and the policymaker) can sometimes make their way into policy studies.
Rather, I am concerned about the political biases that exist in policy
analysis even in its most pure form. The focus of this work will be
on the paradigmatic political biases in policy analysis — biases that
are embedded in the very nature of the analytic paradigms themselves
and would thus come into play no matter who used the paradigms. These
biases originate in the epistemological and methodological assumptions
which infom policy analysis. Several of these assumptions distort
our perspective on policy issues in such a way that certain interests
and ideologies are systematically favored. It is in this sense that
I will argue that policy analysis is politically biased. In order to
begin to percieve this bias it is helpful to consider more carefully
the terms in which we think about policy analysis itself.
Policy Analysis: Tool or Perspective?
How we conceptualize and define public policy analysis has much
to do with whether we see it as neutral or biased. Conventionally,
policy analysis is thought of as a set of tools like cost-benefit ana-
lysis, systems analysis, decisions trees, computer simulations, and
so on, which can be applied to policy problems. Tool are phenomena
which are thought to be politically neutral — they can be used by
Democrats as well as by Republicans and are considered to be "equally
applicable to a socialist, capitalist, or mixed enterprise society, to
a democracy or a dictatorship."^^ Since the analytical tools can be
used by all sorts of political actors for all kinds of political goals,
any political responsibility is thought to lie with the user, not the
9not the tools themselves. For example, a hammer and a saw can be used
to build a hospital or a torture chamber; but it would hardly seem rea-
sonable to lay the praise or the blame for such structures on the tools
that built them.
The logic of such a position begins to wear thin, however, when
we consider its expression in the campaign against gun control by the
National Rifle Association: "Guns don't kill people
—
people kill people."
The argument is basically the same as that above: blame people not
their neutral tools. But is a gun a "neutral" tool? Perhaps not. Guns
are only good for certain kinds of activities — like violence. And
one could certainly make the case that such "tools" do encourage
violence. And while it would be fallacious to maintain that arms
create violent human tendencies, it does seem likely that their pro-
liferation would exacerbate those tendencies and make it easier to
19fulfill them. And this is, in fact, quite similar to the argument
that I want to make about policy analysis, that it is a set of tools
which are only good for certain kinds of political activities and
they thus encourage those activities. But while I feel this is a
valid line of argument, it is not the one which best illuminates the
political nature of policy analysis. It continues to conceive of
policy analysis techniques as "tools," and I believe that the polit-
ical implications of policy analysis become much more apparent when
we transcend the narrow notion of policy analysis as a tool and
realize that it is better thought of as a perspective — a way of
looking at policy issues.
10
The notion that policy analysis is a perspective on policy
problems is one that finds support from several of the more thought-
ful policy analysts. For example, the eminent policy analyst, E.S.
Quade, shuns the notion that systems analysis is merely a set of
techniques or tools, preferring instead to think of it as an "art,"
an "approach," a "perspective," and even a "philosophy . "^° In addi-
tion, two of the leading analysis at the prestigious Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard, Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, char-
acterize policy analysis, in general, as "a framework for thinking
about policy problems and making choices." In a very real way, pol-
icy analysis is a mode of thought — a way of structuring how we think
of policy problems and how we go about solving them. The extent to
which these Harvard analysts believe in policy analysis as an intellec-
tual approach to the world is made clear by their instructions to
those who wish to become policy analysts.
Our perennial advice to students is "Practice !" Practice on
all kinds of situations, large and small, public and private.
Look regularly at the front page of the newspaper and think
hard about one of the policy problems featured... Practice on
your own problems and decisions, using models to get your
thinking straight or to illuminate commonplace events. For
example when you find yourself waiting in line, ask yourself
what could be accomplished with additional service capacity,
and what the benefits of such a move would be... Make up your
mind that at least once every day you will deliberately apply
the (policy analysis) outline to a problem you face. You'll
be amazed at what it will do for your reputation for percep-
tiveness and good judgement. 22
While a bit overstated, the point is clear enough: policy analysis
is best thought of as a mode of thought or an intellectual perspective
on policy questions. This conception of analysis allows us to under-
stand better the manner in which analysis fits into the decision-making
11
process. It is important to realize that analysis offers to policy-
makers more than information, a model, or even specific policy recom-
mendation; it offers a certain perspective, a characteristic way of
defining and approaching policy issues. This function of analysis is
at least partially confirmed in one of the few major studies done on
the uses of policy analysis research by policymakers. Nathan Caplan^"^
found that, while hard, empirical information sometimes did directly
influence policymakers, more often they cited the major contribution
of policy analyses as being "conceptual." By conceptual it is meant
that the analysis primarily functioned to affect the "frame of refer-
ence" or "perspective" within which policymakers approached policies.
Evidence supporting the conceptual influence of policy analysis
of policymakers and the political system can be found in the very na-
ture of the political language that is characterstic of the modern
industrial state. Many of the concepts and terms used in public
policy analysis have become an integral part of our political vocabul-
ary. Terms like "costs and benefits," "zero-based budgeting," "policy
option," cost effectiveness," "externalities," "maximizing," "program-
matic planning," and so on have become a common part of political dis-
course in our legislatures and bureaucracies. Since we think in terms
of language, this infusion of policy analysis inevitably brings with it
a corresponding infusion of the policy analysis perspective on policy
issues. Thus it can be stressed that the effect of policy analysis
on the policy process is not solely dependent on the power of the par-
ticular analyst, but on the tendency of the terms and perspectives of
12
policy analysis to infiltrate our political culture and help to struc-
ture the way we think about policy questions. But let us get a bit
more specific, and begin to consider just what the exact nature of this
policy analysis perspective is, its defining characteristics, its
assumptions, etc.
Policy Analysis as Scientific Rationality
One of the problems with identifying the perspective offered by
policy analysis is the fact that we have what first appears to be
many different perspectives. There are a variety of policy analysis
techniques— cost-effectiveness, operations research, systems anal-
ysis, econometric modeling, etc.— all with apparently different ap-
proaches. This variety makes it easy to fall into a "forest for the
trees" problem where too much attention to differences makes it dif-
ficult to appreciate what these methods have in common. We can, how-
ever, identify several common threads that run through most Of these
modes of analysis. One of the most important commonalities is a com-
mitment to rationality. Policy analysis in its essence is the attempt
to approach policy issues rationally. Carol Weiss has pointed out
that for most policy analysts,
their commitment to social research is grounded in a belief in
rationality. They see the world as a complex place, and they
seek guideposts and directional principles to find their way
through. In their view, social science provides both the theo-
retical directions and the empirical soundings to reach desired
goals. To put these resources at the service of policymakers
will increase the chances that decisions that are reached will
be sound and wise. 24
As Weiss implies, the rationality sought by analysts is not just
any kind, it is scientific rationality— for rationality and clear
13
thinking in our culture are virtually synonomous with science and the
scientific method. This understanding of the perspective of policy
analysis as a scientific one is evident in many of the common defin-
itions of this activity. For instance, the Policy Studies Organiza-
tion, a prominent professional group, has defined policy analysis as
the "application of political and social science to important policy
problems." Thomas Dye, a noted analyst in academia, sees policy ana-
lysis as a "scientific approach to society's problems, ... an effort
to develop and test general propositions about the causes and conse-
quences of public policy and to accumulate reliable research findings
25
of general relevance." One can also find indications of this scien-
tific perspective in the definition of specific forms of policy analy-
sis. For instance, "operations research is the application of scien-
tific method to the decisions problems of government, business, and
26
other social organizations;" and Edward Suchman has defined pro-
gram evaluation research as "the specific use of the scientific method
27
for the purpose of making an evaluation." And finally, the high
degree of commitment to this scientific image can be seen in the self-
descriptive language of analysts who insist on referring to themselves
28
as policy scientists and to their profession as the policy sciences .
The effort to apply scientific rationality to policy questions
was probably inevitable given the great appreciation our culture has
for science. As Americans, we have always been enamored with the
scientific method and its products, from the steam engine and the
telegraph to radio, television, lazers, and other such modern miracles,
Adn particularly impressive has been the ability of science to solve
14
problems. Scientific thought has been instrumental in allowing us
to span rivers, cure disease, win wars, communicate over vast distances,
and put a man on the moon. Given this impressive track record, it
was probably only a matter of time before we turned to the scientific
method in an attempt to solve the multiplying social and economic
problems of industrial society. In this sense, policy analysis is
the embodiment of our belief that the most serious intellectual ap-
proach to any problem is a scientific one. If you want something done
right— do it scientifically. As Brian Fay has rightly pointed out,
much of the appeal of policy analysis is based on the "tacit presump-
tion that science provides the paradigm example or proper thinking;
and as long as any enterprise is not treated in a scientific way, it
29is being treated in an imperfect way."
It should be noted that the effort to integrate science with
politics did not begin with public policy analysis, but rather is an
old theme in American political thought. Policy analysis is in many
ways simply the modern reincarnation of a political dream which can
be traced back to the Founding Fathers. Federalists like James Madison
and Alexander Hamilton were fond of thinking of their newly drafted con-
stitution as an expression of the "new science of politics." They were
children of the Enlightenment, impressed with the beauty and utility
of precise and regular laws. They attempted to design a political sys-
tem that was grounded upon, in the words of John Schaar, the notion
that "the general laws of political motion are as precise and com-
prehencsive in the political realm as the general laws of motion are
in the physical realm." These early attempts to scientize politics
15
are crude by todays standards of science and social science
. The fulfill-
ment of the desire to wed politics to science has to await the develop-
ment of sophisticated methods in the management and behavioral sciences
like systems analysis and econometric modeling. But once these methods
came into use, commentators were quick to label policy analysis as
the "Space Age method for designing the future rationally and managing
the present scientifically." "
But this characterization of policy analysis as a science raises
an interesting question. If policy analysis is simply an embodiment of
scientific rationality, where could the political bias be? Isn't scien-
tific rationality neutral and value-free? The answer to this last
question if no, and to begin to see why this is so we must remember that
all perspectives — including a scientific one — are ways of organizing
our perception of the world. A perspective is biased in the sense that
it focuses our attention on certain phenomena and away from others. It
divides up the world and directs our analytic efforts in some directions
but not in others. In terms of policy analysis, a scientific perspec-
tive serves to emphasize certain dimenstions of policy questions and
de-emphasize others. But not only does a scientific perspective struc-
ture our perception, it does so in ways that can be fault and mislead-
ing. As we will see, many of the methodological assumptions that lie
at the leart of this scientific approach to policy are in fact flawed
—they work to distort our understanding of policy issues.
My approach to the political biases in scientific rationality is
in some ways similar to the work of those who have exposed the ideolog-
ical dimensions of economic rationality. Many of the techniques in
16
policy analysis, like cost-benefit analysis, are not only examples
of scientific rationality, but of economic rationality as well, and
several authors have shown that the assumptions of economic rational-
ity are in fact biased toward certain kinds of values and political
positions. For example, Aaron Wildavsky, in his 1966 critique of
cost-benefit analysis, demonstrated that it presumes the primacy of
individualistic values, the superiority of the market economy, and
the legitimacy of current distributions of income — that, in effect,
cost-benefit analysis serves as de_ facto liberal-capitalist ideology.
Laurence Tribe has made a similar point in his provocative article,
"Policy Sciences: Analysis or Ideology?", in which he concludes that
a classical economic perspective on policy choices created identifi-
33
able normative and political biases. In his words.
The policy sciences' intellectual and social heritage in the
classical economics of unfettered contract, consumer sovereignty,
and perfect markets. .. inclines them, within that paradigm, toward
the exaltation of utilitarian and self-interested individualism,
efficiency, and maximized production against distributive ends,
procedural and historical principles, and the values (often non-
monetizable, discontinuous, and of complex structure) associated
with personal rights, public goods, and communitarian and ecologi-
ical goals. 34
In the same article, Tribe suggests that a promising direction
for researching the ideological dimensions of policy analysis "would
be to investigate. . .the underlying patterns that the policy sciences'
axioms and criteria reveal, (and) to study how these patterns ' inter-
1.35
lock' with other contemporaneously developed areas of thought..."
This investigation procedes in that spirit, but instead of economic
rationality, the focus is scientific rationality.
17
Components of the Argument
Throughout the various chapters in Part I, the argument will
proceed on three interconnected levels. First, on the theoretical
level I will show how the scientific rationality in policy analysis
36is actually scientism — a faulty attempt to apply the techniques
of the natural sciences to social analysis. The focus will include
a brief consideration of the nature of the logical-positivist phil-
osophy of social sciences to social analysis. The focus will in-
clude a brief consideration of the nature of the logical-positivist
philosophy of social science which underlies and helps to constitute
the scientific approach of policy analysis. In particular I will
be examining three of the fundamental philosophical assertions of
positivism which contribute to this scientific perspective:
1. The assumption of methodological unity in the sciences.
This posits that the methods of analysis appropriate to
the physical sciences are appropriate for the scientific
study of social phenomena as well. Thus it is necessary
and justifiable to approach the analysis of policy issues
in the same manner that a natural scientist would approach
the study of physics.
2. The belief that the evaluation of values issues is beyond
the scope of national, scientific investigation. Thus the
analysis of normative questions neither can nor should be a
central part of scientific policy analysis.
3. The assumption that scientific public policy analysis can
and should be an apolitical activity. Thus it is thought
18
that there is no inherent political bias to this neutral form
of analysis.
It will be sho'wn that all of these notions are indefensible.
However, I do not intend for this work to be yet another full-scale
theoretical critique of positivism. Rather the point will be that
the deficiencies of positivism and scientism are not merely matters of
theoretical concern, but that they have real political impacts. Thus the
second level of my analysis will be a consideration of how the philo-
sophical problems of positivism are translated into political problems
in policy analysis. I will examine how the positivist assumption dis-
torts the persepctive that policy analysts have on policy issues and
how those distortions can have ideological implications. For example,
in Chapter II, I shall show how the fact-value dichotomy in positiv-
ist thought can encourage an instrumental approach to policy issues
which unduly concentrates on questions of menas while neglecting more
important questions of ends. I shall make clear that this perspective
can be useful to those political and economic interests who want to dis-
courage the critical analysis of current public policy goals. The spec-
ific policy example used in Chapter II will be continued growth in elec-
tricity production. This kind of example constutes the third level of
analysis — the effect on these distorted analytic perspectives on ac-
tual energy policy decisions. The area of energy policy was chosen
in part because it is one that has been characterized by continuing
policy failures. It will be my contention that these failures are
in part due to the faulty understandings that are reinforced or
exacerbated by the distortions inherent in policy analysis.
While my approach to the problems in policy analysis is obviously
19
a critical one, it is also intended to be constructive. In Part II,
I will show that policy analysts can play a more useful and enlight-
ening role in the political process if they abandon the positivistic per-
spective, and adopt instead methodologies grounded in non-positivist
traditions of social analysis. Non-positivism, of course, is a very
imprecise term. There are many methodologies which could call them-
selves non-positivist, including Marxism, phenomenology, critical theo-
ry, and so on. In this work, the alternative to positivism that will be
plored is Interpretive Theory . Interpretive Theory is a branch of Eng-
lish analytic philosophy which grew out of an attempt to critique and
move beyond the limitations of the logical-positivism that was dominant
in the earlier part of this century. Many contemporary interpretive
social scientists trace their roots back to the later works of Ludwig
Wittgenstein, in which he developed his "ordinary language" approach to
philosophical analysis in an effort to transced his earlier positivis-
tic writings. Again, this work is not intended to be a full-scale
nor in-depth examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the inter-
pretive social sciences, I would refer them to the works of some of
38
its leading contemporary practitioners— Peter Winch, Alistair Mac-
Intyre,"^^ and especially Charles Taylor^^ and William Connolly.
'^^
In the interests of relevance and simplicity, I will be con-
centrating on three of the most fundamental insights derived from in-
terpretive theory— and how they serve to illuminate the deficiencies
of positivism and indicate what an alterative approach to policy might
look like. The three insights are these: (1) that there is a qualit-
ative difference between natural and social realities which makes it
inappropriate to approach them in the same mannter. For example, it
is maintained in interpretive theory that human actions cannot be ex-
plained in terms of causal laws, but must be interpreted in terras of
the beliefs and reasons of the actors; (2) that there is at least some
rationality to the way people make value decisions, and that value
choices can thus be analyzed and discussed in a rational fashion; and
finally (3), that all forms of social analysis and explanation— in-
cluding policy analysis — are inherently political in nature, and
have implications for the form that politics and political discourse
takes in a society. In the series of chapters that constitutes Part
II, I will be extending these theoretical insights into the area of
policy analysis and consider what changes they would imply for how
policy analysis should be done and how analysts conceive of their
role in the policymaking system. It will be argued that this alter-
native approach will encourage a more open, more relevant, more human-
istic, and more democratic approach to public policy analysis. And
finally, extending the analysis to the level of substantive policy,
it will be shown, using the issue of energy growth, that this alter-
native perspective on policy can produce insights that traditional
policy analysis perspectives cannot.
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CHAPTER II
POLICY ANALYSIS AS INSTRUMENTALISM
In this chapter, I will set out the structure of the argument that
will characterize all' the chapters in Part I. I will consider and
illustrate how the philosophical confusions contained in basic policy
analysis methodologies can work, to distort our understandings of various
policy problems. In particular, this chapter will examine what is
probably the most typical analytic distortion present in public policy
analysis—instrumentalism. Instrumentalism is the tendency to narrowly
conceive of policy analysis as primarily an exercise in instrumental
rationality. As will soon be evident, this concern for instrumental
rationality characterizes much of the policy analysis work done today,
and thus forms an appropriate place to begin this investigation. My
contention is that this instrumental perspective fosters an inclination
on the part of policy analysis and policymakers to become so preoccupied
with questions of means in public policy debates as to neglect the more
important and basic task of critically reviewing the basic ends of the
policy being considered.
In this chapter, I will explore the source and effects of this
analytic bias. I will first examine the philosophical roots of this
instrumental perspective and briefly discuss the positivistic assumptions
which underlie and serve to justify this approach. Once the conceptual
foundations of instrumentalism are established, I will consider how this
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analytic bias has effected our perception of a specific policy issue— the
question of the growth of electricity production in the United States.
(This issue of growth, particularly in energy, will be a subject that
recurs throughout many of the chapters of the dissertation.) Finally,
to complete the argument in this chapter, I will examine the political
implications of instrumentalism and consider how specific interest groups
can benefit from this kind of limited perspective on policy issues.
Fact /Value and Means Ends
Much of the source and justification for an instrumental approach
to policy analysis can be found in the positivist assumptions which under-
lie policy analysis. Among those basic assumptions is the fact-value
dichotomy—more accurately known as the descriptive-evaluative dichotomy.
This descriptive-evaluative dichotomy posits that in social analysis we
must make a basic distinction between descriptive statements and evalua-
tive (normative, value-laden) statements. It is argued that while
descriptive statements— like "lowering inflation produces unemployment"
—
can be empirically tested to verify their truth or falsity, normative
statements— like "unemployment is bad"—cannot be tested in the same
manner. It is assumed that such value-laden statements are noncogni-
tive— that is, cannot be proven true empirically. This assumption of
noncognitivism is often accompanied by an emotivist theory of ethics
which asserts that value judgments are basically irrational or merely
a matter of subjective, personal preference.^ Thus, value statements
are not considered to be the legitimate subject of rational scientific
inquiry, and policy analysts who wish to maintain their commitment to
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the scientific method and their identity as social scientists must there-
fore restrict their investigations to empirical questions.
In policy analysis, this analytic commitment to the fact-value
dichotomy is translated into a commitment to a dichotomy between
questions of policy means and questions of policy ends. As Brian Fay
explains, "policy analysts typically draw a distinction between means and
ends, the idea being the simple one that the choice of ends to be pursued
is thought to be a choice requiring a value judgment, but that the
question as to the best means to a prescribed end is thought to be a
factual question that is therefore decidable scientifically."^ It is
thought that, once analysts leave the normative questions of policy ends
to policymakers, they are "then able to consider the more technical
question of how we should pursue our objectives separately from the
problem of what we should value. "-^
Now it is true that some analysts insist on being able to question
the goals of the policymaker. But usually this is only for the purpose
of clarification. Often policymakers state their goals in ambiguous
and vague terms, and the analyst must seek to make them more clear and
precise— to "operationalize" them—so that they can be better measured
and achieved. This is much different than questioning goals on normative
grounds. Not only is direct challenging of policy goals considered bad
form for an objective scientist, it is also inhibited by several practical
considerations as well. Any analyst who would consistently insist on
addressing questions of policy ends would not only be thought to be cir-
cumventing the democratic process but would also irritate his employers
by interfering with their prerogatives and authority in such matters.
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Such imprudent behavior would hardly increase the analyst's job
security, and thus it forms yet another reason for analysts to restrict
their investigations to matters of means.
In any case, it is clear that many of the most popular types of
public policy analysis, including cost-benefit analysis and cost-
effectiveness analysis, are forms of instrumental ism. They embody
instrumental rationality—the notion that while we cannot be fully
rational about our choices of values and goals, we can devise ways of
determining the most rational means to achieve those assumed ends.
Questions of means are considered to be reducible in theory to questions
of what is the most efficient way to achieve an end, and such questions
are subject to value-neutral, empirical verification.^ For instance,
assuming a set of values, an analyst can empirically verify the various
costs and benefits associated with a set of policy options and determine
which is the most efficient option.^ Likewise, the typical cost-
effectiveness study is also an exercise in instrumental rationality. The
question of how to achieve a given policy goal with the least amount of
expenditure is a factual one which, in principle at least, can be
determined by scientific analysis. Having established the instrumental
focus of these typical forms of policy analysis, let us now turn to an
examination of the ramifications of instrumental perspective by consider-
ing an area in energy policy in which it has been used extensively.
Electricity Generation Policy
On the nations energy policy agenda, one of the issues that has
high priority is the question of how electricity is to be generated in
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the next half century. The importance of this issue lies in the fact
that not only is the overall amount of electricity use projected to
increase over the next several decades, but also electricity is con-
sidered likely to represent an increasingly larger portion of our
national energy budget.
One of the most detailed and insightful studies done of electricity
production decision-making was carried out for the National Science
Foundation by a team of researchers headed by Kenneth Sayre.^ The team
sought to uncover the basic assumptions, reasons, and values that have
been informing these important policy decisions. One of their most
interesting findings concerned the contents and emphasis present in the
utility policy reports. They found that analysts tend to give only
cursory attention to the question of whether more electricity is needed,
and tend to spend much more time analyzing the question of how more
electricity can best be produced.^ This latter question is of course a
question of means, a question of efficiency, and is one ideally suited
to an empirical, cost-effectiveness approach. The analysts typically
consider which source of power (coal, oil, nuclear), which site, and
which facility design would be the most cost-effective. As the study
notes, options like solar energy are usually eliminated because of lack
of technological development, geothermal and hydro are eliminated
because of lack of proper geographical locations, and oil and gas are
eliminated on the basis of resource depletion and the lack of reliable
foreign sources.^ The study team found that in the end, "the proposed
(policy choice) thus boils down to an economic and environmental cost
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comparison of the (utilities') proposed nuclear facility and a coal
plant of comparable capacity. Thus the choice of generation facility
depended primarily on whether the empirical data indicated that the
lower construction costs of a coal plant or the (allegedly) lower fuel
costs of nuclear energy provided the most efficient path toward in-
creased electricity production.
This particular approach to the policy issue of electricity
generation can serve as a good example of how the instrumental approach
that is characteristic of much of policy analysis can help to distort
our understanding of policy issues. Specifically, the means /ends
dichotomy can produce two important distortions, one of which points up
a flaw in the dichotomy itself, the other of which affects the way we
actually define the problem being addressed. The first concerns the
fact that, though we may consider the question of how to generate
electricity to be a question of means, it could hardly be thought to be
a value-free question, as the philosophy of policy analysis would imply.
Indeed, the massive public controversy over nuclear power has shown that
such "instrumental" decisions are clearly full of many basic political
and moral implications. Thus, while it is theoretically possible to
draw a distinction between neutral/ instrumental questions and normative/
goal questions, such a dichotomy breaks down in practice. This is
because it fails to acknowledge that all policy decisions, whether they
be ostensibly about means or ends, inevitably affect people, their social
relations, and their way of life; and this fact makes all public decisions
necessarily normative in character. As Brian Fay argues:
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All political decisions, even those which seem as means
to an end, are social policies, and as such they embody
a notion of what people ought to be required or permitted
to do to others. No social policy's worth can be solely
instrumental because any such policy will require that
people interact with one another in certain definite ways,
and for this reason it must bear social value in itself
.... All political proposals, no matter how instrumental,
will alter and shape the personal relations of at least
some of the members of society, and will affect the relative
welfare of various classes of people; as such they embody
moral notions as to what is permissible, just, or right in
human affairs. They are a species of moral statement.
^
Given the essentially value-laden nature of all policy decisions,
the notion of value-free, instrumental policy studies and recommendations
can only be described as a convenient distortion. When we begin to ask
who it is convenient for, then we have begun a political analysis of
policy analysis. For example, we can certainly say that such a dis-
tortion is convenient for policy analysts themselves in that it serves
to circumscribe a neutral, nonpolitical area of expertise to which they
are uniquely qualified. It justifies the role of the "scientist" in what
is normally considered the political process of policy deliberation.
Similarly, the illusion of a strict dichotomy between means and ends is
clearly helpful to those administrators who want to maintain the equally
questionable dichotomy between politics and administration. Thus,
government and utility bureaucrats can claim not to be concerned with
"political" issues, but only in the best means to produce electricity.
And finally, the illusion of scientific value-free policy decision would
be convenient to any decision-maker who wanted to give the appearance
of rationality and objectivity to decisions made on purely political
grounds. These implications will be discussed in more detail in later
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chapters; but for now, let us turn our attention to the second
distorting effect that the means/ends dichotomy can have on our per-
spective on public policies.
The Politics of Issue Definition
One of the primary reasons that analytic frameworks tend to affect
the way we view issues is the natural tendency for most analysts to
define the problem they address in a way which makes their techniques
and expertise particularly relevant and applicable. Part of what
this means in policy analysis is that policy issues have a natural
tendency to be seen as primarily questions of means—because it is pre-
cisely these questions which can be properly (scientifically) addressed
by the analyst. Of course, this may cause difficulties when the issue
at hand is not primarily one of means. In such cases we may find our-
selves in the situation of the proverbial drunkard who insists on looking
for his wallet under the streetlamp, not because he lost it there but
because that is the only place he can see clearly. In other words,
limited analytic capacities may incline us to conveniently misdefine
social problems—a process which is well illustrated in the case of
electricity policy during the 1970s.
As the Sayre study indicated earlier, the issue of electricity
policy in the United States has been largely defined as how we are to
produce more electricity: and the public debate, often strenuous at times,
has focused on whether our policy should emphasize coal or nuclear power.
But as a number of leading energy critics, like Amory Lovins-^^ and
Barry Commoner, have pointed out, this perspective on the issue is a
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misleading one because it obscures what by all rights should be the
main issue in electricity policy
—
whether we need to produce more
electricity. Both critics have observed that many of our problems in
energy policy in the last decade were related to the fact that much of
the energy debate was unduly hampered by a persistent tendency to ask
only instrumental "how to" questions and not the more basic "what" and
"why" questions. Specifically, they argue that for various reasons the
desirability of energy growth has been merely assumed by policymakers
and the energy policy issue reduced to a matter of how to ensure
adequate supplies to meet that growth. Policymakers, policy analysts,
and the public-at-large have all tended to accept, in Lovin's words, the
"basic tenet of high energy projections . . . that the more energy we
use, the better off we are."-^^ As a result, we have locked ourselves
into a policy of building more and more centralized generating facilities
to meet projected increases in electricity demand, without stopping to
seriously consider the mounting costs of such a plan, or the viability
of alternatives.
Among the social, economic, and environmental costs of increased
electrification are: (1) the introduction of major health risks from
coal mining, coal burning, uranium mining, reactor accidents (like
Three Mile Island), radioactive fuel storage leaks (as in Hanford,
Washington), and so on; (2) acceleration of environmental damages brought
by subsurface and strip-mining, including pollution and depletion of
water resources which are at already dangerously low levels in areas like
the Southwest; (3) inequitable distribution of environmental costs to
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rural areas, while affluent urban areas reap the benefits of the
electricity, as has been the case in the Four Corners power complex
in Arizona which feeds power to Las Vegas and Southern California;
(4) the encouragement of the centralization and "Los Angelization" of
settlement patterns; (5) the use of enormous amounts of capital in a
time of capital shortage; (6) the resulting introduction of major
economic risks (again as in the case of Three Mile Island); (7) the
further concentration of economic and political power in the hands of
energy companies and utilities; and (8) the increased vulnerability of
the energy system to terrorism and sabotage, with the resultant possi-
bility of increased "paramilitarization of civilian life.""'-^
As critics like Lovins have shown, many of these problems could
be avoided if we begin our analysis with a critical look at the values
and goals taken for granted in energy policy. For instance, if we
ceased to assume steady growth in electrical consumption and began to
emphasize conservation, and if we ceased to assume that electricity is
good for all tasks and restricted its use to those things for which it
is appropriate, and if we emphasized development of nonelectric alterna-
tive forms of energy, like solar heating, then we could reduce our use
of electricity by one-third to one-half. This would effectively
eliminate the necessity of building any new centralized generating
facilities in the near future and thus avoid most of the disadvantages
and risks listed above. Obviously, however, this has not been the
course of our energy or electrical policy in the 70s and 80s.
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Clearly, there are a number of reasons that the assumption of
increased growth was not questioned in our energy policy (and we will
be examining some of them in more detail in later chapters)
, but it is
fair to say that the instrumental orientation in policy analysis did play
a part in fostering this limited perspective. A framework of analysis
that concentrates on means and assumes ends does not lend itself to the
questioning of basic goals. One finds volumes of government studies
which compare the relative advantages and disadvantages of coal vs.
nuclear power, but one searches in vain for a government report during
the 70 's which seriously questioned the growth of centralized electricity
production. Reports done by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, the Atomic
Energy Commission,-'-^ The Department of the Interior j-*-^ and the Federal
20Power Commissions^ all simply assumed sustained growth in electricity
consumption and production. The typical perspective of most analysts
was summed up neatly by one study which was entitled, "Energy Strategy:
Not What But How.''^!
Even those studies which explicitly set out to be critical and
questioning, often did so in only an instrumental manner. A good
example of this was an analysis done by Alice Rivlin's Congressional
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Budget Office on President Carter's Energy Proposals. While talking a
strong conservation line. Carter's plan actually called for continued
energy growth, especially in the area of electricity. But the question
of whether increased electricity production was desirable was not raised
at all in the C.B.O. report, and the question of whether Carter's
conservation policies were adequate or desirable merited only two brief
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paragraphs in the 150-page study. The bulk of the report concentrated
on the question of whether Carter's proposals were the best way to
achieve his goal—a typical example of instrumental near-sightedness.
The Growth Assumption
It is crucial to point out that my argument is not that the
instrumental bias in public policy analysis is responsible for the faults
in our energy policy. As I mentioned in the first chapter, the biases
in policy analysis are problematic, not because they can by themselves
dominate policy decisions, but because they can exacerbate tendencies
already in the policy process. This is clearly evident in the area of
electricity policy. The prime reason that electricity growth has gone
unquestioned is not some fault in policy analysis, but the fact that
continuous growth is simply one of the most sacred goals in American
society. The presumption that energy and electricity consumption must
continually increase is inviolable largely because it is seen to be
rooted in the more basic assumption of the necessity of continuous
economic growth. One cannot question the need for more power without
questioning the need for an ever-increasing G.N. P., and it is difficult
to raise that question in America without appearing to be irrational. It
is because this perceived need for continuous growth is considered so
basic to the American way of life that our policy discussions are usually
limited to debate over how this growth is best stimulated. The instru-
mental perspective in policy analysis does not cause this generally
uncritical attitude towards the question of growth, but it certainly
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dovetails quite neatly with it. (The basic assumption of growth
which underlies much of American public policy and counter-arguments
to it will be a topic that will be explored in more depth as the
dissertation proceeds.)
It also should be mentioned at this point that this instrumental
perspective is not simply a characteristic of public policy analysis,
but part of our national political character as well. Americans are
"practical" people who are not particularly inclined to question basic
values and ways of life like growth. Kenneth Keniston, one of the most
perceptive observers of American culture, has pointed out that we
Americans have a cognitive predisposition to think of our problems in
instrumental terms—as problems of instrumental rationality rather than
problems of values or ends.
Ours is a how-to-do-it society, and not a what- to-do society.
For every discussion of the ethics of love, we have a dozen
manuals in every drugstore on the "techniques" of love. For
every discussion of the purposes of life, industry, and society,
a thousand hours are spent in discovering how to sell soap, how
to peddle the image of politicians, how to propagate the "American
way of life." . . . Thus our society characteristically dismisses
"final questions" as either philosophically "meaningless" or
—
more commonly—as "irrelevant" to the pressing problems at hand.
The man who insists on asking such questions is usually con-
sidered an obstructionist. Discussions of "why" and "what"
are relegated to Sunday Church-going, to neurotic adolescents,
and to a few artists and dissidents whose views are occasionally
reported, well behind the business news in our national weeklies.
Keniston is attempting to describe an American habit of mind, but he also
succeeds in describing in a remarkably accurate fashion the guiding
spirit behind the activity of the policy analyst—whose job it is not to
ask "what" or "why," but only "how to." This raises the interesting
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possibility that what we have in public policy analysis is the formali-
zation, the institutionalization of an American intellectual character-
istic—a tendency to become mesmerized by the instrumental dimensions
of our problems. (The notion of policy analysis as an institutionalization
of American thought is another of the themes that will be explored in
more detail in later chapters.)
At some point, however, we must begin to question the rationality
of instrumental rationality. When we define rationality purely in
instrumental terms, we run the risk of actually obscuring the fact that
our policy path may be fundamentally an irrational one. We tend to
mistakenly assume that a policy is rational if it achieves its goal
efficiently, and neglect to question the rationality of the goal itself.
An irrational goal pursued rationally is still irrational. A focus on
instrumental rationality may only encourage, in the words of Yehezkel
Dror, "doing more efficiently the incorrect thing, and therefore both
causing damage more effectively and making the wrong policy more difficult
to change. "^^ In this sense, unless we want to risk merely compounding
our policy problems, we need a kind of policy analysis which can also
question the rationality of policy goals, which can put the basic value
questions at the center of its analysis. But this of course is im-
possible within a positivist set of assumptions. However, as Kenneth
Dolbeare suggests, failure to transcend this current paradigm of analysis
could prove very costly: "Uncritical extensions of current research
premises and approaches in policy analysis seems likely to further rigidify
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available policy alternatives and institutionalize the very value
premises and assumptions which have led to or now sustain existing
problems . "^^
The Political Role of Instrumentalism
This tendency to not question basic ends like energy and economic
growth is, however, not merely a matter of cultural propensity. This
instrumental focus is also a function of the fact that certain specific
political and economic interests benefit quite directly from this
uncritical attitude towards policy. In other words, instrumentalism
has a definite political function. A tendency to support current
dominant societal goals is also a tendency to support the interests of
those who benefit from those goals. As Marx pointed out many years ago,
the dominant values in a society are often a reflection of the most
powerful and dominant groups in society. Thus a perspective on policy
which does not question basic values can provide tacit support for those
groups. In terms of energy policy, for instance, it is evident that
certain financial interests stand to benefit greatly from a tendency to
not question the desirability of continued growth in electricity pro-
duction. Manufacturers of electrical equipment suppliers of coal and
nuclear fuel, and utility companies and their investors, all profit
handsomely from growth in electricity generation. If one were to allocate
responsibility for creating and sustain the emphasis on energy growth,
most of it would not go to the intellectual biases contained in policy
analysis, but to the influence of these powerful interests in the
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policymaking process. As Leon Lindberg concluded in his study of
the failure of energy policies in the United States:
The present dominant criteria and political coalitions
responsible for them are too narrow and undimensional
to provide the basis for a desirable or politically
viable long-term policy towards energy .... supply-
side criteria and definitions of the energy problem have
so far dominated agenda setting and the substance of
policy. This situation reflects, among other things, the
political power of a relatively small number of corporations
and agencies sharing an immediate financial interest in or
intellectually committed to maintaining or expanding energy
consumption.
Thus, while policy analysis may not determine how policy issues
are defined, it can play a supporting role to those political interests
which do influence the process of issue definition to their own ad-
vantage. It is in this sense that the analytical biases inherent in
policy analysis can have important political functions and ramifi-
cations. To reiterate, we are not dealing here with a simple process
of the intentional political biases of analysts creeping into analysis,
but with a complex chain of conceptual convergences beginning with a
certain distorted perspective on policy issues dictated by analystic
assumptions and ending with a biased view of specific policy issues that
can directly benefit some political interests.
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CHAPTER III
POLICY ANALYSIS AS FACT FETISHISM
McNamara's mind was mathematical, analytical, bringing
order and reason out of chaos. Always reason. And reason sup-
ported by facts, by statistics—he could prove his rationality
with facts, intimidating others. He was marvelous with charts
and statistics. Once, sitting at CINCPAC for eight hours watch-
ing hundreds and hundreds of slides flashed across the screen
showing what was in the pipeline to Vietnam and what was already
there, he finally said, after seven hours, "Stop the projector.
This slide, number 869, contradicts slide 11." Slide 11 was
flashed back and he was right, they did contradict each other.
Everyone was impressed, and many a little frightened.
David Halberstam
The Best and the Brightest
This chapter deals with several of the problems surrounding the
tendency toward fact-fetishism in public policy analysis—the tendency
to over-emphasize the importance and relevance of fact-gathering to the
resolution of public policy problems. This problem has been commented
upon by other observers of policy analysis who have noted a tendency
for modern policy problems to be defined as data-collection problems.
With the help of these commentators, it will be shown that many of our
current, serious policy issues are in reality problems of conflicting
values and interests which are not easily resolvable on purely empirical
grounds. Indeed, it will be seen that the "facts" in a given policy
area often actually support a number of competing interpretations and
positions in a given policy issue.
In addition, this chapter will explore how fact-fetishism lends
a scientific facade to the activity of policy analysis, and
how this
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facade may serve a number of different political purposes. For example,
this facade can lend an air of scientific legitimacy to decisions al-
ready made on other grounds. Further, this emphasis on scientific
techniques and fact-gathering may also serve to structure the very nature
of policy discussions in a way which indirectly supports the interests
of particular sides in these policy disputes. In many places through-
out the chapter, the issue of nuclear power will be used to illustrate
the points being made about fact-fetishism. This persistent and con-
troversial issue will demonstrate how this analytic tendency can result
in a number of distortions in the way policy problems are understood
and policy decisions are made.
Science and Facts
According to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the primary require-
ment of the scientific method is "fidelity to empirical evidence""'-—or
as it is known in popular parlance, "sticking to the facts." In the
same manner, a scientific decision, a rational decision, is often thought
to be one based solely on the facts, not emotions. It is unsurprising
then that a scientific perspective on policy decisions puts special
emphasis on facts, and that many policy analysts spend much of their
time and energy gathering and processing information about policy
problems and options. This emphasis on fact-gathering is not only a
function of the scientific perspective, but also a product of the reali-
ties of a large, centralized political system. One of the great dis-
advantages of political centralization is that it is very difficult
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for policymakers to actually know what is happening in their society.
They sit isolated in the capital and rarely have the opportunity or
time to actually see and experience social problems first-hand. They
are forced to rely on their aides and analysts for descriptions of the
nature and extent of these problems. Who are the poor? Where do they
live? How poor are they? In a sense, analysts become the eyes and ears
of the policymakers, collecting the vital information needed for rational
policy decisions. Fortunately, this task of fact-gathering and pro-
cessing has been made immensely easier by advances in electronic
information storage and processing systems. New sophisticated computer
technologies have made it possible to accumulate and analyze enormous
amounts of social data. Many see this as an unmitigated good. Herbert
Simon, for instance, has enthusiastically observed that, "With the rapid
development of information-processing technology, the corporate and
public decision-making processes are becoming immensely more sophisti-
cated and rational than they were in past eras." In the midst of this
kind of enthusiasm, very little thought has been given to the possibility
of political bias. Indeed, it would seem difficult to find a more
politically neutral—and innocuous—activity than data-gathering. But
in fact, even this simple activity can have hidden political impli-
cations, and can distort our understanding of policy problems in subtle,
but important ways. Let us see how this can be so.
The Effects of Fact-Fetishism in Analysis
One unfortunate by-product of the development of sophisticated
information systems is that they have fueled some analysts' tendency to
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become fascinated with the very process and technology of data-gathering
itself. The enormous capacity of these systems had made it possible for
data-gathering and processing to become an essentially endless activity,
and for the analyst to become so immersed in it that he or she loses
tract of the ultimate end involved. One long-time student of public
policy analysis, Ida Hoos , has described this phenomenon in this way:
Dear to the hearts of technically oriented analysts is the
information gathering and processing state. In fact» so
gemutlich is the occupation with data that many systems de-
signs, purported to deal with pressing social problems, never
progress beyond that point. Displaying the ingestive pro-
pensities of a snake, the information system swallows up all
the resources allocated to a given project and diverts attention
from its larger purposes.-^
As a typical example of this problem, Hoos cites a study done for
the Bay Area Transportation Study Commission.''^ Using techniques ranging
from origin-and-destination home interview surveys to aerial photography,
analysts enthusiastically gathered over 10 million pieces of information,
stored on 1100 reels of magnetic tape, at a cost of almost $3,000,000.
Unfortunately, despite all of this effort and expense, "interpretation
of the three-million-dollar agglomeration has never been achieved; the
raw data remains undigested and transportation remains the same hit-or-
miss affair in the area studies as elsewhere."^
These kinds of incidents were most typical in the earlier days of
information technology,^ when the enthusiasm of the data-collectors was
unbounded, and when it was routinely assumed that more information was
always better than less. But while such fiascos are more rare today, it
is important to see that the main problem with this kind of focus
on
facts is not the excesses or waste that it sometimes
produces, but the
47
slanted perspective on policy issues it can encourage. For example, an
emphasis on "facts" in analysis can begin to affect the way we define
and try to solve policy problems. The understandable inclination is to
believe that data-gathering can actually be the key to solving our
social problems. Myra Breitbart, in her study of the basic assumptions
informing the practice of urban planning, noted that "while most tradi-
tional planners acknowledge the complexity of urban problems, they main-
tain a basic faith in science and the power of hard facts to provide
solutions to these problems."^ A typical example of this tendency to
define policy problems as data-collection problems can be found in one
government report on urban planning and metropolitan development:
Information is the usual common denominator in metropolitan
problem solution; it is the core of any metropolitan growth-
management scheme, guidance mechanism, booster campaign, or
research effort, both private and public. A tremendous range
of metropolitan-oriented undertakings, private and public,
operation and research-development oriented, founder for lack
of data.
8
This kind of perspective on policy problems can have a detrimental
effect on our attempts to understand and solve those problems. Consider
for a moment, the effect this perspective has had on the way we approach
and debate environmental issues. Data-gathering has become such a
central focus in this area, that it has begun to distort the nature of
policy discourse concerning environmental issues. Increasingly the
political struggles between business developers and environmentalists in
the courts and the legislatures consists of arguments between and about
rival environmental impact statements—huge volumes, full of thousands
of bits of data, virtually incomprehensible to lay people. One of our
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leading environmental policy analysts, Robert Socolow, sees this develop-
ment as a matter of great concern. He questions the wisdom of having
these debates center around such reports, and points out that these
analyses often "fail to assist in the resolution of environmental con-
troversies."^ These empirically-oriented technical reports are sometimes
irrelevant, he argues, because "they are not about what people care
about. "'^ What people care about are the basic values and interests that
are at stake in these environmental controversies: roughly speaking,
those values and interes.ts favored by industrial and commercial developers
versus those values and interests fostered by a more clean and healthy
environment. Often the core of the dispute is not the exact impact of
a particular project, but the clash of competing values—a subject that
usually gets little direct attention in the fact-oriented policy reports.
The controversy over the Tocks Island Dam is a typical example of
this problem. Between 1962 and 1975, numerous environmental studies
were done of this project—the total came to over 50. The last study
alone weighed sixteen pounds, came in six volumes, and was 3,600 pages
long. As might be expected, much of the formal debate over Tocks Island
was taken up by argument over the accuracy, reliability, scope, and
methodology of these various studies. And yet observers agree that none
of these reports were a crucial factor in the final decision. In the
end it was policymakers values and commitments to regional interests
which finally moved them to decide against the dam—factors that were
rarely explicitly addressed in these statistic-filled studies
.
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Knowledge without Understanding
All of this is not to say that facts are not relevant to policy
decisions—of course they are. But they may not be as centrally relevant
as policy analysts tend to think. As Martin Rein explains, the research
approach used by most policy analysts is guided by philosophical assump-
tions that typically overestimate the role of factual findings in resolv-
ing the normative and political controversies that are at the center of
all policy issues.
Most social scientists take for granted the view that . . .
social science can reduce conflict by expanding the areas
of agreement on what are the facts of the situation and how
they came about. If one assumes that there is a link between
what is truthful (factual) and what is right (desirable) , factual
analysis must also improve the quality of policy decisions.
Governments therefore should invest in policy-oriented research
. . . I disagree with this interpretation of how policy and
analysis interact .... The crucial issues in a policy debate
are not so much matters of fact as questions of interpretation.
In other words, the relevance of facts to policy decisions may
have been oversold by policy analysts. Rein reminds us that "social
policy is above all concerned with choice among competing values,"
and that while there is some connection between facts and values, facts
by themselves can rarely serve as even a general indicator of the correct
value or policy path to pursue. Mere possession of information and facts
on a particular policy issue does not ensure that we know what informa-
tion is relevant, or how to use it effectively. We can be information
rich, but perceptually poor—we can lack an appreciation of the broader
social and economic context which gives meaning to this information. In
other words, empirically-oriented policy analysis can easily produce
knowledge without understanding.
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This problem in policy analysis is similar to a more general prob-
lem afflicting empirical research as a whole that has been described by
interpretive social scientists like Charles Taylor. They argue that
isolated facts tell us very little by themselves. They have little real
meaning for us until we can interpret them, until we can put them into
some theoretical framework which explains their existence and signifi-
cance. Moreover, facts can often be interpreted in different ways; they
can often lend support to several different frameworks and perspectives.
This is, in part, why discovering "the facts" will often fail to settle
the issue in a policy controversy. An illustration of this is the cur-
rent dispute over the meaning of the series of near-disastrous accidents
in our nuclear power program. There is essential agreement over the
facts of the matter— the nature of the accidents, how they occurred,
etc.—but there are tremendous differences in interpretation. Nuclear
opponents cite these accidents as indications of the inherent dangers
involved in nuclear power, while proponents argue that the near-miss
nature of the accidents demonstrates that safety procedures and equip-
ment can keep these power plants safe.
"Facts" are not only ambiguous in this way, but often in a complex
issue like nuclear power, there are enough contradictory facts to reason-
ably support several positions. This seems to be confirmed by a survey
study done by John Reed and John Wilkes on the relationship between
knowledge and support for nuclear power. '^ They sought to discover
whether those citizens most "knowledgeable" about nuclear power tended
to support or oppose it. Some supporters and opponents have long claimed
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that if only the public knew the "facts" of the situation, they would
be on their side. In order to test this hypothesis, Wilkes and Reed
first constructed an information test so that they could measure the
extent of nuclear knowledge of those in their study group. They then
compared the level of knowledge to how the respondents felt about the
nuclear power issues. The results are reproduced in the table below."*"'
TABLE 1
ATTITUDES TOWARD BUILDING MORE NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS IN THE U.S. BY NUCLEAR KNOWLEDGE
(in percents)
Attitude Toward Nuclear Power
Level of
Nuclear
Knowledge
Strongly
Oppose
Mildly
Oppose
Mildly
Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
Four-
Five 39 14 10 37
Three 26 10 19 45
Two 27 15 14 44
One 26 11 26 37
None 24 29 24 32
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As the table indicates, instead of finding a linear relation-
ship between the two variables of knowledge and attitude on nuclear
power— that more knowledge was associated with either strong support or
strong opposition to nuclear power, what Wilkes and Reed found was a
curvilinear relationship, which indicated a higher percentage of knowl-
edgables among the "strongly favor" and the "strongly oppose" groups. •'^
And the higher percentages of the least knowledgeable tended to be in
the mildly favor and mildly oppose categories. In other words, the
increase in knowledge about nuclear power was associated with the strength
of opinion, but not one particular opinion.
To Wilkes and Reed this suggests that in policy areas where there
are a number of competing facts which support both the pro and con
positions, citizens probably select out those particular facts which tend
1 8
to fit best into their preconceived notions about the issue. In any
case, it is clear that factual knowledge about the nuclear power contro-
versy, instead of settling the issue, seems to polarize the various sides
even more. Or in the words of Wilkes, "This isn't really a debate about
the facts at all, its a debate about what nuclear power means to people."
The Cultural Dimensions of the Problem
The problem we have here can be seen as another variation of one
we discussed in the first chapter— the tendency of a scientistic policy
analysis to obscure the true, political nature of public policy decisions,
and thus to inhibit the recognition (and resolution) of the conflicts
over basic values and interests that lie at the heart of all serious
policy disputes. As Socolow observes, this is part of a larger cultural
phenomenon.
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The failure of technical studies to assist in the resolution
of environmental controversies is part of a larger pattern
of failures of discourse in problems that put major societal
values at stake. Discussion of goals, of visions of the future,
are enormously inhibited. Privately, goals will be talked about
readily, as one discovers in even the most casual encounter with
any of the participants. But the public debate is cloaked in a
formality that excludes a large part of what people most care
about. Analyses are part of formal debate. We should not be
surprised to learn therefore, that the disciplined analyses
brought to bear on a current societal dispute hardly ever do
justice to the values at stake. -^^
As Socolow suggests, this reluctance to debate values in public
is related to how we think of "formality" in our culture. Our notion
of what a "formal"—i.e., serious and rational—debate consists of is
strongly informed by the scientific perspective. Science has become
synonomous with a serious and rational appraach to the world. Thus we
tend to think of a formal and serious debate as one which focuses on the
"facts," not on values; for values are thought to be purely subjective
and emotional and thus not the proper subject of rational debate. This
scientific bent, with its emotivist theory of ethics, has worked to limit
our view of what acceptable and serious policy discourse consists of.
This helps to explain why even those opposed to environmentally destruc-
tive projects on moral or aesthetic grounds end up focusing their pre-
sentations in a hearing on the more technical and empirical questions
involved. People who object to projects purely on normative grounds
can be made to feel that their arguments are, at best, subjective opinions,
or at worst, irrelevant, emotional outbursts. To be taken seriously,
one must "stick to the facts"~even if they are not the issue. In chapter
seven I will outline one way to avoid this kind of problem—an approach
to policy analysis that focuses on value issues and attempts to evaluate
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them rationally—but for now let us continue our exploration of this
problem, and in particular, its political implications.
The Political Functions of Empiricism
We are faced with the following paradox: empirical policy analyses
rarely get to the heart of policy questions, yet we seem to be inundated
by them. Or as Socolow has put it, although policy makers often "con-
clude that their time is not well spent pondering the available analyses
. . . they may commission still more of them.' How can this seemingly
irrational behavior be explained? The explanation can only partly lie
in the scientistic bent of the policy analysts, another part must lie in
an understanding of the political purposes and interests that are served
by this data-oriented approach. For example, one of the most plausible
explanations is that these reports are sometimes not intended to serve
as a guide to policy at all, but merely as ways of confirming and sup-
porting policy decisions already made on other grounds. Empirical policy
studies can be employed as a scientific facade to enhance the apparent
desirability of pre-ordained policy choices.
In fact, the profession of policy analysis has long been aware that
its work can serve a "legitimization function"—as the work of Carol
22
Weiss clearly demonstrates. But it is important to note that this
function could become increasingly important as modern policjonakers find
legitimacy an increasingly scarce political resource. Political com-
mentators on both the left^"^ and the right^^ have noted the existence of
a "legitimation crisis" in western democracies, and it is against this
background that much of policy analysis must be understood. Harris polls
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have indicated that between 1966 and 1977 the number of people having a
"great deal" of confidence in the executive branch dropped from 41% to
23%; the Supreme Court has fallen from 50% to 29%; and Congress has
9 Sdropped from 42% to 17%. In 1979, the nation heard President Carter
devote a major portion of one of his television addresses to this very
problem. He pointed to the "crises of confidence" in government and
called it "a problem more serious than inflation or energy." The causes
of this growing disillusionment are many, and it is not my purpose here
to enter into the current debate about them. Rather, I would simply note
that this crisis does exist and has put policymakers in a tenuous posi-
tion—a position which may be reinforced by invoking the powerful symbol-
ism inherent in scientistic policy analysis studies.
It is well understood by politicians that legitimacy is at least
as much a matter of appearance as it is a matter of substance. And it
is in the realm of appearances that policy studies—especially scientis-
tic ones—can serve a useful political function to the policymaker. In
an era when few sources of authority go unquestioned, science remains a
respected form of authority in our culture. And so policy makers who can
give the appearance of scientific procedures to their decisions are in-
voking a powerful legitimizing force. It is this legitimizing force which
helps to explain why policy analyses are commissioned but not really used;
and also why policymakers have readily adopted the language of policy
analysis if not the specific recommendations of the analysts. The use of
scientistic terms and statistics gives an air of rationality and precision
that is unavailable elsewhere. It matters little of course, if the actual
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terms or statistics are fully understood by the public, for it is the
appearance they give which is the point.
The Nuclear Power Issue
The legitimization function of policy analysis can be clearly seen
at work in the area of nuclear energy policy. By the beginning of the
1970s the United States Federal government not only had a large amount of
financial capital invested in the development of nuclear power, but a
great deal of political capital as well. The nuclear power program has
been a government sponsored program from its very beginnings in the Atoms
for Peace program of the Eisenhower Administration. The Atomic Energy
Commission and later the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were prime movers
and supporters of this form of energy. Much of this capital and prestige
began to be directly threatened by the advent of the anti-nuclear movement
in the late sixties. In the face of continuing criticism and increasing
public concern over the safety of nuclear power, it was only natural for
the government to turn to the scietific establishment in 1972 to confirm
the inherent legitimacy of this program by getting at the "real facts"
about safety.
The product was the famous Rasmussen report on the probability of
nuclear accidents. when it was released in 1975, it was heralded by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as the definitive study demonstrating
the safety of nuclear power. Government spokesmen were careful to point
out that Professor Rasmussen was from M.I.T. and had the help of 60 ex^
perts ; that the report cost $3.000.000 , and amounted to 14 volumes full
of scientific calculations that demonstrated that the chance of a reactor
accident killing 70 people was a million to one (per year, per reactor).
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and an accident causing 2,300 deaths had a one-in-a-billion chance of
occuring. Altogether an impressive display of scientific expertise, and
no doubt it contributed to the efforts to allay public fears. It probably
matters little that the report suffered from so many oversimplifications
and gross methodological problems that after many years it was even
questioned by the Department of Energy; for it is probable that much of
its purpose at the time was simply symbolic—an effort to invoke the
authority of science to calm the public and legitimize the long standing
? 7government support for nuclear power.
Of course, whether or not the Rasmussen study was intentionally
conceived of and used by policymakers in such a cynical way is difficult,
if not impossible, to prove conclisively
. But there is some additional
evidence that policy studies in the area of nuclear energy have been pur-
posely used for these purely legitimizing purposes. This stronger evi-
dence comes from investigative work done by David Burnham, a reporter for
the New York Times. In 1974, Burnham discovered that between 1963 and
1973 the Atomic Energy Commission engaged in a deliberate policy of sup-
pressing research studies "that found reactors more dangerous than
28
officially acknowledged.' A typical incident involved a study done by
the agencies own scientists on the proper location of reactors in relation
to population centers. This reactor siting study revealed among other
things that an accident at a nuclear site could potentially kill over
45,000 people and devastate an area the size of the state of Pennsylvania.
In a meeting to consider this report, that was attended by representatives
from six major private utility companies, it was decided to not make the
report public because of "potentially adverse reaction on the part of the
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29public." This pattern of suppression was continued in the recent case
of Dr. Thomas F. Mancuso, whose work exposing the dangers of low-level
radiation on nuclear plant workers led to his government research con-
30tract being cancelled.
In these cases, it is clear that nuclear power policy studies were
not simply seen as ways of gathering relevant knowledge about the prob-
lems surrounding nuclear power; but rather, they were seen by at least
some policy makers as a way of manufacturing support for this contro-
versial program. As Burnham concluded, "Over and over again, the internal
memos of the AEC officials indicate that they were apparently more con-
cerned about the possible public relations impact of safety studies than
the actual safety of reactors.""^"'-
How Fact-Fetishism Can Support Special /Interests
The suppression of factual evidence discussed above is best under-
stood as an abuse of public policy analysis. But it is important to note
that even where no such abuses occur, the tendency toward fact-fetishism
can still lead to distorted understandings of policy issues, understand-
ings which can aid various special interests. I want to suggest that the
very form of political debate encouraged by fact-oriented policy studies
can work to the advantages of particular sides in policy disputes. As I
pointed out earlier, the tendency in this style of analysis is to see
policy problems as technical problems which can be resolved by adequate
empirical knowledge—and it is this kind of perspective which can work to
advantage of special interests. In the debate over nuclear power, for
instance, this kind of perspective has created a "home court advantage"
for its supporters. For until relatively recently, the major questions
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surrounding nuclear power were seen as ones that could be answered by
empirical studies: What is the probability of an accident? Can safety
mechanisms contain such accidents? Are there real dangers posed by
low-level radiation? How can we safely store nuclear wastes? This
view was to the advantage of supporters in one sense because they were
in a much better position to fund research that would support their
position. Research is an expensive proposition, and the government and
the nuclear industry clearly had more funds available than those who
oppose nuclear power. And further, most of the "experts", in the area
of nuclear power are either directly or indirectly dependent on the
federal government or the nuclear industry for their livelihood.
But secondly, and more importantly, the emphasis on empirical
issues meant that many of the most powerful arguments raised by anti-
nuclear forces were relegated to a secondary status. The debate focused
on studies like the Rasmussen report, with disputes over the accuracy of
the methodology, and so forth. But many of the basic points of the anti-
nuclear position were not technical points at all, but moral and political
points. Take, for example, the apparently technical issue of risks.
Many opponents argued that the central questions concerning risks were not
simply a matter of how safe nuclear power is, but how safe is safe enough—
what is an acceptable or desirable level of safety. These are clearly
moral, value-laden questions. Amory Lovins has long argued that "whether
nuclear power should be rejected is a question not of facts but of values.
Facts (to the limited extent that they can be disentangled from values)
are relevant but not dispositive."^^ Opponents also emphasized that there
are serious political questions at the heart of the risk issue—in
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particular, the issue of who has the right to determine what an accept-
able level of risk actually was. They questioned whether private utili-
ties, who stood to profit handsomely from building nuclear plans had the
right to accept risks for the public. They also questioned whether
government institutions like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, whose
existence and growth were directly dependent on the continuation of the
nuclear power program, could be trusted to make these decisions in an
unbiased fashion.
However, advocates of nuclear power have been able to take the
high (scientific) ground in this debate, and convince policymakers that
these kinds of moral and political issues were spurious and irrelevant
—
the product of "political zealots" and "ecology freaks"—and only inter-
fered with a serious and rational approach to the technical problems of
nuclear power. As Dr. Ralph Lapp, a nuclear consultant, testified before
Congress," . . . opponents of nuclear power have converted a straight-
forward technical problem into a politicized and emotional issue. "^-^ The
end result of this tactic was, as I.C. Bupp has pointed out, that "by the
early seventies the general tendency among the Western world's business
and government establishments was to accept the judgment of nuclear
advocates that doubts about nuclear safety were confined to a comparative
handful of noisy and misguided people."
A Technocratic Ethos
Thus a scientific approach to policy issues is not always as
politically neutral as might first appear. Ironically, the effort to
remain "objective" by simply focusing on "the facts" may actually serve
certain political purposes and interests. Leon Lindberg identifies
this kind of approach to policy analysis as part of a "technocratic
ethos: which has come to play a large role in contemporary American
politics. His description of this ethos serves as a good summary of
the points made in this chapter:
The technocratic "ethos" assumes the desirability of separating
scientific questions from political and social value questions,
and assumes further that the scientific and technical questions
are more decisive and that they can be resolved on scientific
grounds apart from ethical considerations, and finally by per-
petuating the notion that scientific expertise is the main
requirement for making reasoned choices among technological
alternatives, restricts participation in such decisions and frus-
trates democratic control of technology. Established interests
and long-standing alliances among government bureaucrats,
industry technocrats and managers, and their legislative patrons
are the usual beneficiaries . -^5
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CHAPTER IV
POLICY ANALYSIS: THE USES OF COMPLEXITY
The basic Issues in energy strategy, far from being too complex
and technical for ordinary people to understand, are on the
contrary too simple and political for experts to understand.
Amory Lovins
Soft Energy Paths
This chapter deals with another major variation of the depolitici-
zation theme introduced in the last chapter. Here, I will examine the
tendency to see public policy problems as primarily problems of social
complexity—a function of the increasingly intricate and complicated
industrial world we live in. Again the emphasis shifts toward technical
solutions, in this case the construction of better policy analysis
models which can untangle the complexity which seems to be frustrating
our attempts to solve our social problems. As before, I will argue that
this analytical tendency in policy analysis can have a dysfunctional
effect on our understanding of the nature of our persistent socio-econo-
mic problems; in particular, it inhibits us from appreciating the
political nature of these difficulties and the political obstacles that
often prevent effective policy action.
Policy Failures and Modeling
Throughout the 1970' s and 80' s, the federal government has been
frustrated in its attempt to solve many of our most important policy
problems, including poverty, energy, inflation, and others. The
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persistence of such problems has led some to despair over the ability
of governments to actually solve problems in advanced industrial socie-
ties. President Carter stated in his 1978 State of the Union Address
that "government cannot solve all our problems, set our goals, or define
our vision. Government cannot eliminate poverty, provide a bountiful
economy, reduce inflation, save our cities, cure illiteracy, provide
energy, or mandate goodness
. Some, including many policy analysts,
have attributed the government's inability to solve our pressing social
problems to the sheer, confusing complexity of modern society. Indus-
trial societies have simply grown to large and complex to be managed in
a straightforward manner. But far from being discouraged about this
state of affairs, many policy analysts are optimistic; they see their
expertise and analytic techniques as the way out of this problem. One
of our more prominent policy analysts, Jay W. Forrester summarizes this
view in the following way:
Whether viewed from Capital Hill, Wall Street, or Middle America,
the list of serious national problems is lengthening. Such
problems include inflation, unemployment, recession, resource
scarcity, environmental damage, instability of governments, decay
in American cities, increasing food prices, and the shifting bal-
ance of international power from resource-consuming nations to
resource-producing nations. The persistence of serious national
problems has engendered widespread public dissatisfaction with the
nations 's ability to find and apply effective solutions to major
difficulties. As the nation increases in complexity beyond the
capacity of conventional social management, new tools are needed
to aid in understanding socio-economic behavior and designing more
enduring public policies .
2
This perspective on our policy problems is common of many analysts
today, especially those who specialize in one of the most sophisticated
forms of public policy analysis, advanced computer modeling. In many
ways, this is the most prestigious form of policy analysis, and those
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analysts who are at the top of this field—Forrester of MIT, Lawrence
Klein of Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Michael Evans
formerly of Chase Econometrics—are often consulted by government agen-
cies and private business, and appear as star witnesses before congres-
sional committees. The rising importance of this computer simulation
school of policy analysis is based in large part on the assumption that
in advanced industrial societies, many policy failures flow directly
from our inability to understand how such a complex organization actu-
ally works. As one analyst observed, one of the inherent problems in
our society is that "as the public policy decision-maker begins his
investigation, ... he confronts an extremely complex society, the
complexity of which is intensified by the recognition that multiple
causes and effects tie many branches together in complex social rela-
tionships." Thus, without a proper model of how the various parts of
our vast and intricate socio-economic system interact with one another
the policymaker is lost. He or she is unable to accurately diagnose
the causes of our social problems, or to successfully predict the
intended (and unintended) effects of his or her policy actions. Ana-
lysts like Forrester suggest that it is this inability to accurately
predict policy outcomes which accounts for many of our policy failures,
and produces "the pervasive sense of frustration and failure" felt by
many policymakers. In effect, our policy problems are seen as modelling
problems.
Obviously, this view of policy serves to justify the increased
role of analysts and their computer simulations in the policymaking
process. Forrester goes as far as to argue that these new tools must
68
replace our common modes of political thought which cannot hope to deal
with the complexity we face in modern societies. Politicians have
always had social, economic, and political theories to explain society
and guide their policy decisions, but to the analyst these are only
"intuitive" theories—and intuition, like spontaneity, is not a charac-
teristic that is looked upon with favor by rational analysts. It is
thought that the kind of intuitive theories bandied about by politicians,
the press, and the public are simply to crude to be of much use, and can
actually do more harm than good. They have the disadvantage of being
based upon "personal experience," the kind of experience that has little
utility in a complex social system which exhibits what Forrester calls
"devious," "diabolic," and "counter-intuitive" behavior. As he explains:
The intuitive process will select the wrong policy solution much
more often than not. A complex system behaves in many ways quite
the opposite of the simple systems from which we have gained our
experience . . . Intuition and judgment, generated by a life-
time of experience with the simple systems that surround one's
everyday actions create a network of expectations and perceptions
that could hardly be better designed to mislead the unwary when
he moves into the realm of complex systems . . . Complex systems
are counter-intuitive. That is, they give indications that suggest
corrective action which will often be ineffective or even adverse
in its results. Very often one finds that the policies that have
been adopted for correcting a difficulty are actually intensifying
it rather than producing a solution.^
As an example of this problem, Forrester points out that while
"humanitarian interests and short term political pressures" may promote
an urban renewal policy which includes new, low-income housing to re-
place the burnt out slums in central city areas, such an "intuitively
sensible policy can affect adversely the very problems it is designed
to alleviate." His analysis of such a policy, using a sophisticated
computer simulation, indicated that increases in low-income housing
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would only have the effect of attracting more low-income people to
urban areas, which would in turn decrease the already weaken tax-base,
and take up valuable land that could be used for new industry.^ Such
arguments serve as good analytical ammunition against "bleeding-heart
liberals," whose programs may be well intentioned, but only create more
problems than they solve.
To replace this faulty "intuitive" approach to policy, policy
analysts offer formal mathematical models. And it would not be an
exaggeration to say that the construction and use of these kinds of
models occupy a large part of many analysts' time. They come in a
dizzying variety—ranging from simple supply and demand graphs and
basic queing models to more sophisticated Markov models and computer
simulations. Analysts are quite willing to admit that good policy
models do not have to be mathematical, they can be conceptual as well;
but in practice, few analysts use conceptual models extensively. As
Stokey and Zeckhauser have pointed out, "in fact, what many analysts
mean when they speak of models are the formal mathematical models that
describe implicitly the quantitative changes in a particular variable
or system in response to various stimuli."^ Given the analysts' attrac-
tion to scientific rationality, the preference for this kind of model
is not difficult to understand. Mathematics allows the analyst to
transcend the sloppy and imprecise conceptiial thinking that is typical
of ordinary political discourse. Numbers offer the most precise way to
measure the variables being considered, and more importantly, equations
are the best way to represent the "cause and effect relationships essen-
Q
tial to the problem being studied." These law-like, causal relationships
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are crucial, because once we are able to discover and model the socio-
economic laws of behavior that govern the policy area we are interested
in, then we are able to successfully identify the key variables to mani-
pulate and to predict the exact outcome of various policy options.
In many ways, modeling is the epitome of the notion of scientific
rationality that animates public policy analysis. It focuses on ideas
of "cause and effect" and "prediction"~the very stuff of the natural
sciences. And computer models even allow the analyst to conduct complex
"experiments" by allowing various policy options to be first tested in
these simulation to see what their effect on the socio-economic system
would be. It is in modeling that policy analysis comes the closest to
being a real social science—a science cast in the image of the natural
sciences. And as Brian Fay has pointed out, much of the optimism that
accompanies policy analysis is rooted in the belief that once it achieves
the level of a science, it will become a major factor in our attempt to
overcome our many social problems.
(I)t is claimed, that just as the natural sciences have provided
men with a certain kind of knowledge by which they can control
their natural environment, thereby making it more hospitable and
productive, so also the knowledge gained from social science will
enable men to control their social environment, thereby making it
more harmonious and congrument with the needs and wants of its
members .
9
Policy Failures; Complexity or Politics?
There are many problems in this modeling vision of policy analysis,
both in theory and practice, and we will be considering several of them
in the following chapters. For now, let us concentrate on the over-
complexity argument which underlies this approach, and seek to ascertain
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its accuracy and political implications. Is our society a highly
complex one? In some sense this is obviously true. But the key
question is not whether our society is a highly complex one, but
whether, as Forrester and others suggest, that it is this complexity
that accounts for much of our inability to solve our social problems.
Or are there other factors which better explain the persistence of
these problems. To begin to answer these questions, let us consider
several problematic areas in our national energy policy.
Energy is surely one of the most complex policy areas facing us
today, and virtually all observers of this area agree that in the 1970s,
the U.S. failed to develop an effective and comprehensive policy pro-
gram to deal with these problems. Some of the policy analysis in this
area has assumed that these two facts are closely related; that one
can put the blame for our energy policy failures in large part on our
inability to develop a coherent and comprehensive analysis of our
complex energy supply and demand system. One massive (800 page) study
done by Resources for the Future for the federal government expressed
this view in a typical fashion, frequently attributing policy problems
to "knowledge gaps" and "disabling limitations in our data.""*"^ Particu-
lar emphasis was put on the importance of developing more adequate
models of the national and international energy system.
National energy policies and governmental energy programs
have always been dependent upon, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, models of the energy system and projections or
forcasts of future events. Historically, the energy models
employed have frequently been judgmental or non-quantitative
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in form .... Despite the large and expanding effort and
the availability of more data and increasingly sophisticated
hardware to manipulate it, we still continue to fall short of
achieving a satisfactory capability to analyze consequences
or impacts of alternative policies on the various parts of
the energy system or to project with an acceptable degree of
reliability what will happen in the future under various as-
sumed conditions. 11
We find a similar argument made by Herbert Simon:
The number of important variables involved in the energy
picture is so large, and the interconnections among variables
so intricate, that common sense and everyday reasoning no
longer provide adequate guides to energy policies—if, indeed,
they ever did .... Hence, the most important organizational
requirement for handling energy policy in an intelligent way is
the creation of one or more models—either of an optimizing or
simulation type— to provide coherence to the decision-making
process
.
But while we can always use more data and better models, the
question is to what extent the lack of such things has prevented the
generation of an effective energy policy. Clearly it has not prevented
the formulation of a comprehensive energy plan—many individuals and
groups, left, right and middle, have produced well-researched national
energy plans. And many of these groups have pointed out that our in-
ability to deal with our energy problems is not so much an analytic
failure, but a political failure— the inability to pass and implement
an effective policy. Indeed, in a rare instance of agreement between
the left and the right, both Barry Commoner and Mobil Oil Company have
asserted that much of our energy problem is political in nature. They
diverge, of course, on the specifics. Commoner and other environ-
mentalist have argued that the main political obstacle to a rational
energy policy has been the power of special interests like the oil
73
companies who have been able to block or gut energy legislation which
has not been in their interests. On the other hand, Mobil Oil Company
has argued that "the energy crisis is in large measure a political
crisis"^'^ due to over-regulation by the government and unrealistic
environmental standards. Despite these differences, the point here is
clear: the explanation for the persistence of our energy problems lies
not so much in the areas of models, but in the area of some old and
intuitive concepts like "interests" and "power." This is an important
point, so let us consider an even more specific example from this
problematic policy area— the deregulation of natural gas.
The Gas Deregulation Controversy
Natural gas was one of the most difficult and frustrating areas
of energy policy during the 1970 's. The primary issue in the prolonged
and intense debate was the desirability of deregulating the well-head
price of natural gas. Specifically, there was disagreement over whether
low gas prices would cause a shortage of natural gas, and whether allow-
ing the price to rise would produce more gas for the market— in short,
the debate was over the elasticity of gas production. On one side were
organizations like the American Gas Association which argued that the
artificially low prices set for interstate gas by the Federal Power
Commission had distorted the market for natural gas."'"^ It was contended
that the regulated prices had not only made gas appear cheaper than it
really was, thus stimulating an artifically high demand, but that those
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low prices also made it unprofitable to drill for more natural gas-
gas that is located in increasingly remote and more expensive areas.
Thus regulation was directly blamed for the natural gas shortages that
affected the country during the late 1970 's. In support of this argu-
ment, some gas policy analysts produced models which showed that higher
gas prices would make more gas available. For example, one study in-
dicated that an increase in the price of natural gas from $1.75 to
$2.50 per million cubic feet Oncf) would increase U.S. recoverable
reserves by approximately 20%.^^
On the other side of this debate were public interest groups and
certain government agencies which maintained that deregulation would
only produce higher prices and higher industry profits and not signifi-
cantly more natural gas. The General Accounting Office, for instance,
produced an analysis which indicated that few additional reserves would
likely be discovered at prices above $1.75 per mcf.-'-^ They argued that
gas supply was not very responsive to price. It is evident then, that
it could be argued that this deregulation problem was actually a model-
ing problem— that if we could only ascertain which model of elasticity
was most accurate, then the issue could be resolved in a rational
fashion. For example, one of the main differences in these elasticity
models concerns different assumptions about the extent of natural gas
reserves and the accessibility of those reserves. Relatively scarce
reserves that are not readily accessible means higher development and
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production costs for the gas companies and that means that higher prices
would be required to produce higher production. Thus it would be very
helpful to be able to establish the exact extent and nature of domestic
gas reserves. Unfortunately, however, because of many uncertainties,
the exact nature of natural gas reserves is very difficult to ascertain
precisely. Reputable geologists have been known to make estimates of
natural gas reserves which differ by an order of magnitude of five.-*-^
Thus, depending on whether one uses reputable optimistic numbers or
reputable pessimistic numbers, one can produce a reputable analysis sup-
porting either side of this debate.
Perhaps more accurate estimates of gas reserves can be developed
—
perhaps not. But what all of this focus on modeling questions obscures
is the great possibility that all of this disagreement over models was
simply a surrogate for a much more basic political conflict between the
parties involved. The real issue may not have been the accuracy of the
competing models, but a matter of justice and equality. As one com-
mentator concluded, the main problem with passing natural gas legislation
in the 1970 's was that it was an "overwhelmingly difficult political
issue, involving an objective conflict of interest among several groups
and several regions, very high financial stakes—perhaps as high as
$400 billion—and correspondingly high passions. "^O xhe heart of the
issue was the enormous amount of wealth that would be transferred to
gas producing companies by virtue of deregulation. Many consumers saw
this as a massive "rip-off," while gas producers simply saw it as good
business practice. In the light of this economic and political conflict,
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the issue of the exact degree of price elasticity was actually a
secondary concern for many. As I.C. Bupp and Frank Schuller observed
in the Harvard Business School Energy Study," as far as independent
(gas producers) are concerned, alternative estimates of price and
supply are beside the point. The point is that big risks should mean
big rewards. So any public policy that tries to moderate such rewards
in the interests of other objectives is unjust. "21 xhe issue was finally
resolved (at least temporarily) in October of 1978 with the passage of
the Natural Gas Policy Act which provides for the increased deregula-
tion of the price of gas—a testimony more to the power of the natural
gas lobby than to the accuracy of their models, for deregulation has
yet to produce any of the substantial increases in supply that were
predicted.
Now all of this is not to say that insufficient models are not
sometimes a problem in policymaking. There are many obstacles to
effective policies, and poor models is one of them. But this explana-
tion of our policy failures only distracts from an understanding of the
primary reason why problems like energy, urban decay, environmental
decay, poverty continue to persist
—
politics . These problems persist
not because they are beyond our intellectual capacities, but because
most real solutions involve some redistribution of wealth, income, and
services in society, and many of the groups that would be hurt are
powerful enough to block or sidetrack those policy measures which would
harm their interests. Entrenched political interests—not complexity
—
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is at the heart of the policy paralysis which is typical in so many
policy areas. In his study of our failed economic policies, MIT econo-
mist Lester C. Thurow has reached a conclusion very similar to this: "Our
economic problems are solvable. For most of our problems, there are
several solutions. But all of these solutions have the characteristic
that someone must suffere large economic losses. No one wants to volun-
teer for this role, and we have a political process incapable of forcing
anyone to shoulder this burden. "^^ Failure to appreciate this truth
that politics may be the central cause of our policy failures—can only
make it more difficult to solve these problems.
Depoliticizing Policy
As Richard Nelson has noted, this tendency to underplay the politi-
cal dimensions of policy problems is part of the intellectual tradition
of policy analysis:
All the traditions (of policy analysis) possess an enormous
amount of confidence that it is possible to find technically
correct answers to important policy problems; they play down
or ignore that many problems may be largely political, in-
volving real conflicts of interests that cannot be dissolved
by sweet rationalism.'^-'
Policy analysts are certainly not unaware of the existence of these
kinds of political obstacles. If quizzed, few would seriously maintain
that all one needs to create an effective public policy is an accurate
model. But there seems to be a discrepency between the analyst's personal
level of political awareness and the awareness embodied in their analytical
frameworks and policy studies themselves. On one level, analysts are
aware of the centrality of political obstacles, but there seems to little
place for this awareness in their work. A study done on national energy
policy by MIT made this schizophrenia clear when it stated that "Behind
every energy bottleneck and every future decision stand serious societal
issues: nuclear power safety, environmental protection and many others.
Such issues, though both appropriate and important to the debate now in
progress throughout the nation, are beyond the scope of this report. "^^
It seems that though policy analysts themselves are not politically naive,
many of their studies are.
The inclination to see the persistence of our social problems as
a function of complexity and insufficient analytic techniques is part
of the general tendency to depoliticize policy problems that is charac-
teristic of policy analysis. As we saw earlier, this tendency is
partially self-serving in that it makes activities like modelling appear
to be more relevant and central to policymaking. But it is also im-
portant to see that this tendency is also strongly rooted in the con-
ception of politics that underlies much of policy analysis. For many
analysts, politics as it is usually practiced is seen as irrational
and corrupt. Policy decisions are often made on the basis of petty
personality conflicts, or on the undue influence of selfish special
interest groups. The idea of the most rational policy seems to get
lost among all of the influence-peddling, back-stabbing, pork-barreling,
and log-rolling that is typical in government. In this sense, most
analysts tend to implicitly adopt a reason/politics split; a belief
that rational analysis is a separate and superior way to approach
political decisions. Sometimes this belief becomes the hope that
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rational analysis will eventually replace politics as the guiding
force in policy making, a hope that was best expressed by John Maynard
Deynes when he said, "The ideas of economists and political philoso-
phers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more
powerful than commonly understood ... I am sure that the power of
vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual en-
croachment of ideas. "^^
Importantly, there is little conception of a legitimate clash
of interests, of valid political conflict, in this view of politics.
There is little sense that these conflicts can be rational, or that
these conflicts may be the inevitable result of the pursuit of freedom
and justice in a given society. Instead, conflicts are seen as
basically irrational; it is believed that "conflict is a corrolary of
ignorance, therefore the application of knowledge will reduce con-
flict. "^^ For example, it is sometimes asserted that the better pre-
dictions produced by mathematical models will lead to the resolution
of most political disagreements. As Stokey and Zeckhauser have argued,
"policy disagreements would lessen—and perhaps vanish—if we could
predict with certainty the safety consequences of the breeder reactor,
or the costs of annual upkeep of clay courts, or whether a special
shuttle bus for the elderly would be heavily used. "27 of course, the
problem with such an optimistic view is that most policy disagreements
are not merely a function of differing predictions, but a matter of
diverging values and interests. Indeed, differences in predictions are
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often a function of differing value orientations. As we saw earlier,
in the conflict of natural gas pricing, differences in models pre-
dictions sometimes only function as a surrogate battleground for
political groups divided by more basic political and philosophical
differences. In these situations, predictive models do not transcend
politics, but tend to become a part of politics. In most controversies,
models function less as objective arbitrators and more as ventrilo-
quists' dummies which spout out the predictions desired by the group
using the model. This need not imply any corruption on the part of
the model managers, but simply reflects the fact that there is often a
very wide range of reasonable assumptions that a model manager can
choose from in constructing his or her model. And it is unsurprising
that analysts for a consumer lobby that is opposed to deregulation of
gas would build a model incorporating the more pessimistic assumptions
relating to price elasticity, while the models produced by gas company
analysis would favor the more optimistic assumptions.
Complexity as a Political Issue
In one sense, the question of whether the persistence of policy
problems is more a function of complexity or political factors is a
very misleading one; it implicitly accepts a distinction between
political issues and issues of complexity. But this distinction is an
artificial one which only obscures the fact that complexity itself can
be thought of as a political issue. Thus even if we grant that the
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over-complexity of modem societies is a major contribution to
policy failures, we need not accept the depoliticizing connotations
that accompany this assertion. It can be argued, for instance, that
the very fact that analysts tend to accept this complexity and only
strive to work within it is itself a political position. For there
are those who oppose accepting the complexities of modern industrial
society and would argue for a more simple and rational form of socio-
economic organization. For example, many of those in the back-to-the
land movement, and other counter-cultural movements of the last decades
have argued that large-scale, complex industrial societies are in-
herently alienating and prone to a whole host of social and environ-
mental problems. In a sense, they agree with policy analysts about
the reasons for the persistence of many policy problems, but they dis-
agree about the solutions. Instead of creating a corps of policy
analysts to "manage" that complexity, they would seek a simpler society
where analysts were not needed.
Marxists economists have also argued that the over-complexity
28
of capitalist economies is primarily a political issue. They argue
that many of the complex dysfunctions afflicting the U.S. economy
—
like the recurring cycles of inflation and unemployment—are due to
the anarchistic and irrational structure built into a capitalist
economic system. In their view, our failure to solve our persistent
economic problems is due to our political commitment to maintaining a
capitalist economy. This commitment prevents the government from
attacking these structural problems directly, and forces the
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government to turn to a series of indirect and complex "fine tuning"
policies which at best can only minimize these economic dysfunctions.
For a Marxist economist then, the role of the analyst in a capitalist
society is a very political one; their job is to manage and thus
legitimize a basically irrational economic system. For example, con-
sider the problem of inflation. This has surely been one of the most
frustrating and complex policy issues to face policy analysts, and
much effort has been applied to producing explanations and models of
inflation that would allow us to bring it under control. Many
elaborate and complicated policies have been devised and employed, in-
cluding efforts to raise interest rates, slow deficit spending,
encourage saving by consumers, and so on. As many of these policies
have failed, analysts have gone back, to the analytic drawing board
to devise even more intricate ways to exert some control over prices.
Radical economists are fond of pointing out that many socialist econo-
mies have not been afflicted with the same kind of spiraling inflation
that has plagued capitalist economies—in part because prices are set
and controlled by the government. In keeping with this, some have
suggested that there is one obvious policy that would stop inflation
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dead in its tracks in the United States—wage and price controls.
But they point out that this relatively straight forward approach to
the problem is impeded by its political implications. It is a dis-
concerting move away from the capitalist tradition of letting
corporations and the market set prices. Wage and price controls,
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if utilized over any long period of time, would inevitably disrupt
some of the price signals which govern economic production; and so
if production shortages and other dislocations were to be avoided,
it might require the government to step in and direct production
activities—and this would be a giant step toward the socialism that
many fear. The point here is not so much the desirability or un-
desirability of wage and price controls, but the fact that if analysts
are committed to maintaining control over pricing in the private sector,
and to limiting government policy to complex and indirect maneuverings
,
this is a commitment with political implications.
One need not be a Marxist to see that, for political reasons,
we often make public policies and policy problems much more compli-
cated than need be. For instance, even Herman Daly, who is hardly a
Marxist, has found in his work on population control that while many
policy analysts and policymakers have begun to agree on the importance
of slowing down population growth, there is a very strong tendency
on their part to shy away from any simple and direct policy program
to limit population growth—like Kenneth Boulding's birth license
scheme. Because of the negative moral and political connotations that
surround the notion of population control, policymakers prefer to
indulge in a variety of complex and indirect strategies to discourage
population growth, including modifying the tax laws, restricting
public housing to small families, encouraging celibacy and late
marriage, encouraging tolerance of homosexuality, convincing people
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to spend their money on consumer durables rather than having children,
making it popular to have children only between ages of twenty and
thirty, and so forth. Daly explains nicely how this kind of awkward,
complicated, and indirect approach to public policy can be understood
as a function of the political concerns of the policymaker combined
with the scientistic perspective of the policy analyst.
Whence this enormous preference for indirectness? It re-
sults partly from our unwillingness to really face the
issue. Limiting reproduction is still a taboo subject that
must be approached in contorted and roundabout ways rather
than directly. Furthermore, roundaboutness and indirect-
ness are the bread and butter of empirical social scientists,
who get grants and make their reputations by measuring the
responsiveness of the birth rate to all sorts of remote
"policy variables." The direct approach makes estimation of
all these social parameters governing tenuous chains of cause
and effect quite unnessary.^^
The Political Uses of Complexity
Daly's remarks suggest an important point: that the use of
elaborate modeling is popular not so much because it is effective in
taming the complexity of the modern world, but because it is effective
in depoliticizing policy issues—and this turning of political issues
into technical issues can actually benefit certain interests. As
Daly implies, one of the most obvious examples of this concerns the
policy analysts themselves who have a vested interest in promoting
complex and roundabout policy approaches which will ensure that their
modeling expertise is indispensable. Depoliticizatlon can also
easily serve the interests of policymakers. For instance, when im-
portant policy measures fail, it is much more convenient for
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policymakers to blame this on the sheer complexity of the social
problems and the difficulties involved in analysis, than to admit to
their own political misjudgments or administrative incompetence.
Moreover, the depoliticizing effect of this complexity argument
has also been known to work to the advantage of various special inter-
ests. As David Noble has observed, analytic techniques can often be
used to create or accentuate the complexities surrounding a policy
issue. Tobacco companies are fond of asserting that establishing the
exact causes of cancer is a difficult and complex endeavor—so com-
plex that one cannot indisputably say that smoking causes cancer.
Noble points out that a common tactic used by corporations charged
with harming the environment is to bring a group of analysts to demon-
strate that establishing undeniable connections between industrial
activities and detrimental environmental effects is an extremely com-
plex and debatable task. The intended effect of this is to confuse
and mitigate any responsibility that any particular company might
have. In Noble's view, much of the corporate funded policy research
in the environmental area is "devoted to hiding the real issues of
power and control in a verbal haze of obscurantist prose, driving
home the industries message: Things are much more complicated than we
thought. Thus the spirit of policy analysis fits quite well into
a standard political strategy, one used by corporations and their
environmental opponents as well: if one wants the government to not
act on a certain issue, this can be best assured by demonstrating that
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the issue is much too complex and confusing to act on immediately, and
by insisting that more studies be done—which will hopefully take
several years and end up being inconclusive.
A Depoliticized Culture
Finally, part of the appeal of the complexity argument can be
traced to the peculiar nature of American political culture. The
notion that social problems are matters of complexity that can be
solved by applying the proper "intellectual technology" has an in-
herent appeal to Americans; for as Kenneth Keniston has pointed out,
we like to believe that most of our difficulties are "problems" which
are inherently cognitive in nature. In his words,
Indeed, the very notion that most difficulties in life are
"problems" is one of the central assumptions of the (American)
outlook. We normally assume that the pitfalls along life's
path can best be dealt with by treating them as cognitive
difficulties whose solution involves the application of "know-
how. "^2
In other words, the very fact that we tend to think of our policy
difficulties as "problems" (as opposed to conflicts) implies that like
math problems, these difficulties have an intellectual solution. Thus
public policy analysis can be seen as the formal embodiment of the
American preference to see ourselves as a practical people who are
quite clever in solving problems. Instead of seeing politics as the
arena of clashing interests and ideologies, we would rather have it
reduced to a matter of "problem-solving." This is a more convenient
vision of politics. For to see politics as conflict would logically
87
imply that citizens should actively participate, should take sides,
and should passionately struggle over the policy issues of the day.
But if politics is "problem-solving," then political activity can be
reduced to hiring the best "problem-solvers." Unlike many Europeans,
Americans do not seem to thrive on intense political participation.
For us, the "pursuit of happiness" has traditionally been a private
endeavor; and political activity is often thought of as a burden or an
inconvenience to be avoided if at all possible. (In keeping with this,
policy analysts tend to emphasize the high "costs" of political partici-
pation.) Thus the predominant, middleclass ideal of politics is simply
to hire a government that will solve the problems that are getting in
the way of their individual pursuits, and then leave them alone. In
such a context, the appeal of a perspective which view political issues
as problems due to complexity or lack of information is obvious.
An Old and Continuing Tradition
The zenith of this depoliticized view of politics was probably
during the optimistic years of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.
During this period the "End of Ideology" rhetoric was quite popular
in both political and academic circles. America was thought to no
longer have political or ideological problems, only technical ones.
As Kennedy himself argued in 1962:
What is at stake in our economic decisions today is not
some grand warfare of rival ideologies which will sweep the
country to passion, but the practical management of a modern
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economy. What we need are not labels and cliches, but
more basic discussions of the sophisticated and technical
questions involved in keeping a great economic machinery
moving ahead.-'-'
In keeping with his views, Kennedy surrounded himself with what David
Halberstam called "the best and the brightest." Men like Robert
MacNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt Hostow; "the new breed of thinker-
doers, half of academe, half of the nation's think tanks and of policy
planning;
. . .
men of applied intelligence who would not land us in
trouble by passion and emotion. "^^ In many ways, policy analysis is
the institutionalized legacy of these intellectuals, particularly
McNamara who was the first high level champion of systems analysis
and cost-effectiveness in government.
The naive kind of optimism that accompanied policy analysis in
its early days has long since waned. In part this was due to the
disturbing role that policy analysis and systems analysis had in the
Vietnam War. In many ways, it was the first systems analysis war.
The war was seen by some as being primarily an exercise in technical
expertise, and volumes and volumes of statistics were gathered to
measure its progress and effectiveness. This view reinforced the
belief that Vietnam was primarily a military struggle; one that could
be won with more troops and more bombs. And the data— the body
counts—always seemed to indicate that we were winning. But all of
this only obscured the fact that Vietnam was primarily a political
struggle. Unable to see this, the United States continually under-
estimated the determination and strength of the Vietcong and
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and North Vietnamese. There were, of course, those in the govern-
ment who suspected this kind of mistake, but often it was only expressed
as a kind of intuition, a notion that is rarely taken very seriously by
some in the analytic community. As Halberstam pointed out:
When the doubters about Vietnam began to express themselves,
they at first tended to be people who did not talk (McNamara's)
language
. . .
They did not think in terms of statistics or
rationalizing systems, and they did not support their judg-
ments with facts as he knew them, but rather by saying that it
did not smell right, or that it just did not feel right; he
would trust his facts and statistics and instincts against
theirs just as he had before at Ford when confronted by the
businessmen who had doubted his facts and charts. 35
The mixed successes and alleged failures of urban renewal and
other "Great Society" policy programs of the 1960s also added to the
disillusionment about the effectiveness of policy analysis, and our
ability to solve our social problems through "intellectual technol-
ogy.""^^ This disillusionment, however, has not signaled the dis-
appearance of this kind of technocratic approach from policy analysis
or the political sphere. In part, this is because the purpose of
this technocratic approach has not simply been to solve social problems,
but also to give the impression that these problems are merely tech-
nical ones and not basic political divisions which reflect deep-seated
conflicts of interest in our society. Thus technocratic analysis has
failed only in one sense—not ridding society of its pressing problems
—
but has been relatively more successful in fulfilling its political
purposes. As we have seen, policy analysis can be helpful in depoliti-
cizing policy issues. And this kind of depolitization not only serves
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various interests, it also fits in well with the subcurrent of de-
politicization that runs throughout our political culture. For these
reasons, despite the fact that many analysts and policymakers are
now more "realistic" about the effectiveness of public policy analysis,
this does not necessarily mean that the tendency to see policy problems
as problems of complexity is likely to disappear.
Furthermore, if there is a persistent failure to recognize that
policy problems are in many cases essentially political in nature, then
policy analysts may find themselves in undesirable political positions.
At best it means that policy analysts and their studies will often wind
up being largely irrelevant to the resolution of these problems, and
at worst it means that analysts could simply become unwitting partici-
pants in the political struggles surrounding public policies, with
their studies being used for unforeseen political purposes. It is
worth our while then to seek a way out of this technocratic perspective.
At a minimum, this would require a conceptual move beyond the rational-
ity/politics dichotomy that lies at the heart of this perspective. It
requires, for instance, that analysts become more sensitive to the
political implications of their supposedly neutral scientific ration-
ality. In part, these first chapters are a step in that direction.
But analysts must also begin to make a more serious attempt to address
the normative and political issues involved in policy decisions. Just
how that can be done will be the subject of Chapter IX.
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CHAPTER V
POLICY ANALYSIS AS PREDICTION
The success of mathematical physics led to the social
scientists to be jealous of its power without quite under-
standing the intellectual attitudes that had contributed to
this power. The use of mathematical formulae had accompanied
the development of the natural sciences and become the mode
in the social sciences. Just as primitive peoples adopt the
Western modes of denationalized clothing and of parliamentarism
out of a vague feeling that these magic rites and vestments will
at once put them abreast of modern culture and technique, so
the economists have developed the habit of dressing up their
rather imprecise ideas in the language of the infinitesimal
calculus ... To assign what purports to be precise values
to such essentially vague quantities is neither useful nor
honest, and any pretense of applying precise formulae to these
loosely defined quantities is a sham and a waste of time.
Norbert Wiener
in God and Golem
Econometric models have been helpful, indeed necessary, tools in
the design of macro-economic policy in the United States for many years
now. The interrelated problems of inflation, money supply, growth,
recession, etc., are simply too vast and complicated to deal with with-
out models to help us predict the consequences—both intended and
unintended—of various economic policy options. As Jay W. Forrester
argues, if models can be developed to dependably represent and predict
the cause and effect relationships that characterize our socio-economic
world, they would be tremendous aids in almost every area of policy-
making . ^
Nevertheless, there is one important question that must be
examined in detail: just how reliable are these sophisticated
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mathematical models? In this chapter we shall examine not how
modelling can be a depoliticisizing distraction, but some of the
internal limitations that affect these modelling efforts. While analysts
and policymakers have come to rely increasingly on such models to guide
crucial policy decisions, there are real questions emerging as to their
accuracy and reliability. On the one hand, there are some modellers
who are typically quite enthusiastic about the relevance and reliability
2
of these models. But there are also those who have begun to seriously
question dependence on these elaborate constructs. Nowhere is the
disillusionment about the reliability of these complex models more
evident than in the area of econometric modelling. These models were
once thought to be the prototype for all policy models, but in the 1970 'i
there had been increasing concern over their adequacy. Fully 75% of the
college economics professors polled in a recent survey said that they
have "increasing doubts about the accuracy of macro-economic models."-^
These doubts have been founded on the very real failures of these models
for example, the failure of econometric models to predict or to even
explain the kinds of inflation and stagflation that have afflicted the
economy during the last decade. One economist summed up the situation
in this way:
The influence of economists has never been greater . . .
yet the public esteem of economists has never been
lower . . . Economic forecasting has become a multi-
million dollar business . . . Yet the economy is widely
perceived as out of control with the economists having
little of value to contribute . . . mathematical models
and their empirical analogue—econometric models—have
now become the standard tools of economics . . . Econo-
metric models proved not up to the task.
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Another policy area in which the adequacy of current models
has come into question is that of energy policy. In a recent study
of leading energy system models done by Sergio Koreisha and Robert
Stobaugh, it is not only concluded that "a models prediction may be
quite imprecise and therefore not particularly useful for policymakers,"
but it was also found that many energy models actually helped to distort
our view of our energy problems.^ As a specific example, they point out
that many of these models only fed the illusion that our energy problems
were not serious.
The major studies since 1973 have given us predictions about
the U. S. energy situation that have been consistently more
optimistic than the reality proved to be, especially in regard
to energy supplies. Some of these models were published with-
out receiving much notice and had virtually no lasting impact.
Nevertheless, it seems abundantly clear that some of the
optimistic forecasts issued did influence—and mislead—both
the energy policymakers and the informed public about the
causes and possible solutions for the energy problem.^
These generally recognized failures in the area of policy modelling
have raised the question of whether and how these models can be improved
and made a more reliable guide for policymaking. But this potential for
improvement depends greatly, of course, on the nature and source of these
current failures. Are these failures due to unique technical problems
located in particular models, or are these failures caused by a more basic
philosophical shortcoming in the nature of these models which limits their
predictive abilities? Let us consider each of these explanations in turn,
for each gives us a quite different understanding of the possibilities
inherent in these models.
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Modelling Failures: A Technical Explanation
Technical explanations of model failures are those which focus
primarily on the technical aspects of the models themselves, and in
general attempt to lay the blame for predictive failures on the fact
that current models are too simple to adequately predict the complex
workings of our energy system or economic system. In order to construct
a workable model, all 'model builders must make a number of simplifying
assumptions which can lead to some inaccuracies. For example. The
Kennedy-Houthakker World Oil Model incorporated the assumption that
rising oil prices would lead Industry and utilities to switch to coal.^
They based this assumption of the fact in the past price differences
had led these institutions to switch from coal to oil. However, it
turned out that while it is easy to convert coal handling equipment into
oil burners, it is much more difficult to convert equipment originally
designed to be fueled by oil into coal burners. One problem is that oil
burners typically have much smaller fire-boxes than coal burners, and
thus can only be converted to coal at the lost of substantial capacity.
As the result of such oversights, the models prediction of the conversion
rate was much too optimistic.
In the area of econometric modelling, there have been many attempts
to explain the Inadequacy of these models in terms of their failure to
incorporate some important characteristics of the economic system. One
common argument has been that models have been based on Keyneslan
assumptions which have ignored the supply side of the economy, and focused
Q
too much on controlling the economy through regulation of demand.
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Others have argued that an equilibrivim model of the economy is over-
simplified and inaccurate; that models must begin to assume that
disequilibrium is the prevailing condition of a capitalist economic
9
system. The details of these arguments are not as important as their
general thrust: that problems with, current models are primarily technical
in nature and can be overcome by making them more complex and more
accurate representations of the system under consideration.
There is certainly some truth in this perspective—there is room
for the technical improvement of policy models. But some critics of
policy analysis have argued that these models will always suffer from
problems of oversimplification. As Martin Rein has observed:
While simplified models of economic and social reality can
be developed, based upon stylized facts and heroic assumptions,
none of the insights derived from these exercises provides
secure basis for the design of social policies . . . There are
too many variables and we seem to be unable to isolate a few
crucial imputs. Moreover, there is an inherent paucity of
reliable information about these variables.-'-^
This point is reiterated by Ida Hoos:
. . .
complete models [may be possible] in designing missiles
and rockets but not in the realm of social affairs where the
multiplicity of unqualifiable, if not unidentifiable, variables
make prediction at best a statistical exercise . . . This often
leads to oversimplications
,
neglect of vital facts, and inap-
propriate or unwarrented recommendations and conclusions
.
These critics and others contend that social systems are simply
12
too vast and "essentially complex" to be captured accurately in models.
Accurate predictions are possible in the physical sciences because we
can reduce the number of important variables to a manageable few. But
this is not possible in society, where there are too many variables, too
many bits of information that we would need to collect to produce accurate
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social predictions. One critic, Amory Lovins, takes this point to its
logical extreme by arguing that even if we were able to somehow
reproduce the essential complexity of socio-economic phenomena in a
model, it would probably do us little good. As he explains it:
One makes a model, presumably, because some system is too
complex for its behavior to be apprehended intuitively. The
same, unfortunately, is then bound to be true of the model,
and one will never know whether to believe it or not, nor
how far it can be used for guidance, since one does not under-
stand it and has no way to validate it.-'--^
But most of these kinds of criticism of modelling have had little
effect on that activity. Indeed, there is little reason to believe that
this kind of over-complexity argument would discourage modellers. For
as we saw in the last chapter, it is exactly this argument— that it is
the complexity of social reality that makes prediction so difficult
—
that modelling advocates use to justify their work. Critics may charge
that models tend to be incomplete. But incompleteness is not a fatal flaw;
the cure is all too obvious—one simply makes the models more complete.
Science is not easily intimidated by mere complexity, especially with the
advent of sophisticated computer technologies. And so it seems that the
primary effect of this line of criticism has been to simply spur on
analysts—like J.W. Forrester and others—into collecting more and more
data, devising more ways to quantify previously ignored variables, and
creating more complex computer simulations of our economic and energy
systems. In this sense, the efforts of some critics to undermine the basic
faith and optimism underlying modelling have backfired.
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Modelling Failures: The Philosophical Explanati on
Lures
There is, however, an explanation for the predictive faili
of descriptive mathematical models which goes beyond these technical
kinds of criticisms. It is at its core a philosophical or epistemo-
logical explanation that applies not just to econometric and energy
models, but to all social science models which are based on positivist
assumptions. This explanation begins by pointing out that policy
analysis shares its predictive problems with all of the social sciences.
It is argued that the predictive ability of the social sciences has
always been poor because of their inability to develop a basic set of
rigorous casual laws as the natural sciences have done."'"^ Laws which
express casual relationships which are constant over time are the
crucial ingredient in effective predictive models. The positivist
explanation for this failure is essentially the same as the one discussed
above: social reality is so much more complicated than natural reality
that social laws are necessarily more rough and probabilistic than
physical ones. However, during recent years there has evolved a
different explanation for this problem of insufficient laws in the social
sciences—one which explicitly rejects the positivist argument. One of
the first formulations of this counter-argument is found in the work of
Peter Winch. Winch can be considered a founding member of the Inter-
pretive School of Social Science, a post-positive approach to social
analysis having its conceptual roots in English analytic philosophy and
the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.-'-^ In 1958, Winch produced his
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now famous short monograph, The Idea of a Social Science
, in which
he put forth a provocative philosophical critique of the positivist
conception of knowledge and social inquiry."*"^ For our purposes, one of
his most important arguments concerns the inability of the social sciences
to produce reliable laws and predictions as the physical sciences have
done. Rejecting the positivist explanation, he argued instead that
this failure to produce reliable socio-economic laws is not due simply
to the sheer complexity of social phenomena, but to the basic qualities
of social phenomena which separate them from natural phenomena. Winch
rejected John Stuart Mill's classic argument that social phenomena are
"just very much more complicated" than natural phenomena, and insisted
that the difference between them is not so much "a difference in degree,
but a difference in kind."-'-^ In other words, there is a basic qualita-
tive difference between natural and social reality which makes scientific
prediction of social phenomena problematic. Let us consider for a moment
just what this difference is.
According to Winch, the essential difference between social and
natural phenomena is that the behavior of the latter is dictated by the
laws of physics, while the behavior of human beings is governed by the
beliefs that are held by them.-^^ Or to put it another way, social
phenomena are constituted in part by human beliefs, but natural phenomena
are not. Thus while the behavior of natural objects proceeds according
to constant natural laws which operate independent of human beliefs about
them, social practices and institutions (like the economy) can exist and
proceed only if certain beliefs and rules are held by the participants
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in those institutions. A natural process like water evaporating on
the ocean will occur quite independent of our beliefs about it, but a
social institution like the economy could literally not exist without
certain beliefs about what exchange is, what a price is, what money is
worth, and so on. It is in this sense that social institutions and
practices are constituted in part by human beliefs.
It is this fact that human actions are governed by beliefs and
not laws which makes social prediction so difficult. For beliefs are
inherently more variable than laws. Accurate prediction requires a
vision of social life as determined by laws of behavior. Thus the
predictive ability of policy models rests on the positivist presumption
that there is an essential similarity between natural and social
phenomena, and thus a similarity between the methods of understanding
appropriate to both. (This is the assumption of the methodological unity
of the science cited in the introduction.) But if human activity is
actually constituted by beliefs then the constancy needed for accurate
forecasting is undermined. Beliefs are not necessarily constant, they
can be consciously changed. In other words, as human beings our actions
are not determined by constant laws, we have the capacity of choice,
the ability to choose between the beliefs that inform our actions. It
is this ability that frustrates the deterministic vision that would
make prediction easy, and helps account for why mathematical, law-like
policy models are subject to failure.
A consideration of some of the elements frustrating energy policy
predictions provides some support for Winch's arguments. For example,
most policy analysts have been consistently overly-optimistic in their
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predictions about the price and availability of foreign oil resources.
During much of the 1970s, various administrations expressed the belief
that the OPEC cartel could not maintain its strangle hold on oil prices;
and one administration official, referring to one large computer model,
confidently asserted in 1975 that "We expect oil prices to level out
between $4 and $6 a barrel. Clearly part of the problem here is the
analyst's inability to anticipate the changing views and beliefs of
those who make decisions for the member countries of OPEC.
In addition, the work of several young economists like Robert
21Lucas and Robert Barro also lends support to some of Winch's argu-
ments. They argue that the failure of traditional econometric models
can be traced to the fact that these models do not incorporate the
ability of economic actors to change their beliefs and therefore their
actions. They point out that these models assume that people will react
the same way to similar economic situations. But this is not always
true. People can learn from their experience, change their beliefs,
and react differently. For example, the government may increase the
money stock in order to stimulate the economy. People find themselves
with more money and so go out and spend it on more goods, and so on.
But eventually, as the inflation caused by increased money stocks makes
itself felt, people realize that they have overspent and overborrowed
,
that their increased wealth was just an illusion, and they become more
wary. So when the government tries the same tactic again, the response
is far different. As Lucas explains, "When expansionary monetary policy
is used repeatedly over time, it no longer accomplishes its purposes.
lOA
There is no stimulating effect on spending and output. Expected
expansions come out as inflation and nothing else."22 Thomas Sargent
adds that "People recognize the truth and stop making the same mistakes.
When they do, they eliminate the planned effects of the policy. "^-^
Despite such problems, these economists remain enthusiastic about
the use of models, insisting that we should be able to predict these
changes in beliefs and behavior, and incorporate them into our models.
They argue that we need only assume that "people tend to act rationally
and intelligently in their own interest, "^'^ and that this kind of
behavior can be predicted with accuracy. It is thought that if there
is any "law" of human behavior it is that people will always try to act
in their own self-interest. If this "rational expectations" theory is
true, then reliable models and predictions along the lines of the natu-
ral sciences might still be a real possibility. But there are of
course some problems with this theory. For instance, there is the
questionable assumption that people do act rationally—Irrationality is
not an uncommon human characteristic. Economists like Lucas dismiss
this problem by arguing that to dwell on it would get in the way of
making good models. "Irrational behavior can't be predicted. You
can't model it, just because it l£ irrational. But good models have
to assume that people act rationally ."^^ This is a classic example of
how the requirements of their models, not the characteristics of human
social reality tend to inform the perspectives of policy analysts. But
even if, for the sake of argument, we were to grant the assumption that
all people act rationally, non-positlvist critics like Winch would
still maintain that prediction can be problematic.
Interpretation and Fallibility
Winch argues that even if people act rationally, even if we
know the beliefs and rules that inform their actions, we may not be
able to predict their behavior. This is because social action, in
contrast to natural events, require interpretations by the actor. To
follow a rule, to act on a belief requires that the actor interpret
how that rule applies in a given situation. For example, what it
means to act rationally may not always be entirely clear, especially
when the actor faces a situation that is new to him or her. There may
be a number of possible interpretations. For instance, consider a
group of workers confronted with a new Presidential request to keep
wage increases below 7% in order to slow down inflation. Some workers
might interpret acting rationally in their self-interest as meaning
that they should support this measure, and thus encourage others to do
so, eventually curbing the inflation which is eating away at their
standard of living. Other workers may think that it is rational to
oppose the wage cap, and strive for wage increases that will keep up
with inflation. We have a situation of conflicting interpretations,
in which both groups are attempting to act rationally in their own
interests, and in which neither interpretation is obviously wrong.
Thus because the concept of "rationality" is subject to various
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interpretations and definitions, an analyst can assume that all
people act rationally, and still mis-predict the public's reaction
to public policies.
This understanding of the inherent problems surrounding the
prediction of "rational" action is supported by the work of Phillip
Green. His book, the now classic Deadly Logic , is a critique of the
models and predictions used to justify our policies toward nuclear
confrontation and wars.^'^ Much of our strategic policy is based on
the analytic framework of game theory—which attempts to predict the
behavior of various rational "players" in confrontation situations. In
a critique very similar to Winch's, Green points out that much of our
strategic thinking mistakenly assumes that what "rational action" is
in these situations will always be clear. Green argues that in
situations of nuclear confrontation, the crucial attempt to predict the
enemy's rational actions and reactions depends directly upon our ability
to accurately determine the values that enemy policymakers are seeking
to maximize through those actions. However, at best, game theory can
give us only a static representation of those values. Even assuming
that this initial representation is correct, it is quite likely that
these "values will undergo change during the drawn-out decision-making
process" that one would find in such a situation. Green points out
that to assume, as game theory does, that "we (can have) in hand some
kind of quantified and unvarying national value estimate, a sort of
operational version of the Preamble of the Constitution . . . (is)
simply anti-empirical."^^ Given these sorts of problems. Green
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concludes that game theory models can foster overconfidence in our
ability to correctly predict the rationality and acts of enemy planners,
and that this can lend a false air of precision and accuracy to the
deterrence model that was relied on so heavily in our defense planning
at the time.
For Winch, there is also another unique characteristic of human
behavior that makes social prediction problematic—human fallibility.
The argument here is that even if we had perfect knowledge of the
beliefs and motives of the public and even if through some miracle
everyone had the same interpretation of those beliefs, we still might
be unable to accurately predict the behavior of citizens—because they
might make mistakes. Beliefs and rules, unlike natural laws, can be
followed either correctly or incorrectly, and so there is always the
possibility that someone will make a mistake while trying to follow a
rule. A citizen, for example, may very well intend to support or follow
a certain government policy, but makes a mistake and actually undermines
it with his or her actions. At first glance, a factor like fallibility
may seem to be an insignificant problem in policy analysis, but in fact,
one of the most controversial policies of the last decade was so largely
because of the failure of policy analysts to fully take into account
the factor of human fallibility. Critics of nuclear power have argued
that many of the safety analyses done on nuclear power plants under-
estimate the risks involved because they fail to adequately incorporate
the possibility of human error. For example, the most famous safety
study, the Rasmussen Report, focused most of its attention on the
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question of whether the reactor design and the operating procedures
were adequate to ensure safe operation of these facilities. But while
these factors may be adequate in theory, what the report failed to
adequately assess was the possibility of human error—either in the
construction of the reactor, or in its operation. It underplays, for
example, the possibility that an accident could be initiated by an
error on the part of a plant employee, or that an operator attempting
to follow normal procedures during an "incident" makes a mistake and
aggravates the situation, or that an employee inadvertantly disables a
piece of equipment during maintenance making it unavailable during an
accident.-'-^ Omissions like these can be crucial. The last two factors
mentioned were major contributors to the accident at Three Mile Island.
One major review of Rasmussen's Report—which finally led to its being
repudiated by the Energy Department—cited the fact that "operators and
other employees might make matters much worse during an accident in ways
which are intrinsically hard to analyze."-' And more significantly, it
concluded that even though this human factor was "one of the major
contributors to the general problem faced by the (Rassmussen Report) in
making quantitative risk estimates ... we don't know of any specific
way in which the methodology in this difficult area could have been
improved . "^-^ And this, of course is exactly Winch's point, that no
improvements in methodology can circumvent the problem of human agency
and failure in human affairs. Nor can it produce the kind of extremely
reliable predictions needed in an area like nuclear power.
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Human Creativity and Social Change
Part of this problem of fallibility is related to the final
characteristic of human action that Winch feels makes precise social
prediction difficult—human creativity. Human beings are blessed
with the unique ability to act and mis-act in new and creative ways.
We can invent new beliefs, new rules, new ideologies to guide out
actions. And Winch argues that the development of these new ways of
thinking and acting may be impossible to predict, in principle . As he
explains
:
Think of the way in which the game of football was revolution-
ized by the Rugby boy who picked up the ball and ran. It would
certainly not have been possible to predict that revolution
from knowledge of the preceding state of the game any more than
it would have been possible to predict the philosophy of Hume
from the philosophies of his predecessors. It may help to re-
call Humphrey Lyttleton's rejoinder to someone who asked him
where Jazz was going: "If I knew where Jazz was going, I'd be
there already."
Maurice Cranston makes essentially the same point when he
notices that to predict the writing of a piece of poetry or
the making of a new invention would involve writing the poem
or making the invention oneself. And if one has already done
this oneself, then it is impossible to predict that someone else
will make up that poem or discover that invention. "He could
not predict it because he could not say it was going to happen
before it happened.
It would be a mistake, though tempting, to regard this as
a piece of trivial logic-chopping. One appears to be attempt-
ing an impossible task of a priori legislation against a purely
empirical possibility. What in fact one is showing, however,
is that the central concepts which belong to our understanding
of social life are incompatible with concepts central to the
activity of scientific prediction. When we speak of the possi-
bility of scientific prediction as social developments of this
sort, we literally do not understand what we are saying. We
cannot understand it, because it has no sense.
A good example of how creativity may interfere with public policies
and policy analysis is the entrance of new beliefs and belief systems
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into the political arena. The unexpected evolution of the environmental
movement is an instance of this. Up until the late 1960's, the environ-
mental movement consisted of a relatively small number of people whose
main interests were largely aesthetic—the preservation of untouched
wilderness areas. However, during the sixties, environmentalism took
an unforeseen turn and became focused on issues of health and the main-
tenance of the earth's eco-sphere on which all of human life is de-
pendent. Environmentalism moved beyond being a club and became a
significant social and political movement. Looking back, this develop-
ment may seem inevitable, but few, if any, people actually predicted
this change in environmental consciousness. In many ways, this was the
emergence of a truly new political force, and it eventually wreaked
havoc with many of the predictions made by analysts in the energy field.
Because analysts had not foreseen the growing strength and commitment
of this movement, many of the predictions made during the seventies about
how quickly new sources of energy could be utilized were overly opti-
mistic. Unexpectedly strong environmentalist opposition to projects
like oil pipelines and nuclear reactors was a significant factor in
frustrating analysts and policymakers attempts to develop an effective
energy policy.
Another way to say all of this is that policy models and pre-
dictions tend to become less reliable in times of socio-political
ferment and change. During periods of relative socio-political stabil-
ity and tranquility, where there are widely shared ideological
frameworks and set patterns of social behavior, predictive models are
Ill
more likely to be successful. But ironically, it is when quiet times
yield to more chaotic and volatile times that the reliability of these
constructs begin to ebb—at exactly the time when the security afforded
by reliable predictions is most desired by policymakers. Our conceptual
footing becomes slippery just when we desire it to be steady and firm
—
but such is the nature of social change and the role that human creativ-
ity plays in it.
Discouraging Over-Reliance on Models
This interpretive understanding of the inherent limitations of
prediction and modelling gives us additional insights into the nature
of policy model failures. Most importantly, it shows that there are
good reasons to believe that public policy analysis cannot, in principle
,
provide the same kind of accurate and reliable predictions that the
natural sciences are famous for. Because of such factors as human
creativity and fallibility, human relations are at best only quasi-
casual in form, and the enterprise of social prediction will always be a
problematic one. Now this does not mean that we cannot ever predict
social behavior, or that models are useless, or that models can't be
technically improved. It means primarily that analysts and policymakers
had best adopt an attitude of humility towards the capabilities of
these mathematical tools—an attitude somewhat closer to that reflected
in a recent poll which showed that public respect for economic fore-
casters is only marginally ahead of that for stockbrokers and astrolo-
gers.-^^ All too often, analysts typically acknowledge the limits of
112
models in theory, and then conveniently forget about them in practice-
especially when they are enthusiastically promoting their own individual
models. But instead of assuming (as one analyst does) that computer
models will form the "ultimate authority for public of ficials,"-^^ it
would be better if analysts erred on the side of caution and made sure
that policymakers did not become over-reliant on these models. Ad-
mittedly, this kind of hvimility goes against the self-interest of the
model builder, and it requires resisting the policymakers desire for a
clear, scientistic answer to policy problems. But one can hope that the
analysts integrity and commitment to truth will win out over these more
political considerations.
If taken seriously, this kind of humility could have some impact
on the way we approach policy. It implies, for example, that we cannot
rely on accurate models to circumvent disagreements over policies, as
some analysts have hoped. Milton Friedman expressed the beliefs of many
analysts when he argued that "differences about economic policy among
disinterested citizens derive predominately from different predictions
about the economic consequences of taking action—differences that in
ii37principle can be eliminated by the progress of positive economics."
Assuming for the sake of argument that policy disputes are predictive
rather than normative and political, we have seen in this chapter that
positive economics probably cannot produce the kinds of clear, un-
disputable predictions that could solve these disputes once and for all.
This helps to make it clear that there are no easy ways out of policy
conflicts, and reemphasizes the fundamentally political nature of these
decisions
.
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Finally, a sense of humility about the power of modelling
suggests that we be wary of entering into risky or dangerous policy
projects that rely significantly on the presumed accuracy of these
models. A prime example of this is the nuclear power program. As we
saw earlier, the case for the desirability and safety of nuclear power
has rested heavily on a series of studies which have given very opti-
mistic predictions of the unlikelihood of a serious nuclear accident.
Given the potentially disastrous consequences associated with this
policy, we must ask whether the analyst is justified in attaching the
appearance of science and rationality to predictions which are ultimately
based on debatable assumptions. Analysts would be doing more of a
service to policymakers and the public by abandoning the mystifying
cloak of science and acknowledging that social prediction is a very
human activity, in the most fallible sense of the word. As Kenneth
Boulding has warned us: "Deciding under uncertainty is bad enough, but
deciding under the illusion of certainty is catastrophic."
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CHAPTER VI
POLICY ANALYSIS AS CONTROL
Each new power won man is a power over man as well.
Each advance leaves him weaker as well as stronger. In every
victory, besides being the general who triumphs, he is also
the prisoner who follows the triumphal car.
C
. S . Lewis
"The Abolition of Man"
This chapter is concerned with one of the most subtle, yet dis-
turbing political biases that is present in positivistic policy analysis-
its manipulative, and perhaps even authoritarian, tendencies. The
authoritarian implications of the emerging importance of policy analysis
expertise in the policy process is not a new subject. Indeed, much
has been written about this in the context of the problem of techno-
cracy: the vision of politics in which authority is constituted by
expertise instead of more democratic means."*" Since the dangers of this
kind of political perspective are relatively well known, this chapter
will focus not on technocracy, but on another authoritarian potential
in policy analysis. This other potential is a direct function of the
notion of scientific rationality that is so central to policy analysis,
and the ideas of manipulation and control that are an inherent part
of this rationality. The first section of this chapter will establish
a conceptual connection between this scientistic perspective and the
tendency for policy analysts (and policymakers) to conceptualize
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public policies as the top-down manipulation of the social system.
Once these connections are established, I will briefly consider these
authoritarian implications in the context of our contemporary political
climate, and the ongoing debate about the viability of democratic
approaches to policy-making. Next I will illustrate how this control-
oriented perspective manifested itself in several of the key policies
in the Carter administration's energy program. In the final section
of the chapter I will introduce an alternative to this control-oriented
approach to policy—a more bottom-up approach that will be developed
further in Part II.
Science as Control; People as Material
As we saw in the prior chapter, many policy models may be too
simple to reflect the complexities and unpredictabilities of modern
social life. There are several ways this problem tends to be dealt with.
One can, as we saw earlier, attempt to make the models more complex,
or one can try to manipulate and reorganize society to fit into the
simplified assumptions of the model. In other words, one can try to
make social behavior more predictable. This latter possibility was a
matter of concern to Hannah Arendt. One of the most insightful modern
political theorists, Arendt was a non-positivist who shared Winch's
belief that unpredictability is an inevitable characteristic of all
social and political life.^ But she was concerned that the inevitable
frustrations accompanying this unpredictability would drive political
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actors into seeking more direct ways to exert more control over social
life. She was afraid that this drive to eliminate unpredictability-
would encourage tendencies toward authoritarian control over society.
She was also concerned that scientific rationality could have an
important role to play in this process. Specifically, she argued that
modern policymakers when faced with the "authentic perplexities inherent
in the human capacity for action," can fall prey to the "strength of
the temptation to eliminate the risks and dangers by introducing into
the web of human relationships the much more reliable and solid cate-
gories inherent in activities with which we confront nature."-^ In other
words, Arendt was concerned that policymakers will be tempted to make the
same scientistic mistake we discussed in the last chapter— the attempt
to approach social reality in the same way that a scientist approaches
natural reality. Like Winch, Arendt warns us that this attempt to
"bestow solidity upon the realm of human affairs" is based upon a mistaken
assumption—"the delusion that we can 'make' something in the realm of
human affairs— 'make' institutions or laws, for instance, as we make
tables and chairs, or make men 'better' or 'worse' . . . coupled with
the Utopian hope that it may be possible to treat men as one treats other
.
,
,,4
materxal
.
Arendt 's primary concern then was not so much with the methodologi-
cal problems surrounding scientism, but its disturbing political impli-
cations. She correctly discerned that there is an inherent connection
between scientific rationality and the notions of "making" or "manipula-
ting" things in human affairs. This is what makes her thought relevant
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to our analysis of public policy analysis. It is quite possible
that the political tendencies that Arendt was concerned about are
represented in the work of policy analysts. At least a strong con-
ceptual connection can be made between policy analysis and the notions
of scientific control and manipulation. Much of the appeal of public
policy analysis is that it is based on the assumption that just as
scientific rationality has been "successful" in the realm of natural
phenomena, it will also be "successful" in the realm of human social
phenomena. The implicit hope is that just as the natural sciences
have provided the kind of knowledge that allows us to successfully con-
trol our natural environment, the policy sciences will allow us to
better control our social environment. But the word "environment"
only serves to mask the disturbing political implications of this kind
of approach. For while the natural environment is made up of "material"
the social environment is made up of people . And while manipulation of
material may not evoke second thoughts, the manipulation of people
should. Scientific rationality may indeed be an effective way to
approach the control of phenomena. But we must question whether this
kind of effectiveness is desirable, for effectiveness at social control
has serious authoritarian implications.
While some policy analysts, like Larry Wade, are candid enough
to admit that they think it is "obvious" that the "manipulation of
human behavior is what politics is about, "^ it is probably unfair to
characterize analysts as insensitive social engineers whose goal is
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to manipulate and control the public. Most analysts have better
intentions. But the case for policy analysis as social control does
not rest on the assertion that analysts are intentionally interested
in manipulation of the public. Rather, it rests on the argument
that irrespective of the individual analysts intentions, the notions
of prediction and manipulative control are an inevitable and essential
part of the paradigm of scientific rationality that is imbedded in
policy analysis. As' Brian Fay explains, the idea of manipulation is
intimately bound up in the very notion of explanation, that is character-
istic of positivistic, scientific methodologies:
Underlying and informing the (positivist) theory of explana-
ation are deeper assumptions as to the nature of truth and
reality, and these deeper assumptions are rooted in the notion
of manipulative control. So the conclusion is not merely that
scientific knowledge provides the basis for manipulative con-
trol, but also, and more importantly, that what can count as
scientific knowledge is that which gives us the means by which
one can in principle control phenomena . . . The scientist says
that he knowa what happened when he knows the causes of an
event, and he means by this when he knows the mechanism in
terms of which he himself can in theory produce the event in an
experimental situation. All of this means that the notion of
understanding in science is intimately bound up with the notion
of control, for it is our ability to control events, at least
in principle, which constitutes one of the criteria in virtue
of which one can be said to have given a valid scientific
explanation. It is in this way that the possibility of manipu-
lative control is a constitutive element of the scientific
enterprise . . . ^
This logic of manipulation is most easily seen in the models used
by analysts. As we saw earlier, the whole purpose of policy models is
the attempt to embody the law-like relation in society tn a way that
makes accurate prediction ; possible. And the primary reason that one wants
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to predict is so that one can control.^ Through models, politics
itself becomes conceptualized in scientistic terms: policies become
"independent variables" which cause certain effects on the "dependent
variable"—i.e., the public.^ Inevitably, the notion of control becomes
one of the dominant concerns in this vision of politics. We find, for
example, policy analysts who seriously argue that "modern polities are
confronted with a vast range of problems the management of which"
depends on "successful strategies of control" and a "clear-headed under-
standing of what is wanted in the way of behavior modification."^ Such
a perspective on politics and policies would certainly not be out of
place in an authoritarian state.
While the conceptual connections between the notions of prediction
and control in policy analysis are clear, it is more difficult to cite
unambiguous examples of authoritarian/control tendencies in actual
policy studies. While analysts seem willing to talk explicitly about
the need for behavior control and modification in a theoretical context
(i.e., among themselves), there seems to be an understandable reluctance
to publicly state these concerns in specific policy studies. Nonethe-
less, there are several examples of control-oriented studies that can
be cited. One of the best examples is a policy study done by Space-
General Corporation for the state of California on the prevention and
control of crime. -'-'^ The stated objectives of the study were:
Analyze the California system of criminal justice utilizing
the techniques of systems engineering and operations analysis,
and thereby explore the feasibility of application of these
techniques to social problems.
Recommend a California program directed toward more
effective prevention and control of crime and delinquency.
123
The language of this study makes clear from the very beginning
its assumption that one can approach social problems in the same way
as other "engineering" problems. It is unsurprising then that an
examination of the study reveals tendencies toward authoritarian policy
measures. In fact, after a careful look at this study, Ida Hoos
concluded that its proposed approach embodied a significant threat to
the liberty and privacy of large groups of citizens . -'-^ To see how
this might be so, one must first consider the specific approaches that
the study recommended to control crime. Among other things, the study
suggested "a systematic study of persons involved in criminal activity
and an identification of crime-susceptible groups," and a "carefully
selected program directed towards the susceptible offender groups."
Here the move from prediction to control becomes clear. The study
seeks first to predict criminal activity by identifying certain categories
of people who are considered most likely to commit crimes. As Hoos
points out, "high-lighted were individual characteristics of the
iil4
offenders, e.g., age, sex, colour, education, employment status, etc.
Then those categories of citizens were to receive increased "attention"
from the law enforcement system. The obvious danger in this kind of
approach to controlling crime is that innocent individuals that happened
to fall into certain suspect categories could be subject to unwarranted
harrassment. In Hoos' words, an individual "could be tabbed by the
system as a potential member of some designated 'risk' population, such,
for example, as criminal, welfare, or even politically subversive, and
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thus be subject to unwelcome attention if not discrimination and
persecution. "'^ One can easily imagine a person who is unemployed and
living in a high-crime neighborhood being subject to arbitrary
surveilence or qxieatloning
, Given such obvious potential abuses, Hoos
concluded that
control, or immediate reduction of the kinds of crime regarded
as important in this study, could only lead to severe repressive
measures, perhaps more dangerous for society than the offenses
.... If applied, the conclusions of the study would have
resulted in a "system of criminal justice" which would have
embodied a disastrous attack on the human liberty of the least
protected sectors of the population t-'-^
Once the Space-General study is seen through Hoos' eyes, the
authoritarian implications of this heavy-handed, control-oriented
perspective becomes clear. However, often these implications are
obscured or made more palatable by the very nature of the language used
in policy analysis—a language which tends to desensitize its users to
the human consequences of this control-orientation. Because analysts
spend much of their time working with statistics and models, the
public can easily come to be thought of and talked of in very abstract
terms. Instead of speaking of unemployed people and the harsh reality
they live in, analysts tend to speak of the "unemployment rate."
Deliberately throwing people out of work can be thought of as "creating
an upward response in the dependent variable of unemployment," or more
simply, as a "Philips Curve trade-off." This kind of sanitized language
does little to stimulate the policy analyst to the authoritarian impli-
cations of a control-oriented perspective, or the human effects resulting
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from the manipulation of "policy variables." As Arendt noted, people
tend to become objectified, thought of as "material." Again, it may
seem a bit far-fetched to assert that analysts could actually begin to
think of real people as objects—but we need not go too far into the
literature of public policy analysis to find an analyst who defines
public policy as involving "a desired course of events, a particular
sequence of behavior in a particular object or set of objects. "^^
This kind of scientistic, analytic language is not only an apt expression
of the control-oriented perspective of policy analysis, its rational and
objective sound serves to disguise its troubling human and political
implications
.
A Growing Impatience with Democracy
Before considering several more examples of this control-oriented
policy perspective, it is important to first locate this tendency in
the context of our current political climate; for while there i£ a defi-
nite concern for manipulation and control running throughout public policy
analysis, it would be a serious mistake to think that this kind of
analysis is, by itself
,
any kind of authoritarian threat. Similarly it
would be mistaken to argue that this kind of scientific rationality is
responsible for the governments increasing concern for regulating and
controlling our economic and social system. Indeed, the opposite is
quite probably the case. The emergence of policy analysis with its
manipulative perspective on politics is the product of a political system
already highly concerned with extending control over society. It is
hardly a coincidence, for example, that we find the beginnings of
126
scientific policy analysis in the depression of the 193Q's, a time when
the industrial world had gone out of control and political leaders
were desperately looking for ways to increase their control over the
economy. The growth of public policy analysis has paralleled quite
closely the growth of big government, and in many ways it symbolizes
the concern for technical control, regulation, market manipulation, -"-^
and planning that is characteristic of the modern state.
It is not sufficient then to simply identify the tendency toward
social engineering and manipulation in policy analysis; this has been
done before. What is crucial is to locate this authoritarian potential
within our current political context so that we may assess whether any
political threat actually exists here. The disturbing potentials in
policy analysis become a serious matter of concern only when they inter-
sect and support similar tendencies in the society at large. For exampl
as Arendt and others have pointed out, notions of authoritarian control
tend to surface during times of disorder when policies seem unable to
deal with persistent social problems.^ In such times, there is a
tendency for those in power to strengthen the reins of control in an
attempt to ensure that their policies have the effect they intended.
There is usually an accompanying tendency to complain about the ineffi-
ciencies of democratic procedures, and a call for strong and decisive
leadership. As Guy Benveniste has pointed out, policy analysts some-
times echo these same kinds of concerns. He notes that conditions of
social disorder "lead the expert to believe that planning has to be
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imposed from the top because the beneficiaries at the bottom cannot
perceive the outcome of their own actions. He becomes increasingly
impatient with democratic politics and. insists that in times of crisis
leadership has to be reaf firmed. "^^
In other words, when there is a conflict between democracy and
control, or as it is usually put, between democracy and efficiency,
there is an inherent tendency for the analyst to support the latter.
This kind of political bias could have a part to play in the debate
over democracy vs. efficiency that is going on today. Some influ-
ential organizations involved in policy analysis have already taken the
side of efficiency and authority. Take, for example the policy studies
done by the Trilateral Commission. This organization was originally
created by David Rockefeller to study and make policy recommendations
concerning the many economic and social problems facing Western Europe,
the United States and Japan. 22 it is composed not only of leading
policy analysts, but also of bankers, corporation executives, politicians,
and scholars from the three regions. Former members include President
Jimmy Carter, Vice President Mondale, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and six
members of the Carter Cabinet. In other words, the commission is a good
example of policy analysis as it is done at the highest levels.
Several of the studies produced by analysts of the Trilateral
Commission have displayed marked tendencies toward reliance on top-down
control mechanisms to deal with persistent policy problems. One study,
for instance, was completed by the Trilateral Task Force on the Political
and International Implications of the Energy Crisis, consisting of
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two high-level policy analysts, John C. Campbell (senior research
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations)
,
Guy de Carmoy (professor
at the European Institute of Business Administration, Fontainebleau)
,
and a former Japanese ambassador, Shinichi Kondo.^"^ In their report,
they observed that adapting to the changing international energy
situation would require "acceptance, voluntarily or involuntarily, of
governmental regulation of an increased sector of personal life. "24
They were concerned that because democracies are sensitive to the wishes
of the public, that these government may not be able to impose on the
public the kinds of policies needed to deal with our energy problems.
In their words, "it is a real question whether the necessary sacrifices
will in fact be accepted by powerful elements of the body politic . . ."25
They fear a "growing extremism . . . instability and turmoil" in
26Western democracies as a result of these political difficulties. They
finally conclude that a coordinated and effective approach to our energy
policy problems will only be possible with an increased emphasis on
"social discipline and government control."
A more wide ranging and more disturbing attack on the viability
of democratic procedures and values can be found in another Trilateral
78
report. The Governability of Democracies . Its subject is a familiar
one: the inability of modern governments to solve the persistent socio-
economic problems which they face. The report concluded that one of
the major impediments to effective government action was the democratic
process itself. In the words of the report's authors:
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. .
some of the problems of governance in the United
States stem from an "excess of democracy"
. . .
the operations of the democratic process do indeed
appear to have generated a breakdown of traditional means of
social control, a delegitimation of political and other forms
of authority, and an overload of demands on government, exceed-
ing its capacity to respond. 29
The report argues that the explosion of political activity and
demands that begin in the 1960s has led to a "democratic distemper,"
which has undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of modern govern-
ment. The cure for this distemper, according to one of the report's
authors, Samuel Huntington, must begin with a realization that there
are "potentially desirable limits to the extension of political
democracy . "-^^
The effective operation of a democratic political system
usually requires some measure of apathy and non-involvement
on the part of some individuals and groups. In the past,
every democratic society has had a marginal population, of
greater or lesser size which has not actively participated
in politics. In itself, this marginality on the part of some
groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one
of the factors which has enabled democracy to function
effectively.-^-^
In effect, Huntington's arguments are a version of a point made in
earlier chapters of this work: that it is political conflict—conflict
amplified and made more explicit by our democratic form of politics
—
that often interferes with effective policy actions. Put simply,
his conclusion is that if we limit participation in policymaking,
this will in turn limit these conflicts, and the product will be more
effective public policies—a line of reasoning we will question in
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a few moments. For now, it is interesting to note that this kind of
undemocratic rhetoric is really nothing new in American politics.
In many ways, Huntington's arguments are merely a modern reincarnation
of the political philosophy of James Madison who argued in Number 10
of the Federalist Papers that only a centralized federal government
could overcome the evils of political factions. And we should remember
that the idea that "the evils we experience flow from the excess of
democracy" did not originate with the Trilateral Commission, but was
voiced nearly two hundred years earlier by Elbridge Gerry of Massa-
chusetts. But the fact that these undemocratic and authoritarian
sentiments are part of the American political tradition should not
serve to mitigate their ominous political implications—especially
considering that these views have begun to be expressed in concrete
policy proposals. Several recent policy proposals in the area of
energy have been clearly informed by the belief that democracy and
public participation have been getting in the way of effective policies
to solve our energy problems.
Making the Reactors Run On Time
One good example is a bill introduced by the Carter Administration
(with the backing of the utility industry) that would have reduced
the number of public hearings and court challenges related to the
licensing of nuclear reactors . -^-^ Among other things, the bill would
have authorized and encouraged utilities, reactor vendors, and the
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government to agree on standardized nuclear plant designs, which would
then receive near-automatic government approval, regardless of where
they were located. It eliminated some public hearings altogether,
and cut down on the rest by mandating that if an opportunity once
existed in any hearing for discussion of an issue, that issue could not
be raised at later hearings unless significant new information had
surfaced in the interim. Also, it would have authorized the granting
of limited work authorizations which would allow construction on
reactors to begin before formal hearings were held on the construction
permit.
Administration backers of the bill insisted that these changes
were simply procedural ones, and were only intended to make the licens-
ing process more rational and efficient. But opponents pointed out
that the purpose of public hearings is to provide the opportunity for
public participation in an issue of great concern, and to fully air
all the issues involved, not to license reactors as quickly as possible
At a hearing on the bill, Anthony Z. Roisman of the National Resources
Defense Council complained that the only values being discussed were
how to build reactors faster. "(T)he licensing process is designed
to decide whether to build and operate nuclear reactors, not how
quickly . . . ," he said.-^'^ Opponents saw this measure not so much
as an attempt to make the licensing process more rational and efficient
but as an attempt to minimize the kind of public participation that
has frustrated the move toward nuclear power—a move strongly backed
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by the government and the utilities. As John O'Leary of the
Energy Department commented, "Democracy is not the most efficient
system in the world. "-^^
Another example of the undemocratic trends surfacing in energy
policy proposals was the Energy Mobilization Board proposed by the
Carter administration. The Board was designed to expedite the
development of a number of specific, needed energy projects like
oil pipelines, syn-fuel plants, etc. Among the provisions and powers
included in various versions of this bill were the following:
1. The EMB would have the power to set project timetables
for all federal, state, and local agencies. This would
take precedence over timetables in other laws and
regulations
.
2. On its own authority, EMB could order a federal agency
to streamline a specific list of procedures—hearing
consolidation, etc. State and local agencies may be
ordered by court to employ streamline lists if they
miss or are likely to miss a deadline.
3. EMB could require single, consolidated federal environ-
mental impact statements.
4. EMB could permanently waive any new requirements (environ-
mental, etc.) if it judges requirements may be impediment
to implementation of project. Findings and decision not
reviewable by court, except for Constitutional Violations.
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5. EMB could recommend waiver of any federal or state
or local law it considers an impediment to project
development, even if it was not related to delays in
agency decision-making
.
This board was an unprecedented attempt to consolidate power in a policy
area in one, small, centralized, federal board. Particularly dis-
turbing was its ability to over-ride or sidestep federal, state, and
local environmental laws— laws which were arrived at after years of
debate in those democratic institutions. This drastic attempt to make
an end-run around the democratic process was obviously rooted in the
frustrations experienced by the Carter administration and others in
their attempt to implement the kind of energy policy they desire. As
Carter himself said in his speech introducing this proposal, the
purpose of the Energy Mobilization Board was to ensure that "nothing
stands in the way of achieving (our energy) goals." And clearly, this
"nothing" included the public and the democratic procedures they
cherish. Clearly it should be a matter of concern when we find policy-
makers so willing to sacrifice democratic procedure simply because they
are thought to be interfering with the "efficient" management of our
society. We must ask whether it is really worth this price to make
sure that the trains or nuclear reactors run on time.
Of course, the defeat of the EMB bill during the summer of 1980,
and the election of the Reagan administration could be interpreted as
movements away from a centralized, control oriented perspective.
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Indeed, the early rhetoric of the Reagan administration appears to be
very hostile to this perspective and any form of big-government
regulation of social and economic life. However, even a cursory
examination of the proposed policy actions of this administration re-
veals that it is hardly immune to the powerful, control-oriented forces
at work in the polity. For example, in the area of energy policy where
the Reagan administration claims to be committed to "getting the
government out of the energy business" and letting the market work its
wonders, one finds plans to provide large subsidies to certain forms
of energy that the administration feels are desirable, but which have
had problems competing in the marketplace. The Reagan budget promises
to double subsidies for the ailing breeder reactor program, for instance.
In addition, the administration seems committed to using decision
techniques in energy policy which discourage democratic debate and
citizen input. The most obvious example of this control-oriented
tendency is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposal to reduce the
right of the public to gather information from the commission to use
in licensing hearings. This proposal would make it possible for the
NRC to refuse to provide public groups with the documents and testimony
that these groups often use to gather the detailed information that
is necessary to participate effectively in formal hearings. As one
environmental spokesman described the proposal: "Basically, they
will take away the tools citizens have in a democratic proceeding."
As this example indicates, this new administration is little
different than the previous one, in that it is more than willing to
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circumvent democratic safeguards and public participation when those
procedures get in the way of desired policies—like nuclear power
development. This kind of early evidence indicates that even an adminis-
tration that is initially opposed to a government control-oriented
perspective can quickly find itself embracing techniques of regulation
(like import restrictions on foreign automobiles), subsidy, and control
when these appear necessary to achieve their ends. Noting this, some
political analysts, like Sheldon Wolin, have argued that as the Reagan
administration becomes increasingly frustrated by its inability to
revive our faultering economy, it could easily be forced to take an
increasingly control-oriented approach to economic policy—one which
would ultimately be based on a technocratic justification.
If the American political economy, like the economics of West
Germany and France, has entered a period of low economic
growth that will compel state authorities to impose even
more severe wage restraints, cut-backs in services, anti-
inflationary measures at the expense of employment, and a
list of similar measures, it wll find itself in a true
crisis of legitimacy. . . . The Reagan years promise a
political economy in which the state will seek to ground
its legitimacy in the authority of technical and scientific
knowledge rather than in "democratic" consent, and the economy
will be able to count on a more trackable, less backward-
looking population who will have the President's amiable
moralizing to distract them.-^^
Naturally, if the Reagan administration does find itself basing
its policy proposals on technical and scientific knowledge, then the
kinds of policy analysis described in this chapter will play an in-
creasing role in this administration—despite all the initial appear-
ances .
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Is a Top-Down Approach Really Effective?
Again, the point is not that policy planners and analysts are
incipient fascists, but that their traditional, control-oriented
perspective fits very easily into any move toward more centralized,
authoritarian forms of policymaking and implementation. As Benveniste
observed, "There is a conventional notion that planners and government
need strong power to plan;
. . . that short of centralization and
strong executive control to impose the plan, it will fail."^^ As
Hannah Arendt has pointed out, the rationale for this kind of approach
to policy is as old as politics itself. It is the belief that the only
way to escape from uncertainty in human affairs is to impose order upon
society from the top-down. In this view, human order is something
created and maintained through hierarchical rule. As Arendt explains it:
Escape from the frailty of human affairs into the solidity
of quiet and order has in fact so much to recommend it that
the greater part of political philosophy since Plato could
easily be interpreted as various attempts to find theo-
retical foundations and practical ways for an escape from
politics altogether. The hallmark of all such escapes is
the concept of rule, that is, the notion that men can law-
fully and politically live together only when some are
entitled to command and the others forced to obey.^^
In some sense, the notion that a top-down approach to policy is the
most efficient and effective one is simply the modern descendent of
the traditional political desire to create order through rule. But
it is possible, indeed necessary for those committed to democracy.
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to question this assertion. Is a top-down, control-oriented ap-
proach to public policies truly the most effective one?
In considering this question, let us begin by assuming as
Huntington does, that much of the appeal of this top-down approach
lies in its ability to overcome the kind of political conflicts and
interest group squabbles that often get in the way of the formulation
and implementation of effective policies. But is this approach
actually an effective way of dealing with or eliminating these kinds
of conflicts? I think not—for this approach does not really address
those conflicts at all. To limit participation in the policy process,
as Huntington suggests, would not eliminate these conflicts, but only
eliminate one avenue of their expression. It would kill the messenger
of social discord, but not the social discord itself. A top-down
approach does not try to solve conflicts, but rather, attempts to
overpower them by imposing a policy plan on the participants. And
while this kind of strategy can sometimes be effective in the short
run, its failure to eliminate the basic conflict itself can backfire
in the long run. Reconsider, for example, the nuclear licensing and
the Energy Mobilization Board policy proposals that were discussed
earlier. These were certainly good examples of a top-down approach
to our energy policy problems. But if those bills would have been
passed, would they have been effective? There is reason to doubt that
they would— for these bills, even in the proposal stage, did more to
heighten opposition to these projects than to dampen it.
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Environmentalists and other groups were angered that the government,
instead of addressing their legitimate concerns, was attempting to
eliminate their participation in the decision process and to over-ride
environmental regulations. The governments high-handed approach
only served to provoke these opposition groups even more, and to
contribute to their determination to oppose these projects by what ever
means were available: court fights, demonstrations, occupations, etc.
This could hardly be considered "efficient."
Those who advocate more top-down approaches to public policy
tend to underestimate the importance of public support to the success
of public policies. Truly effective public policies are a combination
of government authority and public acceptance, with the latter being
the most important ingredient . After all, most policies are finally
carried out by some segment of the public itself. As we saw with the
energy bills, hints of authoritarianism may only serve to undermine
this necessary public support, by arousing political suspicions and
by stimulating more indignant opposition to those policies. One of
the major political flaws in the scientistic approach to policy is
the fact that citizens understandably resent being treated as "dependent
variables" or "objects" to be manipulated. The resentment often surfaces
in the form of stubborn resistence to government policies that the
public feels are being imposed on them. Even when the government is
"successful" in using its authority to ensure compliance with a policy,
it can often be only a hollow victory. For the use of authority and
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coercion to implement policies often only encourages the public to
search for ways to circumvent or evade those laws. At best a dis-
gruntled public tends to only obey the letter of a law that is
imposed on them—not the spirit—and it is difficult for policies
to be truly effective if their spirit and purpose do not have public
support. In this sense, it could be argued that top-down approaches
to public policy are actually inefficient in that they tend to alienate
the public support necessary to ensure that they are carried out.
An Alternative Perspective: Policy as Promising
Despite these kinds of problems in the top-down approach to
policy, it is a fact that this can be a popular approach and it can
work. Political control is^ one way to maintain order and to implement
policies in a society. And if there were not other ways to create
order and effective policies, accepting this control-oriented vision
would be quite understandable. But as Arendt points out, there is
another option, another way in which human beings can create order in
their affairs and implement effective public policies. Human order,
she explains, can also be a product of the "promises" that we make to
each other. For her, promising is a unique human capacity which "at
least partially dispels . . . the unpredictability of human affairs;"
and she maintains that the "power of stabilization inherent in the
faculty of making promises (is) the only alternative to mastery which
relies on . . . rule over others. Arendt sees mutual promises or
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contracts as a more democratic approach to creating order in human
societies.
Interpretive social scientists would no doubt take Arendt's
ideas one step further and point out that not only are mutual promises
desirable ways to organize human activity , they are in fact much of
the way order is maintained in society already. Peter Winch argued
that social reality differs from physical reality in that it is ordered
by the mutually held beliefs of those who live in that reality. In a
sense, Arendt's "mutual promises" are simply a more conscious version
of the intersubjective beliefs which play a central role in ordering
all societies. Mutual agreements and beliefs are the "glue" which
hold social life together and allows it to exist and function in a
smooth way. This understanding of the sources of social order can
inform the way we think about "effective" policies. It implies that
if policies are to be effective, they must become part of the web of
intersubjective beliefs— they must be accepted by the public as part
of the rules which will govern behavior. If policies fail to become
part of this mutually held belief system, it quickly becomes clear
that power and control are by themselves very inefficient tools for
ensuring compliance with policies. For example, consider a society
that is in a revolutionary situation, where most of the citizens no
longer believe in the legitimacy of the government or its policies.
If that society refuses to function normally, if citizens take part
in a general strike, it is extremely difficult to force that society
work. Even if the government has a virtual monopoly on coercion and
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violence, it is often impossible to make that society function
normally. This is an extreme demonstration of the fact that social
order is ultimately a function of the public's agreements to act in
certain organized ways.
More importantly, the notion that order is a function of inter-
subjective beliefs or "promising" lays the philosophical groundwork
for a more democratic vision of public policy—one which is not rooted
in the notion of people as material to be manipulated, but which is
built upon the unique capacity of human beings to order their world
through shared beliefs and mutual agreements. This is turn implies
that effective policies are not something which is imposed on the
public, but something which requires the active support and partici-
pation of the public. "Policy as promising" suggests a view of policy
coming from the bottom-up—as a product of public understanding and
agreement as to the correct course of action to take to solve social
problems. This suggests that policy formulation and implementation
cannot ignore or try to overpower conflicts in the policy, but must
be a process which attempts to resolve those conflicts and integrate
opposing viewpoints. In this sense, public policies would be policies
which came from and were embodied in the public.
All of these are important suggestions and implications of
Arendt's views, and we will be considering them in much more detail in
the last chapters when we explore what an "integrative approach" to
policy and policy analysis would look like. For now, however, the
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important point is that this more public vision of policy does not
occupy a central place in the current practice and perspective of
public policy analysis. Indeed, it seems that the ideal public for
the positivist policy analyst is not one which is active, but one
which only reacts in predictable ways. In the current view, policies
can only be effective when the public acts like a good "dependent
variable." As one non-positivist social theorist, Jurgen Habermas,
has observed, a passion for democracy is not a characteristic of
modern policy analysis. In the activity of devising rational public
policies, "the public body of citizens confering in an unrestricted
fashion about matters of the commonwealth does not play an essential
role."'^^ For Habermas this lack, of concern for democracy in public
policy analysis is simply a manifestation of the disturbing change
in the function of political thought and social analysis that has been
brought about in modern industrial societies.
Emancipation by means of enlightenment (has been) replaced by
instruction in control over objective and objectified processes.
Socially effective theory is no longer directed to the con-
sciousness of human beings who live together and discuss
matters with each other, but to the behavior of human beings
who manipulate ... No attempt is made to attain a rational
consensus on the part of citizens concerning the practical
control of their destiny. Its place is taken by the attempt
to attain technical control over history by perfecting the
administration of society. ^
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CHAPTER VII
POLICY ANALYSIS AS CONSERVATISM
Perhaps the most important role of the intellectual since the
enlightenment has been that of unmasking ideology .... We
can confidently expect this role to be abandoned as the intel-
lectual becomes the administrator of a new society.
Noam Chomsky
"Philosophers and Public Policy"
The last bias in policy analysis that will be considered is a
tendency toward conservatism—meaning that some policy analysis methods
tend to assume and conserve the status quo in society. One important
source of this conservative bias lies within positivist thought and the
deterministic vision of the world that it encourages. The main focus of
the chapter is on the manner in which this conservative bias has dis-
torted our perspective on United States energy policy and constrained
our choices in this area. I will focus in particular on the question-
able relationship between energy and economic growth, which is in many
ways the key issue animating many current energy policy decisions. In
the final sections of the chapter I will attempt to illuminate the power
of this conservative bias by locating it within the broader cultural
proclivity that supports it— the human tendency to believe that certain
social problems are normal, natural and inevitable. I will argue that
this perspective is dysfunctional in that it puts artificial and undesir-
able constraints on policy-making creativity. However, before proceeding
to address these questions, I will begin with a consideration of the
nature of this conservative bias.
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The Conservative Bias in Analysis
"Policy analysis," according to Edith Stokey and Richard
Zeckbauser, "is a discipline for working within a political and economic
system, not for changing it."""" They are quite right; and it would be
difficult to find a better description of the conservative bias that
afflicts public policy analysis. In its essence, this conservative bias
is a tendency to take current socio-economic arrangements as given, and
thus lend tacit support to those arrangements. Or to put it conversely,
there is an inclination in policy analysis to ignore approaches and solu-
tions to policy problems which would require questioning or changing the
current structure of our American socio-economic system. As Robert Bish
admitted in his discussion of the public choice approach to policy
analysis, policy analysis techniques often prove to be most useful to
"those who wish to discover recommendations for improving the present
2
structure and functioning of the American . . . public economy." In
one sense, whether this tendency to conserve the status-quo is good or
bad depends entirely on whether the status-quo is considered desirable
or not. If one feels satisfied with current arrangements, this conser-
vative bias would probably be seen as a healthy one. But I believe that
a good case can be made that this kind of perspective on policy is dys-
functional in a more general sense—in the sense that it inevitably
works to artificially constrain our search for solutions to present and
future social and economic problems. As we will see, this dulling of our
political imaginations can cripple our abilities to respond adequately
and appropriately to our changing world.
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Before beginning to consider the sources and effects of this bias,
several potentially confusing points should be cleared up. First of all,
the conservative methodological bias in policy analysis should not be
assumed to always support politically conservative (right-wing) posi-
tions—although, as will be evident later, this potential is certainly
present. It is important to note that this conservative methodology
could also easily support liberal positions, in that it could work to
conserve elements in the status quo that are amenable to liberal inter-
ests. It is quite conceivable, for instance, that this conservative bias
coiald assume (and thus support) the continuation of government interven-
tion into the economic system—a current and basic tenet of liberal
politics. Thus the key point to remember about this conservative ten-
dency is that it is a methodological phenomenon that works to support
the current socio-economic structure of society, irrespective of the
3
particular political perspective embodied in that structure.
It would also be misleading to assume that this conservative bias
is always opposed to change. Oddly enough, the conservative bias in
analysis can actually assume change, if^ that change is a constant charac-
teristic of the present socio-economic system. For example, as Robert
Ayers has pointed out, analyses done for mainstream social institutions
like government and large private corporations typically portray the
future as the present writ large—higher productivity, more energy con-
4
sumption, more income, more technological breakthroughs, and so on.
This is an example of what he calls conservative or "alpha"
forecasting
—a deterministic approach to the future in which the analyst
simply
forecasts the future as the extrapolation of the trends and
changes
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currently at work in society.^ Thus, assuming the continuation of the
status quo could easily mean assvnning the continuation of certain charac-
teristic forms of change.
Finally, though some policy analysts are obviously aware of the
conservative bias built into analysis, it is not my contention that this
bias is an intentional or premeditated one. This bias, like many of the
others we have explored, is a systemic one—one that is built into the
system of analysis itself. It is in part a function of the positivistic
assumptions that lie at the heart of policy analysis, and thus operates
without the conscious effort of analysts themselves. Let us consider
what it is about policy analysis that builds in this conservative bias.
Descriptive Models; Objectifying Our Social World
As we have seen, the construction and use of descriptive models is
in many ways the essence of policy analysis. The purpose of these models
is to "describe the way the world operates." Or as Buchanan and Tullock,
the fathers of public choice analysis put it, "We seek to learn how the
world works in order to make it work better, to improve things."^ This
is a laudable goal, and one which would seem to have little bias attached
to it. But in fact, it is this conception of the analyst's work that
forms the philosophical foundations of the conservative bias in analysis.
The bias is again rooted in the mistaken tendency to equate the social
world with the physical world—an equation that is evident in the state-
ment by Buchanan and Tullock. Note the language used; note that our
social world is referred to as "the" world—the implication being that
just as there is only one physical world, there is only one social world.
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But this, however, represents a mistaken understanding of the unique
nature of human social reality, for while It may be valid to assert that
there is one physical world, constituted and ordered by one set of immu-
table natural laws, the same does not hold true for social reality. As
I have argued, social reality is constituted in large part by the shared
beliefs of those who participate in it—and since beliefs can differ
greatly, so too can social worlds. Indeed, the staggering diversity of
social systems that can be seen in human history is in large part due to
the variety of possible human belief systems. Thus it is accurate to
say that there is not one social world, but many possible social worlds.
We do not live in the world, but in our particular world, governed by
the particular beliefs that order our lives. And therefore when modelers
claim to be "describing the way the world operates," they are in fact
simply describing the way our current social system operates.
There is more than a semantic difference here. The posltivist
tendency to think of our world as the world is much of what creates the
conservative bias in analysis; for the variety, creativity, and possi-
bility that is such a unique and basic part of human existence tends to
get factored out in the use of these policy models. Descriptive models
restrict themselves to describing how our current social system works,
and as a result, the rules and requirements of our particular way of life
tend to become objectified, tend to become considered the natural, objec-
tive requirements of the world. These objectified assumptions become
part of the criteria by which policy options are judged feasible or not,
and those policy options which violate or challenge current requirements
are considered to be unrealistic and tend to be dismissed out of hand.
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But let us move beyond a theoretical understanding of how this conserva-
tive bias works, and consider in some detail how it has affected our
national energy policy.
Constraining Energy Policy Choices
It is generally agreed now that national energy policy in the
1970 's was unduly constrained by an over-emphasis on supply-side solu-
Q
tions and an under-emphasis on demand-side solutions, like conservation.
In part this was because virtually all energy analysts and their models
assumed that the demand for energy would naturally have to keep rising
as it had in the past. For most private and public analysts, the energy
crisis was defined as a problem in finding enough new and reliable sup-
plies to meet our ever-increasing demand. This assumption had a very
direct effect on our energy policy efforts. It meant that we would have
to stay dependent on foreign oil to supply at least part of this growing
demand, which has proved to not only be expensive, but a direct threat
to our national security. We were also led to exploit more remote and
expensive supplies of domestic energy (off-shore and Alaskan oil) , which
contributed to inflationary pressures. The assumptions of growing demand
also meant increasing use of coal and nuclear power, despite the very
real environmental and health risks associated with these forms of energy.
The need for growing supplies was also instrumental in supporting efforts
to undermine and rollback the environmental standards that were passed
in the earlier part of the decade. In short, the assumption of increas-
ing energy demand carried with it a number of quite important conse-
quences, and played an important part in shaping our energy choices.
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The typical reasoning underlying the prediction of increasing
energy demand was expressed well in an analysis done by the Energy
Economics Division of the Chase Manhattan Bank:
With growing economic activity and a rising standard of living,
the per capita use of energy has increased steadily in the past.
It has doubled within the last 30 years. And evidence that it
will continue to grow at even a faster rate is unmistakable.
... It has been recommended in some quarters that the United
States should curb its use of energy as a means of alleviating
the shortage of supply. However, an analysis of the uses of
energy reveals little scope for major reductions without harm
to the nation's economy and its standard of living.
^
This statement captures the three main assumptions that informed vir-
tually all national energy models: first, that since energy demand has
grown steadily in the past, it was likely to do so in the future; second
that there is an "iron" link between energy growth and economic growth;
and third, that continuous economic growth was necessary and desirable.
All of these assumptions appeared quite reasonable. There was strong
empirical evidence that energy growth and economic growth were directly
linked. For example, the figure below was sometimes used to illustrate
the striking parallel between the growth in GNP and the growth of energy
consumption in the United States during this century. Thus there seems
to be little question of the direct connection between continual economic
growth and increased energy growth. Further, it was uniformly assumed
that continuous economic growth was a systematic requirement of all ad-
vanced capitalist states, including the United States. The structure of
such economies requires them to grow in order to survive and prosper;
lack of growth can only mean increasing unemployment, recession, and
eventual depression.
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1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Fig. 1. Per capita average power consumption and
per capita gross national product in the United States.
(Gross national product figures are given in 1973
dollars, dollar figures for previous years have been
increased to take account of inflation. )-^^
Given this model of the energy-economic system, any policy advo-
cating vigorous conservation of major reductions in energy demand would
understandably be considered unrealistic, if not dangerous. To slow
energy growth would imply slowing the economy, with all the economic
and social dislocations that would accompany that slowdown. In this
context, a slow or no growth energy policy proposal could only be con-
sidered irrational. This is a nice illustration of one of the main pur-
poses of policy models: to specify which policy options are feasible.
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given the systemic characteristics and requirements that are incorpora-
ted into the model. Analysts like J. W. Forrester, designer of the
Systems Dynamics National Model has argued forcefully that computer
models should play this kind of role in informing national policy de-
cisions.
Many expectations for the future are not consistent with cur-
rent realities. By showing how assumptions and policies bring
about future consequences, the National Model should help to
distinguish between unjustified hopes .and possible futures.
Any aspirations about the future should reflect a realistic
understanding of the structure of society and a set of viable
policies capable of leading to that future. When the National
Model becomes a sound basis for judging the merit of future
alternatives, national leaders and the general public may be
able to use the Model to help set achievable national goals
and choose feasible futures
.
It is exactly this kind of perspective that resulted in the label-
ing of serious conservation efforts as unfeasible and undesirable. A
"realistic understanding" of the structure of our current society re-
vealed an energy-GNP link and an economic growth requirement that
could not be violated.
In recent years, however, the necessity of increasing energy de-
mand and the models which supported that notion have come under increas-
ing attack. The first chink in the armor of increasing demand was a
persuasive critique of the "iron link" between energy growth and econo-
mic growth. There is now a growing consensus that the energy-GNP link
is much looser than once thought, and that strong conservation measures
could be applied without slowing down the economy. Even the Carter ad-
ministration admitted that energy growth could be reduced to 2% a year
1
2
without adversely affecting the economy. This is possible largely
because of the tremendous amount of energy that is currently being
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wasted in the economy—many analysts estimate the waste figure at ap-
13proximately 30%. If this waste could be eliminated through increased
energy conservation and efficiency, the growing demand for energy
could be slowed without hurting the prospects for economic growth—and
in fact, this has been the reasoning underlying the push toward more
conservation in recent years.
Thus it would appear that by incorporating a true description
of the energy-GNP link (i.e. a loose relationship), the systemic bias
against a strong conservation policy would be eliminated from our
energy models and analysis. But in fact this is only partly true; for
as long as we assume and promote a continually growing economy, a slow
or no growth energy policy must eventually be considered irrational.
For energy growth and economic growth can only be decoupled temporarily
—until all of the 'slack' in the currently loose relationship caused
by waste is used up. Once this slack is taken up, the energy-GNP re-
lationship will again be a tight one, and energy growth would have to
again keep pace with the ever-growing economy. William Ophuls' analy-
sis has indicated that even the best conservation program—one that
would save up to 50%—would only buy us "a decade or two of time" be-
fore we would again have to face the task of finding vast new sources
14
of energy to keep up with increasing demand. In short, ensuring
economic growth is the bottom line in most energy analyses, and is the
central assumption which necessitates a commitment to ever-growing
supplies of energy.
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Questioning Continuous Economic Growth
Thus if conservation and limited energy growth are to be consi-
dered as serious, long-range energy options, one must begin to question
the assumption of continuous economic growth. And in fact, during re-
cent years, several social and economic analysts have begun to criti-
cize this most hallowed American goal. Some of the most prominent and
persuasive of these critics include Herman Daly, Fred Hirsch, and
William Ophuls.'''^ This is not the place to examine the growth critique
in depth (the issue of growth will be addressed in more detail in the
last chapter), but the essence of the arguments is easily grasped.
Criticisms of continual economic growth fall roughly into two categories.
The first is concerned with the social limits to growth and the second
focuses on the ecological limits.
Fred Hirsch represents one form of the social critique. In his
book. The Social Limits to Growth , Hirsch argues that while economic
growth has been successful in allowing large segements of the U.S. pop-
ulation to share in the enjoyment of material goods, this growth will
16
necessarily fail to fulfill everyone's social needs. Hirsch identi-
fies a set of social goods (including privacy, exclusive higher educa-
tion, and good jobs) as "positional goods"
—
goods that are inherently
scarce in that they can only be enjoyed by those few people who occupy
the higher positions in society. General use only deteriorates these
goods, thus they will always be relatively scarce; not even economic
growth can change that fact. Indeed, as material prosperity makes these
social goods more attractive to large numbers of people, frustration and
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competition will only increase. In short, economic growth contains a
false premise of social affluence for everyone—a kind of general af-
fluence that can never be achieved.
The ecological critique of economic growth takes a different
tack, one which not only questions the promise of growth but also
its very possibility. Critics like Daly and Ophuls focus on the in-
evitable environmental and health damanges that result from the in-
creasing use of natural resources and the increasing pollution that is
the unavoidabale by-product of this growth of resource consumption.
Rather than seeing our energy problems as a matter of finding more sup-
lies to feed our growing demand, they perceive it as a good example of
the kinds of problems that are caused by an economic structure which
requires continuous economic growth. In essence, they argue that a
policy of unlimited growth is fundamentally incompatible with a world
of limited resources. These authors are good examples of the kind of
analyst that will be discussed in Part II—analysts who begin to avoid
the positivist traps built into present forms of analysis. Rather than
routinely accepting the assumptions and relationships that dominate our
current socio-economic system, they are willing to explore alternative
assumptions and the alternative policy paths they imply. In this case,
both Ophuls and Daly argue that in the place of an economy which re-
quires reliance on increasingly scarce, expensive, and risky energy
sources, we should be moving towards a no-growth or steady-state econo-
my—one which requires a low or constant supply of energy, much of
18
which could be supplied by renewable energy resources.
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Needless to say, this steady-state vision of the economy has met
with little acceptance among mainstream policy analysts and policymakers.
Indeed, for many, the notion of zero-growth is so ridiculous that it is
used as a slur against political opponents. In a speech attacking en-
vironmentalists. Mollis W. Dole, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of
the Interior, thought it sufficient to refer to them as "stop-every-
thing zealots whose real cause is not environmental protection, but
19the zero-growth society." And when Craig Hosmer, President of the
American Nuclear Council, wanted to condemn a group of White House
energy advisors, he called them "bad guys" whose aim was to "convert
the country into a drab, energyless, no-growth, sleeping-bag society.
That is their goddamned transcendental notion of a great future for
20
the U.S.A."^
The failure of the steady-state proposal to become a legitimate
part of the debate over economic and energy policy is in part due to
the conservative bias in policy analysis. The growth requirement char-
acteristic to a particular economy has become objectified and used as
the unquestioned standard by which policy proposals are evaluated.
According to this standard, no-growth is the same as failed growth,
with all the economic dislocations that accompany that failure. This
kind of thinking was best exemplified by an analysis in Fortune , which
argued that the severe recession of 1973-1975 was in fact "a real life
tryout of zero growth." But as Herman Daly points out, this kind of
reasoning is faulty:
Fortune identifies a steady-state economy with a failed growth
economy. A condition of nongrowth can come about in two ways:
as the failure of a growth economy, or as the success of a
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steady-state economy. The two cases are as different as night
and day. No one denies that the failure of a growth economy to
grow brings unemployment and suffering. It is precisely to avoid
the suffering of a failed growth economy (we know growth cannot
continue forever) that we advocate a steady-state economy. The
fact that an airplane fails to ground if it tries to remain sta-
tionary in the air simply reflects the fact that airplanes are
designed for forward motion. It certainly does not imply that
a helicopter cannot remain stationary. A growth economy and a
steady-state economy are as different as an airplane and a
helicopter. (The growth assumption) remains supreme when even
the failures of a growth economy become arguments in its de-
fense. 21
Daly's point is straightforward: what may be a requirement for
one socio-economic system may not be for another; and that it is a
serious mistake to evaluate all policy options according to current
systemic criteria. The current structure of our socio-economic sys-
tem may require continuous economic growth—but it does not necessarily
have to always be so. As Daly demonstrates, it is quite possible to en-
vision a steady-state economy which is healthy and prosperous, with full
employment and all basic material needs adequately met. But such an
economy would have to be structured according to much different values
and beliefs than are at work today. Among other things, a steady-
state society would require a commitment to zero population growth; a
move away from self-indulgent consumerism and materialism and a commit-
ment to the development of non-materialistic values; a commitment to
producing more durable goods in a manner that was less energy intensive
and more labor intensive; a system for limiting the amount of resources
consumed by the economy; and a limit on corporate growth and profits.
Given the assumptions and values of Daly's perspective, not only is a
steady-state economy rational and possible, the currently dominant
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notion of an ever-growing economy becomes seen as irrational and irre-
sponsible.
One need not agree with Daly's specific prescriptions to see the
basic validity of the theoretical point being made here; that the no-
tions of "necessity," "feasibility," and "rationality" that serve to
limit policy analysis and discourse are not neutral or objective terms,
but system-bound terms—terms relative to the system of values and
theories that we assume. In policy analysis, the tendency is to assume
the values and theories characteristic of the current social system—in
the name of being descriptive. The result is the elevation of these
assumptions to the status of natural laws—as exemplified by the econo-
mist who reportedly supported the notion of economic growth by arguing
that "it is a law of nature, either grow or die." First of all, this
statement shows a mistaken understanding of nature—very few things in
nature, besides cancer, grow continuously; plants and animals spend
most of their lives in a mature, steady-state condition. But more im-
portantly, it displays a typical lack of appreciation for the differen-
ces between natural and social reality and the fact that beliefs that
order human societies are much more relative than the laws which order
nature. This distorted perspective inhibits our ability to see that
what is irrational, unfeasible, and impractical in one context may ac-
tually be reasonable in another context. All too often in policy analy
sis the powerful notions of rationality and necessity are used to elim-
inate some policy options and justify certain choices—without any ref-
erence to the potential relativity or questionability of those standard
A typical example has been the debate over nuclear power policy, where
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the concept of "necessity" has occurred again and again as one of the
key justifications for the advancement of this program. Because of the
acknowledged risks, few analysts and policymakers enthusiastically em-
brace nuclear power; instead, they usually argue that whether we like
it or not, nuclear power is "necessary" if we are not to freeze in the
dark in the future. As one report typically put it, ".
. . commitments
to nuclear power will continue to grow out of necessity ."^^ And it is
significant that Hans Bethe, a distinguished phsyicist, chose to call
his article on nuclear energy in the Scientific American , "The Necessity
23
of Fission Power." Of course, what is usually not mentioned in these
arguments is that nuclear power is only necessary given a system of in-
creasing energy demand and the neglect of conservation and alternative
forms of energy. Thus the illusion of necessity, supported by "neutral"
descriptive models, has served to advance the development of nuclear
power
.
The Political Advantages of the Conservative Bias
The conservative bias in policy analysis exists and persists not
simply because of the positivistic assumptions characteristic of analy-
sis, but because it is advantageous to certain groups in society. For
example, it has certainly proved convenient to policy analysts them-
selves. The artificial limits this perspective puts on policy choices
certainly serves to make the analyst's job much easier. If the policy
analyst's job is to simplify a complex world of innumerable choices,
then a conservative bias can be quite helpful in that process. As
Charles Lindblom has pointed out, taking for granted the prevailing
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belief system or ideology automatically eliminates a whole set of poli-
cy options from consideration, and thus serves as an "enormous and in-
dispensable aid to the analysis of public policy."
A working commitment ... to a pluralistic democracy and cor-
porate enterprise, for example, permits a policy analyst greatly
to restrict his search for policies and generally to simplify his
analysis so that he can better grasp it. In effect, an ideology
takes certain beliefs out of the gunfire of criticism. These
beliefs
. . . can therefore be introduced into policy analysis
as though they were settled facts. 24
Thus ideology—values and theories
—
gets introduced into policy
discourse as "facts"—not as a matter of deception, but simply because
it is convenient to analysts to do so. Intellectually, it is much
easier to restrict one's attention to "conventional" or "realistic" al-
ternatives, than to have to critically assess the whole range of op-
tions. Kenneth Boulding has described this kind of dogmatism as intel-
lectual agoraphobia (fear of open spaces)—in this case, a "fear of open
spaces of the mind" which is characterized by a "tendency to retreat in-
25
to the cozy, closed spaces of limited agendas and responsibilities."
But all of this discussion of the conservative bias as a function
of policy analysis and policy analysts can be very misleading for the
primary force behind this perspective on policy is political, not in-
tellectual. In the real world of policymaking, policy agendas are
limited and policy options are ignored largely for political reasons,
not analytic ones. And the tendency in policymaking to preserve the
status quo is primarily due to the fact that certain specific interests
benefit from the preservation of current socio-economic arrangements.
Thus the conservative bias in policy analysis is important, not because
it by itself serves to limit our policy options, but because it can
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play a supporting role to political groups who promote and benefit from
those limits. For example, the main reason conservation has not been
considered a viable energy option is not simply the models used in anal-
ysis, but the ability of energy suppliers to focus the attention of
policymakers on supply-side options. The oil and gas lobbies are
widely recognized as two of the most effective forces in Congress. As
the Hairvard Business School study pointed out, there were few powerful
economic groups supporting conservation. "What economic entity has an
interest—economic or otherwise—in promoting (conservation)
,
lobbying
Congress, spending millions to advertise the case? Thus the energy
suppliers pretty much shaped the terms of the debate, and established
26
what was important and what was not." And what was not important,
of course, was conservation; a view that was helped along by the
"neutral" energy policy models discussed earlier.
Thus the conservative bias in policy analysis can often lend
explicit support to various special interest groups—not through any
conspiracy between analysts and special interests, but simply because
they both share the same systemic or ideological assumptions. A good
example of this process can be found in our petroleum policy. Virtually
all energy analysis models assume, in Lindblom's words, "a working com-
mitment to corporate enterprise;" the presumption that private oil com-
panies have the inherent right to own, develop, and profit from oil
resources. Even the analyses done for President Carter, clearly one
of the most outspoken critics of the oil industry to ever inhabit the
White House, presumed that "the private sector will continue its
primary role as the major producers of energy resources." The
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prevalence of this assumption is of course primarily due to the fact
that the right of private ownership and profit are two of the most ba-
sic systemic characteristics of the American economy—two of the essen-
tial elements of capitalist ideology.
However, these kinds of assumptions may have the uncomfortable
effect of supporting oil company interests when they conflict with the
public interest. Analyses which assume the right of corporate owner-
ship and profit implicitly lend support to the right of oil companies
to "hold oil for ransom"—to refuse to produce vitally needed oil until
they are ensured a. high enough profit margin. Thus if one presumes the
continuation of present economic arrangements in the oil industry, one
must logically support oil industry proposals for decontrol and enor-
mous profits. For given a system of production for profit, the only
"realistic" and "viable" way to increase oil production is decontrol.
Thus the systemic assumptions built into most energy policy analyses
can work very much in the private interests of the energy industry.
They effectively eliminate from serious consideration the option of
nationalization—despite the fact that we are now the only major indus-
trial nation which does not have a nationally owned oil company.
Naturalness and Apathy
Acquiescence to the prevailing ideology is, of course, not a
unique characteristic of public policy analysis—it is a common feature
of all societies. All cultures tend to be ethnocentric in the sense
that they think of their own way of life as being natural and inevitable,
The conservative bias in policy analysis is simply a more formalized
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version of this perspective. The persistence of this bias is partially
a function of the fact that it matches a bias already present in the
culture at large. A bias which matches one's own seems not to be a
bias at all.
However, as Barrington Moore Jr. has observed, this kind of
ethnocentricity— this tendency to think of our particular social world
as natural—can have some detrimental effects on politics that we have
not yet considered. It can, he argues, contribute to the view that
certain kinds of social and economic problems are "natural" or "inevi-
table" and therefore do not deserve serious policy attention. In his
study, called Injustice
, Moore examined examples of people who have
been the victims of injustice, from the Hindu Untouchables to the Jews
of Nazi Germany and found that "people so often put up with being the
victims of society," because they believe that "the portion of human
misery caused by the workings of social institutions" are not really
27
man-made, but "part of the natural order of the universe." Thus a
positivistic perspective on our social world may only serve to produce
or reinforce apathetic attitudes toward persistent social problems.
One good example of this phenomena is the problem of structural
unemployment. It has been common for modern economic analysts to
maintain that a certain level of unemployment—4.5% is now a popular
figure— is normal or natural. In fact, some have suggested that we of-
ficially redefine full-employment to mean 4.5% unemployment or less.
In effect this would "solve" the problem by declaring it normal—by
defining it away. But of course this level of unemployment is simply
a characteristic of our particular economy and not an objective
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necessity. Indeed, many socialist states and even some Western Euro-
pean states do not consider 4.5% to be normal, and this level would be
considered a matter which would demand immediate attention. But if
some analysts have their way, once unemployment here is down to 4.5%,
it would cease to exist as an issue at all.
Again, this acquiescent attitude in policy analysis would not be
so worrisome if it did not dovetail so neatly with developing public
sentiments. As numerous opinion polls have indicated, the public seems
to be becoming increasingly pessimistic about the future and especially
our ability to solve many of our persistent social and economic prob-
lems. On the policymaking level, this kind of pessimistic perspective
was best expressed in President Carter's famous observation that
"government cannot solve all our problems, . . . cannot eliminate pover-
ty, provide a bountiful economy, reduce inflation, save our cities,
28
cure illiteracy, provide energy, or mandate goodness." Positivist
policy analysis can help legitimatize this kind of resignation by por-
traying our socio-economic problems as natural and inevitable—as
simply "facts of life." As "realistic" policy analysts are fond of
pointing out, "the descriptive approach (to policy analysis) accepts the
29
facts of life." To be fair, it may be true that certain problems are
indeed inevitable—our limited supplies of natural resources might be
a good example. But the false air of naturalness that positivistic
analysis can lend to problems can only do a disservice to policymakers
and the public by obscuring the issue of which of these problems are
indeed "facts of life," and which are simply a function of the present
structure and operation of our particular socio-economic system, and
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thus may be potentially solvable.
Normalizing Risks
The final form of the conservative bias that we will consider is
also one of its most currently popular forms: comparative risk analy-
sis. Typically, this technique involves comparing the risks of some
new activity—say the production of a new chemical that may have car-
cinogenic effects—with the "normal" risks taken by people in our so-
ciety. First one Identifies a series of risks that people normally
accept. Automobiles are a favorite example: thousands of people die
every year in car accidents and yet people continue to buy and drive
cars. Also although dams are known to burst, people continue to volun-
tarily build houses downstream from them. People normally climb lad-
ders despite the risks, and so forth. One then calculates the probabil-
ities for these kinds of accidents and these figures become the standard
of acceptability for new public projects. One calculates the cancer
risks involved with the new chemical, and if those risks are similar or
lower to the "normal" risks, the chemical is approved.
This kind of reasoning is typical in policy analyses which have
tried to minimize the health risks associated with complex energy
technologies like synthetic fuels and nuclear reactors. The Rasmussen
30
Report, for example, included a table comparing the estimated proba-
bilities of a nuclear fatality with those for auto accidents, falls,
fires, tornadoes, etc., in an effort to show that nuclear reactors are
more Innocent of risk than most of life's hazards. And in his article
arguing the "relative safety of nuclear reactors," Hans Bethe invoked
169
this same technique, arguing that "A reactor accident ... is less
32serious than many minor wars."
There are of course a number of different problems with this
approach to risk evaluation. For example, this approach seems to have
a very questionable method for ascertaining whether the public accepts
a risk. For instance, from past public behavior, it is simply inferred
that Americans accept the fact that 50,000 people a year will die in
auto accidents? Do people really "accept" this? When did they "decide"
to accept this risk? Acceptance implies that there is some kind of
voluntary choice involved, but in fact most people have very little
choice about driving a car. If there are no viable alternatives to
the car—say, extensive mass transit systems
—
people can do little but
"accept" the risks associated with driving. In short, observing be-
havior often tells us little about whether public acquiescence to a
risk is conscious or voluntary; and would thus seem to be a poor way
to make those crucial value judgments about risks. It would make more
sense to consult the public directly, and let them express their views
of risks through democratic political processes.
For our purpose, though, the most telling criticism of this
approach is the following: even if people accepted one risk in the
past—say, living downstream from a dam—it is faulty to assume that
they would be willing to accept additional numbers of comparable risks
—let's say, living close to a nuclear reactor also. Could not a ra-
tional person accept one of those risks, but not both? Is there not a
limit to the number of comparative risks that a person would want to
accept? It is one thing to accept one potentially carcinogenic food
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additive, but it is quite another to accept scores of them. Compara-
tive risk analysis makes the mistake of assuming that values are
stable—that past risk choices are a legitimate indication of future
choices—which leaves out the distinct possibility that the public
could change its mind on what an acceptable risk is, or on the number
of risks it is willing to take. This is another example in analysis
of the tendency to see the future as merely an extrapolation of the
past. It is also another argument for why risks decisions should be
made directly by the public, instead of through analytic technique
—
the political approach could more easily express changing public senti-
ments on the acceptability of the risks of modern industrial life.
These shortcomings in comparative risks analysis would only be
of theoretical concern, if not for the fact that they quickly translate
into political problems. Because of its tendency to rationalize the
acceptance of risks, this method of analysis has quickly been seized
upon by numerous political and economic groups who wish to promote
products and projects that serve their own interests, but have been im-
peded by the fact that they expose the public to significant risks.
The nuclear industry is only one example; as David Noble points out,
the chemical industry has also gotten heavily into this method as a way
of dismissing public concern over the safety of its products.
In the past when regulators identified a chemical as carcino-
genic, that charge alone was enough to alarm the public, rally
support behind the regulation, and put the chemical industry
on the defensive. Today corporations like Union Carbide have
begun to shift the very nature of the debate. They now readily
concede that their products are carcinogenic, but blandly insist
that the acknowledged risk of cancer be put in "perspective,"
that it be compared with other risks and traded off against pro-
duct benefits. Life after all, is risky. . . . Horrified by the
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consequences of carcinogenic pollutants? You take a greater
risk driving to work every day. So what's all the fuss
about? 32
Unfortunately, this kind of argument can be very effective, not because
it is rational, but because people usually get tired of thinking about
all the risks they face in their food, water, and air. One cannot
live with continual fear; and so if risks continue long enough, they
begin to be thought of as normal—or more accurately, not thought of
at all. And so it is quite possible that the public will eventually
get bored with the risks of carcinogenic chemicals or nuclear power,
the same way they have become bored by the 50,000 deaths a year on our
highways, or the hundreds of thousands who die each year from cancer
caused by smoking. What is worrisome about this is not just the risks
and dangers that are being ignored—but how deadened and insensitive
we can become as human beings.
The Necessity of Flexibility
Finally, it is worth reiterating the point that one does not
have to be anti-nuclear, anti-corporate, or anti-growth to conclude
that the various forms of conservative bias we have discussed are un-
desirable ways to approach public policy. For irrespective of the par-
ticular interests and policies that this bias supports or undermines,
it can be considered dysfunctional simply because it stifles policy
creativity and puts artificial limits on our policy options. It
limits our vision to those policies which are compatible with current
systemic characteristics and ideology—a process which Introduced undue
inflexibility and narrowness to our political considerations.
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Flexibility is an extremely important value in policymaking. It enables
a society to respond to the unpredictable and ever-changing develop-
ments that it inevitably faces. As we s'aw earlier, part of the problems
we are experiencing in energy policy stem from an inability to adapt
our socio-economic system to the developing scarcity of energy resources.
A blind commitment on the part of policy analysts to "working within
our political and economic system" only serves to worsen this problem.
If a society is to remain healthy and prosperous, it must be able to
question its own assumptions and to adapt and change its structure in
the face of changing conditions. Thus, if there is any law of nature
that is to serve as a guide for public policy analysis, it should be the
one that mandates that any organism or eco-system which cannot adapt
itself to a changing environment faces sure extinction.
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CHAPTER VIII
POLICY ANALYSIS AS PROMOTING POSSIBILITIES
Normal politics is indeed "the art of the possible"; it
consists in working as best one can for valued objectives
"within the system"— that is, inside the current political
paradigm. However, politiking (to give it its true name)
is only one part of politics, and the lesser part of that;
in its truest sense, politics is the art of creating new
possibilities for human progress.
William Ophuls
Ecology and the
Politics of Scarcity
As the previous chapters have shown, many of the problems affect-
ing public policy analysis are rooted in its conceptual structure, in
the positivistic assumptions and quest for scientific rationality that
underlie this perspective on policy. Therefore any attempts to over-
come these problems must necessarily begin with an effort to modify
this analytic perspective. That is the subject of Part II of this
dissertation.
It is important to note, however, that a non-positivist approach
to policy analysis is more than simply an attempt to not make the
positivist mistakes described in the previous chapters. The non-posi-
tivist approach to be discussed in the next chapters in an attempt to
bring a new perspective to policy analysis—one based on the insights
of the interpretive approach to social analysis. This interpretive
approach will add something to policy analysis; a new understanding of
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the nature of social reality and nature of policy decisions that will
give us a fresh perspective on issues like energy and growth. Probably
the most crucial element that an non-positivist/interpretive approach
will add to policy analysis is a humanism ; for in many ways the central
problem with the positivist perspective is its denial of some of the
most basic characteristics of human reality. Often the scientistic
approach obscures the intensely human nature of the subject being
studied. For example, the positivistic assumption of the methodological
unity of the natural and social sciences (a notion explored in chapters
V and VII above) explicitly denies the uniqueness of human reality. It
ignores the fact that human reality is constituted in part by our
mutually held beliefs, whereas physical reality is not. A humanistic
approach to policy analysis would necessarily attempt to incorporate
this new interpretive understanding of the unique nature of human
reality into its approach to policy studies. As will soon be evident,
this new analytic assumption brings with it new implications for how
we perceive policy choices.
In these next five chapters, I will build an alternative approach
to positivistic policy analysis—a humanistic approach to policy
analysis. I will discuss not only the essential elements of this
approach, but also consider how these elements can be incorporated into
actual policy studies. This discussion will also include a considera-
tion of the extent to which some policy analysts have begun to do
studies which embody this humanistic model. The approach consists of
three basic elements:
As mentioned above, one of the' elements of a humanistic
perspective is the assumption that human reality is con-
stituted by the beliefs of those who participate in it.
In the rest of this chapter, I will show that this assumption
carries with it some important implications for how we
should perceive policy options. In particular, this
assumption implies a more serious development and explora-
tion of a wider range of policy possibilities than is typical
in positivistic policy analysis.
Another key assumption in a humanistic approach to policy
analysis is that values lie at the heart of all human
decisions, and that analysts can and should begin to bring
rationality to these value choices. This notion stands
in contrast to the positivist assumption that a consider-
ation of values is basically inappropriate in rational
policy analysis. In Chapter IX, I will use the work of
modern moral philosophers to support my argument that the
rational analysis of normative issues deserves a key
position in policy studies; in Chapter X. I will illustrate
how this value-oriented policy analysis can impact on
on specific policy decisions.
The final animating assumption of the humanistic approach
is that policy analysis is an inherently political activity.
Given that human policy decisions are inherently political
in nature, a humanistic perspective necessarily acknowledges
that the activity of recommending policy choices has strong
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political implications. In Chapter XI, I will explore
the political ramifications of an approach to analysis
that focuses on values, and delineate how this per-
spective logically supports a more participatory mode
of policy analysis and policy decisions.
To finish my consideration of this humanistic approach to policy
analysis, there will be a final chapter in which I will return more
explicitly to the subject of energy growth and illustrate how this
humanistic analytic perspective would effect the way analysts and policy-
makers approach this vital policy issue. For now, however, let us begin
the consideration of the first element in the humanistic model. I will
start where the previous chapter ended, with a consideration of the
conservative bias in analysis. I will show how humanistic analytic
assumptions can help to overcome this bias, and how this new perspective
can begin to illuminate a wider range of policy possibilities.
Transcending the Conservative Bias
By acknowledging the unique characteristics of human reality
policy analysis can begin to overcome the conservative bias in policy
analysts. By recognizing that social reality is constituted in large
part by our beliefs, and that those beliefs are subject to change, two
important changes in perspective can be accomplished. First, analysts
can begin to pierce the naturalistic mask that overlays much of
current policy. Many of the key terms that analysts use to describe
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current policies—"realistic," "feasable," "rational," "necessary,"
"viable," and "practical"—can begin to be stripped of their neutral
and objective connotations. These terms can now be perceived as
ideological and system-bound concepts; concepts that are relative to
the socio-economic system that is assumed by the analyst. A human-
istic perspective on policy would make it clear that many of the
constraints that limit our policy choices only exist given our current
socio-economic arrangements, and that what may seem impractical, un-
reasonable, or irrational in one human system, may not in another.
A second, more positive implication of the realization of the
unique and changable nature of human reality is that analysts can begin
to more actively explore and report on a wider range of policy options
—
including options which challenge or go beyond current socio-economic
assumptions. Policy studies developed from the humanistic model of
policy analysis would not confine themselves to proposals that are
consistent with the reigning ideology or the conventional wisdom,
but also seek to include a serious consideration of proposed explana-
tions and solutions to our social problems which would require modifi-
cation of current assumptions and social arrangements to become viable.
Moreover, from the perspective of a humanistic model, the job of the
analyst would not be simply to dismiss those goals and values which
"are not consistent with current realities," but to show us how
current realities can be changed in order that we may achieve those
cherished human values. This would be an important shift in emphasis;
181
for now the role of the analyst would not be to limit our political
vision and imagination, but to expand them by offering a truly wide
variety of policy alternatives based on different theories and models
of social life. From a humanistic perspective, public policy analysis
should not dampen our public hopes, it should enliven them. As we
have seen, the positivistic perspective can all too easily become
burdened with a sense of determinism and inevitability, where trend
becomes fate, and where the social world becomes solidified and
closed-up. In contrast to this, a more humanistic approach to policy
analysis would embrace a more open and more hopeful vision of society,
based on the recognition of and faith in the human capacity to be
creative and change. It would assume and emphasize our ability to
solve problems by living differently and beginning anew. In this
sense, a humanistic approach to policy would function as an optimistic
voice in the modern world—one which encouraged hope rather than
resignation and hopelessness
.
Such terms as "faith" and "hope" may seem out of place in the
context of such a serious (i.e., scientific) activity. To use such
terms leaves one open to charges of naivete and idealism. To be
taken seriously, most policy analysts must cultivate an image of
themselves as hard-nosed realists. To a realist, notions like hope
represent a kind of irrationality, a kind of wishful thinking that
can only produce well-intentioned, but doomed policies. This view
182
betrays a very unrealistic understanding of social reality, and a
failure to appreciate the very real role that faith and hope can
play in policies promoting social change. Hope can be seen as
rational, and it can play a beneficial role in policy analysis—but
in order to see this, we must reconsider once again the difference
between natural and social reality.
Hope as a Self-fulfilling Prophecy
Social reality, unlike natural reality, is ordered by beliefs;
and part of those ordering beliefs are those theories and assumptions
that are generated and promulgated by policy analysts and policymakers.
Thus the social theories and models used in analysis can actually
become part of the subject they seek to describe— those theories can
enter into society and actually help to orient social behavior. Indeed,
that is part of their intention. But a curious phenomenon can result
from this: those theories and assumptions can become self-fulfilling
prophecies They can contribute to their own fulfillment. The existence
of this unique social phenomenon means that it can make quite a differ-
ence whether analysts assume pessimistic or optimistic social theories.
As one interpretive theorist, William Connolly, has pointed out, a
pessimistic theoretical assumption can sometimes work to create the
very situation it fears.
Suppose, as a participant in a social setting, I hold the
Hobbesian theory that human beings are essentially egoistic.
Influenced by this belief, I will be tempted secretly to break
community rules based on mutual trust. If I don't, my reason-
ing goes, others will, and I will then be placed at a
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comparative disadvantage. As others realize that I respond
in this way to them, they will conclude that it would be
dangerous for them to abide by the common rules: for such
conformity threatens to put them at a disadvantage against
people like me. As each suspects that the others will not
do their part, the arrangements of mutual trust become
unstable. My theory about human nature thereby contributes
both to the instability and to the production of evidence
in support of my initial theory. The evidential support in
turn encourages others to conclude that the theory is correct
and thus to reinforce even further defensive responses to
the expected selfishness of others. The theory itself thus
again encourages the behavior it expects and the behavior
provides more evidence to sustain the theory.-^
A process very similar to this can occur in policy analysis. The
models used in policy analysis produce predictions about the way that
our social system will operate; these predictions serve as guides
for our policy actions, actions which may in turn ensure that society
does in fact operate in the way predicted. We can see this phenomenon
at work in policies concerning continuing economic and energy growth:
if we assume a society in which growth must be continual, then we will
enact policies to ensure that it will happen, which in turn is taken
as evidence that growth is necessary and inevitable. Herman Daly
explains the logic of this process nicely:
Suppose that a forecast shows that the future will very
likely be X. Next it is shown that for X to happen, the
necessary conditions Y and Z must also happen. Then it is
concluded that to ease the transition toward our "destiny,"
K, we must strive for Y and Z. But as often as not, either
Y or Z or both turn out to be not only necessary but also
sufficient conditions for X, so that in preparing for the
predicted future we in fact bring it to pass. The pre-
diction is self-fulfilling because it was, from the begin-
ning, more in the domain of planning than of prediction. . . .
If the Edison Electric Institute makes a projection of energy
demand for the year 2000, and the number is such that supply
can meet it only with a crash program of building breeder
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reactors, and we undertake such a program, then barring
technical failure and nuclear war, the Edison Electric
Institute's projection will be borne out.^
Thus social predictions are not simply just detached descriptions
of the future, but can function to actually help create the future in
their own image. As Daly points out, they become a kind of de facto
planning. This process of analytic theories and assumptions becoming
self-fulfilling prophecies is, as we saw in the last chapter, often
most evident when assumptions tend to perpetuate the status quo. But
could not this same phenomenon be at work in the process of social
change? Could it be that analytic assumptions which view optimistically
the possibility of change may actually make change more possible? Or
to put it more in terms of policy analysis, might not policy plans
which are guided by analyses which assume the possibility of a dif-
ferent and better way of life also become self-fulfilling prophecies?
In other words, as long as the assumptions in analysis can sometimes
contribute to their own fulfillment, why not favor the more optimistic
assumptions? This is, in fact, exactly what Connolly argues:
Concepts and beliefs about social life help to some degree
to constitute that life. Therefore, privileging the more
optimistic assumption might well help both to bring out
evidence in its support previously unavailable and to con-
tribute itself to the optimistic possibility .... Conduct
based on more optimistic beliefs can sometimes contribute
to their fulfillment. Arnold Kaufman, in his defense of
citizen participation in group decision processes, captures
this idea nicely: "The effort to achieve a possible good
(sometimes) depends on our belief in the possibility of
that achievement— the very nerve of our effort to achieve a
good may be cut by premature admission of its impossibility.-^
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Lest this begin to sound like pollyannaism or policy through
wishful thinking, it should be pointed out that not all assumptions
are self-fulfilling prophecies. Also, it is not being argued that
optimistic assumptions are sufficient in themselves to cause desired
social change, only that optimistic assumptions can sometimes be a
necessary factor in the process of change. Still, despite these
obvious limitations, there is reason to believe that there are potential
benefits from "privileging the more optimistic assumption" in policy
analysis. Consider, for example, some recent policy changes enacted
by several local libraries in the United States. One of the per-
sistent problems afflicting many libraries is that of book thefts and
over-due books. In dealing with this problem, roughly two sets of
assumptions— two models of public behavior—have been available to
library policymakers. First, one can adopt the "realistic" model,
and assume that this problem is due to the irresponsible and selfish
nature of the public. Assuming that human nature will not change,
the logical policy option is to install expensive and elaborate
electronic detection systems at their doors to deter thief s, and to
initiate a stiff fine system to ensure books are returned on time.
While producing some success, this system has also produced some
resentment on the part of patrons. On the other hand a handful of
libraries have adopted a radically different policy and have elimi-
nated check-out systems entirely, allowing patrons to take as many
books as they want and return them when they are done. The assumption
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here was that if people are treated as responsible beings, they
tend to act that way, and an effort was made to educate the public
on how the effective running of the library depended primarily on
them. Many of these libraries have enthusiastically reported this
policy is working as well or better than previous systems.'^ Thus it
seems that in at least this case, policies based on trust and an
optimistic view of human nature can be self-fulfilling prophecies.
Given this phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecy, then, a good
case can be made for including a serious consideration of a wide
variety of policy proposals and assumptions in policy studies—even
those suggestions which may. not appear at first to be "realistic."
This phenomenon also implies that the inclusion of an element of faith
or hope in policy analysis is not necessarily a "naive" or "hopelessly
idealistic" act. There are good reasons why these notions are a central
part of human experience, and why they deserve a place in practice of
policy analysis— they are often crucial to any prospect of a better
world. In some situations, faith and hope are the only realistic
alternatives.
Multi-Perspective Policy Analysis
What would a humanistic policy analysis informed by this sense
of hope and wider possibilities actually look like? It would most
likely have to be some form of multi-perspective approach—that is, an
approach which incorporates a number of competing perspectives on
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policy issues. This would be an explicit attempt to get away from
the use of one model and one set of assumptions by using several
different sets of models and assumptions. Instead of analysts re-
stricting themselves to the one most "plausible" or "realistic" set of
assumptions, they would be encouraged to explore a wide variety of
assumptions. For example, a study might give consideration to several
different explanations of a particular socio-economic problem and
demonstrate the implications these competing explanatory frameworks
have on policy formation.^ One of the obvious advantages of the
multi-perspective approach is that once policy discourse is cast in
terms of competing perspectives, it is more likely that citizens
and policymakers will become more aware of the importance of assumptions
in policy analysis and decisions. Clashing perspectives tend to expose
rather than obscure underlying presuppositions.
Of course, a multi-perspective approach to policy analysis is
not a totally new suggestion. There have been several steps taken in
this direction already. One of the most promising is a multi-scenario
approach to analysis in which studies explore a number of competing
visions of the future. Scenarios start with the present state of the
world, and then shows, in a step by step fashion, how various futures
might develop.^ Importantly, scenarios are not intended to be pre-
dictions of the future, but explorations of various possible futures
even those which may not seem particularly plausable at the moment.
Scenarios, like any form of analysis, can be done either well or poorly.
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When they are done well, they emphasize, instead of a future that
is the product of inevitable trends and constraints, a future that is
shaped by the decisions we make today. Multi-scenario analysis
accentuates the importance of human agency in human affairs. It was
once said that science discovers order in the world, while art seeks
to create new orders. If this is true, then a multi-scenario approach
to analysis is more like art than science, for it seeks to explore how
various new future orders can be created. Let us consider what the
art of multi-scenario analysis can look like in practice.
Several of the most provocative analyses of our national energy
policy done to date have utilized verions of this approach. A classic
example is A Time to Choose
,
the comprehensive study of energy policy
released by the Ford Foundation in 1974. The study began with a
macro-economic models developed by Data Resources Inc. The exogenous
assumptions of the model were first calibrated to produce a Historical
Growth Scenario. In this scenario it was assumed that energy demand
in the United States would continue to grow at the historical rate
—
3.4% annually—until at least the end of the century. It further
assumed that no deliberate effort would be made to alter current patterns
of energy use, and that a vigorous effort would be made to enlarge non-
renewable supplies to keep up with rising demand.
Next, the energy assumptions in the model were adjusted to
produce another scenario— the Technical-Fix Growth Scenario, in which
it was assumed that energy conservation practices and energy saving
189
technologies would be incorporated into production and consumption
patterns to the extent possible within existing life-styles and
economic organization. Energy demand would grow at a 1.9% annual
rate. In the words of the study, "Technical Fix is leaner and trimmer,
but basically on the same track as Historical Growth." Finally, the
models was adjusted to produce a Zero Energy Growth Scenario, in which
it was assumed that in addition to the technical fix measures, there
would also be changes in life-styles and economic structure to produce
a situation of constant energy consumption. This would be primarily
accomplished by "small but distinct redirections of economic growth,
away from energy-intensive industries toward economic activities that
require less energy."^
The study caused quite a controversy when it was made public.
It concluded, among other things, that the Historical Growth Scenario
which dominated policymakers considerations at that time could produce
major economic, environmental, and foreign policy problems in the
near future, and severely limit our ability to pick and choose among
various energy sources. Virtually all sources would have to be ex-
ploited heavily, including coal and nuclear power. Further, the other
two scenarios suggested that the growth in energy demand could slow or
stop without unduly harming economic growth. This was the first
major study to seriously question the iron-link between energy and GNP.
These conclusions gave a considerable boost to those groups seeking
to emphasize conservation and alternative energy sources, and the
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report was one of the first to lend some legitimacy to the Zero
Energy Growth alternative. As Herman Daly pointed out, "the Ford
Foundation Energy Policy Project took seriously the alternative of
zero energy growth, and included it as one of their three possible
scenarios for the future, thus giving a certain respectability to
what (many in government) and others evidently still consider a 'far
out' idea." 1° In addition, the study played a part in informing
Jimmy Carter's energy plan, with several top analysts from the project
participation in its early development. Carter's emphasis on conser-
vation (in word, if not in deed) can be partially attributed to the
influence of this scenario study.
The Need for Pluralistic Research Funding
However, inspite of its contribution to broadening the range
of energy policy debate in the U.S., the Ford Study is perhaps not
the best example of this multi-scenario technique. Ideally, if this
analytic technique is to be most useful and provocative, it must in-
corporate a wide variety of assumptions. For example, scenarios should
include a range of possible socio-economic theories— for these theories
are one of the key constraints on policymaking. But the Ford Study
actually incorporated only a very narrow range of different assumptions,
The models used in the scenarios were virtually alike, except for
differing assumptions about the level of energy demand. "The general
specifications of the macro-economic model were held unchanged in the
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three different energy scenarios; only energy specific parameters
were varied to secure the move between the three alternative growth
paths. Thus none of the scenarios seriously challenged conventional
economic theory, or the need for continuous economic growth. All
scenarios simply assumed "a steady growth in gross national product and
nl2income." It is of course debatable as to how wide a range of assump-
tions is desirable in this approach; but if one of the purposes of this
technique is to avoid the conservative bias, then it would seem
necessary to construct scenarios which embody truly competing socio-
economic theories
.
To be fair, it might be too much to expect one policy analysis
team to produce scenarios embodying a full range of socio-economic
assumptions. It is difficult for one analyst to be intimately familiar
with more than one theoretical system. This however is not so much
an argument against the feasibility of this scenario technique, as
it is a commentary of the limitations inherent in the One-Big-Report
approach to policy analysis. Instead of expecting one team to produce
a series of analyses based on different assumptions, it would be more
realistic to commission a series of reports done by analysts with
different theoretical frameworks. This would ensure that truly alter-
native scenarios were presented with equal vigor. All too often,
policy research grants go to those organizations which uphold current
assumptions, instead of groups who seek to challenge those assumptions
and propose alternative socio-economic arrangements. But just the
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opposite should be the case; policy research funding should seek to
break down analytic hegemony by going, in part, to those research
groups who seek to expand our options beyond current horizons. This
would enable alternative perspectives on policy issues to be more
fully developed and presented to a national audience. This approach
assumes of course that the purpose of funding policy research is to
expand our choices and not to simply confirm current political pre-
judices—which is a highly debatable assumption.
Scenarios as Qualitative Analysis: The Work of Amory Lovins
Perhaps the most famous scenario analysis done in the area of
energy policy is the Hard Path/Soft Path choice set out by Amory Lovins.
Beginning with his article in the October, 1976 edition of Foreign
Affairs
,
"Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken," Lovins has argued that
the choice facing the nation in energy policy is between two mutually
exclusive paths, one characterized by hard technology, the other by
soft technology. The Hard Path assumed continued energy growth met
by non-renewable resources utilizing centralized, complex, capital
intensive technologies, with an emphasis on centralized electricity
production. In contrast, the Soft Path emphasized conservation,
renewable resources, and relatively simple, decentralized technologies
that were more compatible with the environment.
One of the most unique and provocative aspects of Lovins'
analysis is its emphasis on a qualitative as well as quantitative
description of these two scenarios. Instead of focusing, primarily
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on the quantitative—usually economic—dimensions of our energy
choices, Lovins seeks to give equal time to discussing the moral,
social, and political implications of these two different energy
paths. In his book. Soft Energy Paths
,
^ Lovins not only includes
chapters on economic issues like the capital requirements of different
technologies, but also chapters with titles like "Sociopolitics ,
"
and "Values." He concludes that following the Hard Path is not only
economically undesirable, but that it would also tend to encourage
elitist technocracy, concentrate economic and political power, foster
increased bureaucratization and alienation, encourage urbanization,
and produce greater distributional inequity within and between nations.
On the other hand, he claims that the Soft Path would foster more
local control, increase participation in the political and economic
system, encourage the creation of a society that is more diverse,
pluralistic, and egalitarian.
The effect of Lovins' analysis was immediate. Less than two
months after publication of his article in Foreign Affairs , Lovins
was summoned to Congress to testify about his work before a joint
hearing of two U.S. Senate committees. Soon afterward, he was also
asked to vist the White House and the Department of Energy to present
his controversial views. Irrespective of whether one thinks of
Lovins as a "genius" or a "pied piper," it is clear that his analysis
has changed the way many people think about our energy choices. His
book. Soft Energy Paths , has been called the
"Bible" and the
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"Das Kapital" of the alternative energy movement, and Lovin's has
been described even by one of his critics as "the most articulate writer
on energy in the world today. "''^
I believe that at least part of the success of Lovins ' analysis
can be attributed to his methodology—a scenario approach which ex-
plicitly addressed the moral, social, and political implications of
our energy options. By including these elements in his scenarios, he
was able to portray a much more rich and vivid vision of the future
implied in our energy choices—a vision described in very human terms,
and thus more easily understood and appreciated by the average citizen.
As Lovins explains it, scenarios should be "descriptions of how future
events (could) unfold, described chronologically and at least quali-
tatively in sufficiently vivid detail that readers can readily imagine
themselves participating in the events they describe. ""^^ Conventional
forms of policy analysis, like cost-benefit analysis, because they tend
to focus on the quantitative, economic implications of policies,
often times fail to portray the full human implication of policy choices.
As Charles Taylor has observed, they can distort our understanding of
policy decisions by portraying them as decisions about having more or
less of something—as if policies only produce quantitative changes in
1 c
society. He argued that in actuality, most important policy decisions
were qualitative in nature and involved choosing between this way of
life and that way of life.
By using scenario analysis, it can be made clear that the choices
facing us in areas like energy policy are not simply technological or
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economic, but choices between different ways of living our lives,
different sets of moral, political, and environmental relationships.
For example, the fact that we are talking about alternative ways
of life is made very evident in the following frugal, soft-path scene
painted by Robin Clarke:
A countryside dotted with windmills and solar houses, studded
with intensively but organically-worked plots of lands; food
production systems dependent on the integration of many different
species, with timber, fish, animals, and plants playing mutually
dependent roles; with wilderness areas plentiful and available
. . . a life-style for men and women which involved hard physi-
cal work but not over-excessively long hours or in a tediously
repetitive way; ... a political system so decentralized and
small that individuals—all individuals—could play more than
a formal, once-every four years role.l^
One need not agree with this somewhat extreme vision to appreciate
the power and utility of the scenario approach it illustrates. When
it is done well, it portrays in a vivid way the full human implica-
tions of our policy choices. In this way, it is a useful way of trans-
cending the kind of narrow, "factual" perspective on policy issues
that was discussed in Chapter I. Instead of relegating the social
and political dimensions of policy issues to a secondary status, a
scenario approach to analysis helps to bring them to the forefront
and grants them a legitimacy in policy deliberations. Thus one of the
most exciting potentials present in this scenario approach is not only
its ability to widen our analytic vision by portraying a number of
different possible futures, but also its ability to deepen our
analytic understanding by giving us a more rich and detailed vision
of what policy choices mean to our lives.
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Incorporating Multiple Normative/Theoretical Perspectives
While scenario analysis has promise as a way of developing a sense
of wider possibilities in analysis, it is not a fully developed form
of multi-perspective analysis. In order for an analysis to be truly
multi-perspective, it must not only incorporate a number of different
models and visions of the future, but it must also evaluate them from
a number of different normative/ theoretical frameworks. If, for
example, no attempt is made to consider a variety of value perspectlvss
in the evaluation of different policy options and scenarios, scenario
analysis could easily degenerate into just an elaborate form of cost-
benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis does consider a variety of
policy options, but these options are evaluated from a single, fixed
value perspective. It assumes uniform agreement about what is a cost,
1 Q
what is a benefit, and what they are worth. But in a fully developed
multi-perspective analysis, this uniformity would not be assumed. In-
stead, it would assume a plurality of value and interest perspective
—
as actually exists in the real world. As a result, it becomes more
clear that policy choices are not simply a matter of objective calcu-
lations, but a matter of value choices. A policy study which Illustrates
this point very nicely is Solar Energy in America's Future , a report
done by the Stanford Research Institute for the Energy Research and
Development Agency in 1977.-*-^ The report studied the feasibility and
desirability of expanding the role of solar energy in our energy system.
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Almost immediately, the researchers realized that one's understanding
and evaluation of solar energy depended primarily on one's "perspec-
tive"—i.e., one's normative-theoretical framework. So they set out
to produce an analysis which demonstrated that what was at issue here
was not so much a set of technological choices, but a choice between
different views of reality, of which values were a crucial part.
Their aim, in their own words, was to produce an "analysis of policy
issues (beginning with the assumption that groups experience different
perceptual realities
. . . (that) when people appear to be arguing
about technical issues or choices among energy options, they may in
fact be arguing from different fundamental perceptions of the nature
of social reality. "2^
First, three scenarios were constructed: A Reference Scenario
(the familiar hard path, with high demand met with hard technology);
a Solar Emphasis Scenario (high demand, with an emphasis on soft energy
technologies); and a Low Demand Scenario (low demand and soft tech-
nology) . These three scenarios were then evaluated from the perspec-
tives of three individuals using different normative and theoretical
assumptions. The first perspective (which I will call the Status-Quo
Perspective) assumes that continued economic, material, and techno-
logical growth; centalization, and free enterprise are all desirable
and necessary. The second perspective (the Environmentalist Perspective)
stressed the limits to growth, and emphasized the desirability of
decentralization, simplicity, and frugality, and seeks to maximize
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social and environmental values. The third perspective (the
Radical Perspective) assumes the values of the Environmentalist
Perspectives, but differs theoretically by stressing that those values
cannot be realized within the current structure of society and the
economy, and emphasizes the necessity of fundamental transformation of
culture, institutions and world view as the answer to our energy/
environmental problems. Table 2 summarizes how these different per-
spectives view the three scenarios
.
The Relativity Trap
In some ways, the SRI study is multi-perspective analysis at
its best; for it allows us to fully sense not only the range of possible
policy paths but also the extent to which our evaluation of those
options depends so highly on the values and theories that we assume.
It also enables us to appreciate the coherence of other perspectives
on energy policy. However, while this study is a good illustration
of the potentials of this style of policy analysis, it also reveals
one of its most potentially serious problems— the inherent tendency
of this style of analysis to degenerate into an immobilizing kind of
relativism in which each scenario is seen as desirable and valid as
the next one, given the assumptions contained in particular perspectives.
22
As Table 3 illustrates, each scenario can be considered "Right on!"
given a particular perspective. The authors of the report are aware
of this problem:
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TABLE 2
PERSPECTIVES ON SCENARIOS
SCENERIOS PERSPECTIVES
Status Quo Environmentalist Radical
High Demand
—Hard Tech
Of the three, this
is the best future
for the U.S. and
the best hope of
raising the stan-
dard of living of
the poor nations.
Above all, the
nation needs e-
nough energy to
keep the economy
rol 1 ing.
The costs of this
scenario greatly
exceed the bene-
fits. Strong
measures must be
taken to reduce
energy demands
below the levels
of this scenario.
This scenario rep-
resents gluttonous
use of energy in a
world becoming re-
source poor. The
outrageousness of
social and envir-
onmental costs
help to demon-
strate the need
for a new social
order
.
High Demand
—Soft Tech
Solar energy
should be stimu-
lated only moder-
ately; it is gen-
erally desirable
to keep interfer-
ence with the mar-
ket to a minimum.
It is also impor-
tant to keep
energy prices
down to insure
a strong economy
The society must
move in the dir-
to renewable energy
sources and
lowered demand.
The strong stimu-
lation of solar
energy development
in this scenario
is highly desir-
able.
Stimulation of
solar development
is desirable but
the total energy
demand is much too
high. In addi-
tion fundamental
change in economic
and social insti-
tions will be re-
quired for a
rational energy
future
.
Low Demand
—Soft Tech
The low-demand
scenario is absurd;
it endangers all we
have built up and
imposes unnecessary
sacrifices on the
individual. It
would inevitaby
bring a depressed
economy
.
We must choose vol-
untarily a scenerio
with energy demands
as low as this or
lower, in order to
avoid terribly seri-
ous costs in the
long run.
Energy demand as
low or lower than
this must be a-
chieved, but this
is incompatible
with the structure
of the eoncomy.
Fundamental change,
probably coming
about through a
traumatic transi-
tion period, will
be necessary to re-
duce environmental
and social assaults
to tolerable levels.
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TABLE 3
HOW PERSPECTIVES VIEW EACH OTHER
IMRESSION OF
BY PERSONS
WHO HAVE Status Quo
Perspective
Environmentalist
Perspect ive
Radical
Perspect ive
Status Quo
Perspective
Right onl Idealistic
Impractical
Dangerous
,
Revolutionary
Environmentalist
Perspective
Irresponsible Right onl In the right
direction
,
but too
radical
.
More gradual,
rational ap-
proach is
better.
Radical
Perspect ive
Dangerous
Dinosaur-like
In the right
direction, but
unrealistic
about the extent
of fundamental
institutional
change that is
required
.
Right on!
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As we have seen, all three of these perceptions represent
views found among decision makers, analysts and citizens.
All have to be honored in some sense since each "fits" the
observations of his environment as made by the person holding
that view. Presently there appears to be no clear way of
standing apart and objectively determining that one of the
views is more "true" than the other two. No one of these
views can be disproven by "facts" taken from another.
Whichever view society comes to accept, that view will tend
to become more "real. "23
In this sense, the strength of the multi-perspective approach is
also its chief weakness. It requires us to open our minds and to
suspend our notions of common sense in order to appreciate the multi-
plicity of options and perspectives that should be considered; but if
our minds remain too open, we run the risk of slipping into total
relativism and becoming unable to decide which perspective and option
is the right one. Each appears coherent and right given its own
assumptions. It does little good to avoid the trap of objectification,
only to fall into the trap of relativism. It does little good to
multiply options, if we cannot provide some way to choose between them.
This is not merely a philosophical or academic problem. As
Martin Rein has pointed out, it is often difficult for analysts and
policymakers to choose between competing normative/ theoretical frame-
works. This is particularly clear in the area of value assumptions,
for as we saw earlier, most analysts adhere to the positions of value
non-cognitivism and value relativism— the belief that values are
essentially subjective and cannot be proven to be correct. But it
also seems equally difficult to prove which theoretical assumptions
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are valid. If a particular theoretical or explanatory framework
could be shown to be correct, it would not only be shown to be
correct, it would not only indicate what social model we should adopt,
but it would also give us an indication about which values it is
valid to adopt, for as we saw earlier, models help to indicate which
values are practical and achievable in a given society. But the
efforts to test and prove these theories have not been successful or
reliable. For example, it is sometimes helpful to compare various
theories with the known "facts," and thus eliminate from consideration
those theories which are obviously incompatible with our present
information. However, as the SRI report concluded, the present facts
often can support a number of different paradigms. "It may be imposs-
ible at this time to establish which picture among these pictures of
reality is "correct," because the available data can be fitted into
more than one pattern."
Some analysts have suggested a more sophisticated way to test
theoretical frameworks— the construction of policy "experiments" in
order to test which theories actually work in practice. This is the
thrust, for example, of the suggestion put forward by Alice Rivlin in
Systematic Thinking for Social Action . The obvious intention here
is to imitate the analytical approach to the natural sciences. But
again, while this scientistic approach has proved helpful in some
cases, it is far from a reliable technique. It is fraught with both
theoretical and practical problems. For example, because it does not
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acknowledge the unique nature of social reality, it fails to ap-
preciate that "experiments" cannot serve the same purpose in social
analysis as they can in the natural sciences. As I pointed out earlier,
social theories, because they can become self-fulfilling prophecies,
can actually create their own evidence. Testing the predictive
powers of social theories becomes questionable when it is understood
that theories and predictions can actually contribute to their own
fulfillment. 2 Moreover, if a policy experiment fails, this does not
necessarily invalidate the theory underlying it, but only indicating
that it may not be applicable at this point in time. Changes in the
beliefs and values which organize and orient social action might
make that policy a viable one in the future. For example, consider
the policy experiment conducted by one Alaskan town. They took all
of the unclaimed bicycles at the police department, painted them
white, and distributed them in bike racks around town so that residents
could ride from place to place—a sort of poor man's transit system.
Initially, some of the bicycles were stolen and some people called
the program a failure. But the mayor insisted that the program con-
tinue, arguing that it would work once people realized that the
bicycles would always be available and they wouldn't have to steal
them. The changeableness of human beliefs and behavior make theory
testing a difficult endeavor.
There are also more practical problems with constructing valid
social experiments. For one thing, it is often difficult to measure
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social variables with the accuracy necessary for careful experiments.
For instance, in order to draw connections between various variables,
we need to be able to measure them accurately, which is not always
possible. In addition, in social experiments we are often not in a
position to control all the variables involved. Social situations
are so complex, so full of different variables, that it is difficult
to isolate out the limited number of variables necessary for a valid
experiment. And when an experiment fails, it is often difficult to
identify just which variable or variables was actually responsible.^^
In other words, society often makes a poor laboratory.
Back Again Into Politics
Now all of this does not mean that there is no way to choose
between competing frameworks—only that there is no sure, empirical
way to do so. It only indicates what should have been obvious from
the beginning: that the choice of frameworks and perspectives
—
and thus the choice of policies—is a decidedly political activity,
one which depends highly on the values of the chooser. This should
have been clear from our own personal experience, since we all tend
to adopt those socio-economic theories which are most compatible with
our own values. This normal process of choice is usually seen by
policy analysts as a biased and self-serving way to choose among
theories. And there is some truth to that contention; strong value
commitments can tend to blind us to the faults in our favored theories,
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and lead us to ignore facts which are inconsistent with them. But
this does not mean that values never have a sensible place in the
choice process. When we are faced with a situation in which the
facts support a number of different theories, we may be forced to
appeal to values as a final criterion. And as I pointed out earlier,
it may actually make sense to favor the more optimistic assumptions
and theorize in these situations; for given the nature of social
reality, these assumptions may actually contribute to the fulfillment
of valued goals
.
For some, this acknowledgment that the choice of perspectives
and policies is ultimately a value-laden, political activity is a
discouraging admission. It seems to imply that the essence of policy
decisions is forever beyond the realm of rational analysis. But I do
not share this discouragement. First of all, it can only be helpful
to see policy decisions for what they really are: human, and therefore
moral, decisions. A truly humanistic approach to policy analysis
must acknowledge this simple but difficult fact. Secondly, a value-
oriented humanistic approach to policy analysis can only be discouraging
if one assumes that there is no way to evaluate normative issues— that
there is no way to begin to say that some value decisions are worse
than others. But this is an assumption that can and should be chal-
lenged. Indeed, if the humanistic style of policy analysis is to be
relevant and effective, it must not only include acknowledgement of the
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of the centrality of values in analysis, but also a demonstration of
how those value issues can be analyzed rationally in policy studies.
This is the second important element in the humanistic approach and
it forms the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IX
POLICY ANALYSIS AS MORAL RATIONALITY
To assert the necessity of ultimate values in this day and
age is heretical. Scientific orthodoxy says that values
have no epistemological standing; any statement that one
value is to be preferred to another is therefore scientifi-
cally meaningless. And since science is our standard of
social reality, value questions must not be socially mean-
ingful either .... Yet wisdom, if only the rough and ready
kind acquired by everyday living, tells us that not all values
are equal and that virtue matters in life.
William Ophuls
Ecology and the Politics
of Scarcity
We have seen that many- of the limitations and distortions in public
policy analysis are due to the analyst's reluctance or inability to
directly address value questions. But any thorough and relevant approach
to policy analysis must include an attempt to deal with these crucial
questions. Martin Rein has argued that what is needed in the profession
is a "value-critical" approach to analysis, in which "values themselves
become the object of analysis.""'' Robert Dorfman, a leading environ-
mental analyst, has also observed that the ability to address the moral
dimension of policy questions is "the missing ingredient in current
policy analysis."
No one challenges seriously that, in a slavish way, the new
analytic techniques have vastly amplified our ability to design
and appraise projects in the light of given objectives. The
challenge is, rather, that our skills in attaining objectives
^
has outrun our skill in determining or even articulating them.
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In addition, Laurence Tribe, one of the most thoughtful students
of policy analysis, has observed that in the 20th century social
thought reason has become separated from morality. ^ Reason has come to
be thought of as instrumental rationality, which as Dorfman observed
above, is merely concerned with means not ends. Tribe argues that what
is needed in policy analysis today is a "reintegration of reason and
moral perception."'^ It is important to see that this is more than a
philosophical need, that it is a political need as well. The political
world of the 1980 's is an increasingly fragmented one with a multiplying
number of moral and political perspectives on our pressing policy
choices. Not only is there the newly polarized conservative right and
liberal left, but we also have the Environmentalists, the Born Again
Christians, the Libertarians, the Unions, Minority groups, and so on.
We live in a time when society is dis-integrating, a time when society
is increasingly unsure of its values and goals. Policy analysts could
have a constructive part to play in this confusing situation by begin-
ning to bring a thoughtful and analytic approach to the various competing
values being debated in the policy; but as Tribe points out, our current
analytic tools fail us.
Inherited from an era when certain basic values and ideals
seemed to be more clearly (if tacitly) understood and widely
(if not universally) shared, the intellectual and institutional
techniques available to any policy-oriented research institute
seem distinctly ill-adapted to the task of helping to reach
important decisions in more fragmented society, a society which,
for a variety of reasons, is no longer confident about the
priorities among its values, and which is becoming increasingly
aware of the inherent difficulty of choosing among values in
conflict, coupled with the increasingly unavoidable need to do
so . ^
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Clearly, then, a relevant and humanistic approach to policy
analysis must include the attempt to address these crucial normative
questions. Rein, Dorfman, and Tribe all agree that the first step in
this process is to abandon the positivist-emotivist-relativist per-
spective on values which assumes that value judgments are the purely
subjective, arbitrary preferences of the individual. We need a
perspective which assumes that one can critically judge value decisions
and that some values are more important than others, and which begins
to describe how those judgments can be made. That is the object of
this chapter, to remove some philosophical deadwood, and to sketch out
what such a normative policy analysis would look like. In order to do
this, we will have to travel into unfamiliar waters— the realm of moral
philosophy. It is here that the most useful thought concerning the
rationality of moral and value judgments has taken place.
The academic literature advancing the rationality of moral
judgments is extremely rich and varied, ranging from the careful ex-
positions of moral philosophers like Stephen Toulmin and John Rawls
to the more popular forms of "values clarification" that are currently
taught in many secondary schools. This is clearly not the place to
exhaustively survey this field, but it is certainly possible to explore
some of its important contours. I will consider several of the central
thinkers in this area and sample some of their classic lines of argument.
My intention will be to establish the minimum claim of this chapter
—
that it is possible for policy analysis to begin to bring at least some
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rationality to the analysis of the normative judgments in policy
decisions. In the interest of consistency, I will focus primarily on
ethical thinkers who fall roughly within the interpretive approach to
social and philosophical thought— the post-positivist tradition that
has been touched upon throughout this dissertation.
The Rationality in Normative Judgments
It usually comes as a surprise to policy analysts to learn that
their view of values is at least 20 years behind the times
—
philosophi-
cally speaking. As Steven Rhoads observed:
If pressed, most sophisticated analysts would probably say
that there can be no transubjective standard to help determine
what is in the public interest, and they would be surprised
to learn that the contemporary student of philosophy Richard
Flathman has said, "The position that reason is relevant to
value selection and adjudication has the support of the over-
whelming majority of contemporary writers in the fields of
ethics and value theory.
What Flathman has stated is true; ever since the early 1950' s, many of
the prominent philosophers of ethics including Stephen Toulmin, Kurt
Baier, and Kai Nielson have argued that there is a rationality in moral
and value judgments that can be evaluated.^ In an approach which is
obviously indebted to the work of the later Wittgenstein, they argue
that the rationality in these judgments should not be judged by the same
standards of rationality commonly applied to scientific judgments.
Moral and scientific discourse are two different activities (or "forms
of life" as Wittgenstein would say) with somewhat different standards
of nationality. Thus to establish the validity of a normative judgment,
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one need not prove it to be empirically true as in scientific ration-
ality, but simply demonstrate that it is supported by sound reasoning
that could be understood by any rational actor. In keeping with this
understanding, these philosophers have focused their attention on the
logic of moral reasoning, and have argued that it is possible to
evaluate normative judgments, to establish that some moral or value
judgments are more rational and acceptable than others.
However, before we begin to consider how this can be done, a prior
question must be answered: How can moral and value judgments be con-
sidered rational at all? How is it concluded that these judgments are
not simply the arbitrary, subjective preferences of the individual? To
answer this question, I will turn to the work of Charles Taylor, a
leading interpretive social theorist whom we have encountered before in
this dissertation. Once Taylor has laid the philosophical groundwork
justifying the presence of rationality in normative judgments, then
we can move on to consider the work of other moral philosophers who
begin to explain the nature of that rationality.
Is his essay, Neutrality in Political Science , Taylor illustrates
one of the classic lines of argument that demonstrates that there is
o
some rationality in normative judgments. He begins by showing that our
everyday language indicates that we in fact do not consider our moral
judgments to be merely emotional or arbitrary preferences. He argues
that in our everyday lives we all honor an implicit distinction between
moral judgments and mere preferences. He points out that we rarely use
the two notions interchangably in common speech. It sounds natural, for
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instance, to say, "I prefer chocolate ice cream," or "Genocide is
wrong." But it would sound quite odd to say, "I think chocolate ice
cream is wrong," or "I do not prefer genocide." These last phrases
sound odd because the notions of preference and moral choice are not
interchangable—one cannot be reduced to the other.
Taylor maintains that part of the implicit difference between
preferences and value judgments is that we tend to require reasons of
justifications for value judgments, but not for preferences. When
someone prefers a certain kind of ice cream, or a certain color, or
kind of music, we do not usually require justifications for those
choices. But we do for moral judgments. We tend to not notice this
requirement when we agree with a moral judgment, but it becomes evident
when we disagree. We might not question a person who stated that
genocide was bad, but if someone said that genocide was good, we would
most likely demand reasons for such a claim. Or consider the example
used by Taylor. There are two segregationists who disapprove of
miscegenation. In defense of the claim the first argues that mixing
races will produce general unhappiness, a decline in the intellectual
capacity and moral standards of the race, the abolition of creative
tension, and so forth. The second, however, refuses to make any of
these arguments: the race will not deteriorate, man may even be happier
in any case they will be just as intelligent, moral, etc. And yet he
insists that miscegenation is bad. When pressed to produce some reason
he simply says "I do not need to give reasons, moral judgments are
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simply subjective preferences, and cannot be ultimately justified by
reasons and therefore none are required. Micegenation is just bad."
As Taylor concludes,
Now no one would question that the first segregationist was
making the judgment "miscegenation is bad." But in the case
of the second, a difficulty arises. This can be seen as soon
as we ask the question: how can we tell whether this man is
really making a judgment about the badness of micegenation and
not just, say, giving vent to a strongly felt repulsion, or a
neurotic phobia against sexual relations between people of
different races? Now it is essential to the notions of "good"
and "bad" as we use them in judgments that there be a dis-
tinction of this kind between these judgments and expression
of horror, delight, liking, disliking, and so on.^
In short, while some philosophers have gone to lengths to arti-
ficially reduce moral and value judgments into the category of pure
subjective preferences, a careful consideration of the nature of
everyday moral discourse reveals that we demand and give reasons for
those judgments. Taylor is making here what is called a transcendental
argument—an argument that contends that certain principles must be
regarded as correct if certain forms of life or forms of discourse are
to be possible at all.'''^ In this case, Taylor is saying in effect that
for common moral discourse and debate to exist at all, there must be at
least some rationality to normative judgments. Moral discourse would
make little sense, we would have little reason to engage in it if we
believed that values were totally irrational and arbitrary. Thus the
widespread customs of moral persuasion and discourse presuppose that
values can be debated and that moral judgments are based on reasons that
can be evaluated and discussed in a rational manner.
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Taylor's argument against the subjectivity and irrationality of
moral judgments is in many ways simply a modern restatement of a line
of thought that is over 30 years old—one first developed by moral
philosophers like Kai Nielson and Kurt Baier. Nielson, Baier, and others
were part of a movement in moral philosophy that began in the early
1950 's in reaction to emotivist and prescriptivist theories of ethics
which dominated the discipline then. Their approach, which was at
least indirectly based on the philosophical methods associated with
the work of the later Wittgenstein, was to focus on the purposes and
defining characteristics of the activity of moral judgment. They
argued that one of the defining characteristics of moral judgment is
that it is not entirely subjective in nature. For them, moral dis-
course was understood to be inherently concerned with establishing what
are good and bad moral judgments and doing so in such a way that those
conclusions can be reached by any reasonable person. This means that
the validity of such judgments cannot be "dependent on some cultural
or individual idiosyncrasy of the persons involved," but rather, must
be "publically warrantable, that is admit of some publically determin-
able procedure in virtue of which any informed and rational person could
come to accept it."-'--^ This understanding of the nature of moral judg-
ments is confirmed by the way we use the terms "objective" and "sub-
jective" in evaluating moral judgments. By an objective judgment we
mean one which would be arrived at by any impartial, rational person.
We naturally tend to accept such judgments because, as Nielson observes,
"a procedural rule of morality is that the moral agent (as well as the
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moral critic) must, in making moral judgments, try to assume the
viewpoint of an impartial observer. "^^ In contrast, to call someone's
judgment "subjective" is a way of criticising it. As A. Phillips
Griffiths explains.
When someone's judgment is stigmatized as subjective rather
than objective, this means that some idiosyncratic factors
such as the hopes and fears or special interests of the speaker
have affected his judgment; an objective judgment, however, is
one not affected by such idiosyncratic factors but one which
any reasonable and unbiased person would form in the circum-
stances. -'-^
For example, if moral judgments are to be objective or publically
warrantable, then they must be supported by the facts that are commonly
known. As Nielson puts it, "in making a moral judgment .... it must
be possible to give factual reasons in support of the moral claim. "'^
If a moral claim cannot be supported by the facts of a situation this
might indicate that the reasons supporting the claim are primarily sub-
jective. For instance, if someone were to argue that homosexuality
(and therefore gay rights) is bad primarily because gay people harass
straight people and break up their families, but it is well-known that
extensive research has shown that this is not the case, then we might
conclude that the person's judgment is not an objective one, but a
subjective one based on some idiosyncratic factor like a neurotic fear
of homosexuals. In this case, as with the genocide example cited
earlier, it is legitimate to conclude that the argument being made is
not really a moral one at all, but one which simply appeals to sub-
jective prejudices. Nielson and his cohorts insisted that this factual
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support requirement is simply one of several criteria by which we
can begin to judge the rationality of moral judgments. Let us now
examine several of the other important criteria.
Initial Criteria for Moral Rationality
Nielson maintains that there are certain trans-subjective and
transcultural criteria that we can use to help determine if a moral
judgment is objective or not. One of these is the factual-support
criteria mentioned above. There are also other criteria that can be
applied, criteria of consistency or rationality that are built into
the very nature of moral judgments themselves. For example, it can be
shown that one of the essential features of any moral judgment is
"universality." By universality it is meant that if I judge that I
ought to do a certain thing in some situation, I also must implicitly
judge that similar persons in similar situations also ought to do it
—
unless there are some relevant differences. This willingness to
generalize is part of what constitutes a moral judgment. As Nielson
maintains
,
Moral utterances are objective in the sense that they do not
apply exclusively to any given speaker or class of people
but are meant to count for all people in like circumstances.
Moral utterances are universalisable ; they must be so if they
are to count as "moral utterances ."^5
The analyst can use this universality criterion to begin to rationally
criticise the moral reasoning underlying certain public policies. For
example, one can criticise Japanese trade policy as morally incoherent
when that country asserts their right to trade their goods freely in oi
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country, but imposes sti££ trade barriers against the importation
of our goods. This is a subjective position in that its acceptability
depends largely on the idiosyncrasy of being Japanese. Its incon-
sistency and lack of objectivity can easily be identified and bemoaned,
even across cultural barriers. Another example of the use of this
universality criterion occured during the crisis over the presence of
Soviet troops in Cuba in 1979. Some critics of America's reaction
claimed that our moral indignation over having foreign troops so close
to our borders was self-contradictory considering that we had our
American troops stationed right in Cuba at Guantanamo Bay.
There is also another version of this universality criterion
that can be of use to policy analysts. One further rule of universality
is that any form of treatment thought to be right for one person must
also be considered to be right for all others—unless the others are
significantly different. This logical requirement of moral judgments
is essentially equivalent to the requirement of justice or equal
treatment in our dealings with others. For the policy analyst then,
this requirement forms a rational basis for condemning public policies
and institutions that are discriminatory on the basis of race, sex,
and so forth— the argument being that these differences are in most
cases not obviously relevant differences on which to justify ignoring
the requirement of equal treatment.
Philosophers of ethics have also pointed out that another
essential feature of moral judgments is that they are "practical"--
whlch is to say that "moral questions are fundamentally questions about
221
what we are to do."16 ^^^^^ judgments are not theoretical, but
practical in the sense that they are meant to guide our actions. Thus
if a moral judgment cannot fulfill this function—if, for example, the
action described in the judgment is impossible to do—then it is not
considered to be a legitimate or rational moral judgment. This is the
point made by John Ladd,
If we say that P ought to do X, we imply that he is able to
do X; for ought implies can. The principle "ought implies can"
operates as a presupposition of moral discourse. To say that
it is a presupposition means that if it is false, that is, if
the agent is not able to perform the action in question, then
the moral proposition containing the "ought" is void and point-
less. There is no point in telling someone that he ought to
do X if in fact he is unable to do X.l^
This practicality criterion should already be somewhat familiar
to the reader. It is this criterion that is invoked when we use
social theory to demonstrate that a certain policy goal is impossible
or impractical, and thus not a rational goal. This is the criterion
that is used by both sides of the energy and economic growth debate
discussed in Chapter 5. There we found traditional economists arguing
that a viable no-growth economy was an impossibility, while advocates
of no-growth argued that continuous growth was impractical and ir-
rational in a world of limited resources. Since socio-economic theories
help to establish what is possible and impossible in human affairs, they
become quite relevant in assessing the rationality of goals and values.
Before, this was seen as a matter of common sense, now it can be under-
stood as function of the logic of moral reasoning itself.
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The Good-Reasons Approach
Criteria like universality and practicality can begin to add
some rationality to the evaluation of moral judgments. But these
criteria apply essentially to the form of moral judgments, not to
their specific content. Universality can help us detect inconsisten-
cies in a moral position, but it does not by itself serve to justify
the legitimacy of a given moral judgment. Thus we need to be able to
specify just what constituted a good reason for believing that a moral
judgment is a legitimate and reasonable one—a task which spawned the
"good-reasons" school of ethical thought. The good-reasons school is
actually a permutation of the line of thought of philosophers like
Nielson that we have been exploring.-'-^ This school argues that a care-
ful examination of the way we think about and discuss moral questions
reveals an inner logic—a set of good reasons for accepting the legi-
timacy of moral judgments. One of the strongest forms this argument
takes is the proposition put forward by Kurt Baier in his famous work,
19
The Moral Point of View . He argues that a moral judgment can only be
considered legitimate if it meets certain criteria, one of which is that
the judgments "considers the good of everyone alike." His point is
that a judgment cannot really be considered to be a genuine moral
judgment unless it takes into account the welfare of the others in
society. In other words, moral judgments necessarily embody some notion
of the common good. Again, the assumption here is that one of the
Inherent purposes of moral is the promotion of the common good— that a
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morality that didn't do this would be nonsensical. This can be a
useful observation, for it logically follows from it that any judgment
which attempts to base itself purely on self-interest would be morally
invalid. For instance, if a coal miners union attempted to justify a
nation-crippling strike solely on the basis of self-interest, an analyst
could reasonably assert that they have not morally justified their action.
Baier's argument thus serves to establish the notion of common good as
an essential criterion ir evaluating the validity and rationality of all
policies which claim to be moral.
Another moral philosopher concerned with this good-reasons
approach to moral judgment is Stephen Toulmin. Like Baier, Toulmin
attempts to explain in his Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics
how moral judgments can be justified. He argues that if we examine
carefully the way moral reasoning is carried out in moral discourse,
certain characteristics become evident. He concludes from his examina-
tion that moral rules and practices are typically judged on roughly
utilitarian grounds. Utilitarianism typically states that we should
accept those moral rules and practices which create more pleasure than
pain for society as a whole. Toulmin actually favors a negative formu-
lation of this criterion, that we ought to accept those rules and
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practices which cause the least amount of suffering for humanity. He
prefers this formulation because he believes that it is very difficult
to stipulate what will make people happy, but less difficult to deter-
mine what causes suffering. In any case, he argues that it is roughly
on these grounds that we tend to justify our moral claims— that this
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utilitarian reasoning constitutes a good reason for accepting such a
claim.
There is clearly much truth in Toulmin's thesis; we need only
examine any current policy debate to see that each side typically tries
to justify its case by arguing that their policy will produce the
greatest good for the greatest number, or at least will cause less
suffering than their opponents proposals. This is typically part of
what people mean when they argue that their policy is in the public
interest. This kind of utilitarian criterion should ring a bell with
policy analysts, for it is roughly equivalent to the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion that is commonly applied in cost-benefit analysis. This
criterion states that a policy should only be adopted if the societal
benefits exceed the costs, and that we should choose the policy which
produces the most societal benefits (pleasure). In fact, the cost-
benefit approach to policy analysis can best be understood as the
modern reincarnation of utilitarianism, with dollars and cents used to
measure the pleasure and pain. The good-reasons approach to ethics
would seem to indicate that cost-benefit analysis is the ideal way to
approach the rational justification of policy goals. Ironically, then,
it might seem that policy analysts already have a sufficient method for
approaching normative decisions rationally—but unfortunately this is not
true. This utilitarian criterion is useful in a general way, but it is
not sufficient; and as we will see, the manner in which it has been
traditionally pursued by policy analysts has transformed it into a way of
avoiding rather than facing the question of what a good normative judgment
is.
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Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis is probably the most popular form of public
policy analysis, in large part because it is a prescriptive form of
analysis which appeals to our common sense. It offers a precise formula
for choosing between competing policy options: one simply adds up the
costs and benefits of the prospective policies and picks the one which
maximizes the benefits. But while this approach brings with it all the
appeals of utilitarianism, it also brings with it all of the classical
deficiencies of the ethical theory. For example, one has to be able
to attach prices to all the costs and benefits, and this is very diffi-
cult for those social, political, and environmental values which have
been called, "soft," "fragile," and "intangible." But for our purposes
the main problem with the utilitarian approach of cost-benefit analysis
is the problem of justifying the prices one gives to the various cost
and benefits involved. The choice of policy is obviously dependent on
how we value the various results of the policy. But how can we justify
those key value judgments, how can the analysts rationally demonstrate
that each cost and benefit is actually worth what they say it is? Un-
fortunately, though this is obviously the fundamental question in cost-
benefit analysis, analysts seem to work very hard to avoid facing it.
Indeed, they have labored to produce a number of techniques which would
assess values automatically. This kind of "cop-out" is rooted of course
in the analysts positivist conviction that value judgments cannot be
rational— that they are entirely subjective. Given this assumption,
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they have resorted to devising techniques which would attempt to
measure the value preferences of the individuals in society. The
favorite technique is to presume that the market price of the costs or
benefits actually represents what they are worth. The main problem
with this kind of approach (and utilitarianism is general) is that it
does not give us any kind of critical perspective on the values being
considered. For instance, nary a thought is given to Oscar Wilde's
warning that one can know everything about prices and nothing about
values. The analyst is never encouraged to ask if the commodities and
services being considered actually are worth the prices given to them
in the market. Prices are presumed to represent something's correct
value. Cost-benefit analysis simply attempts to ascertain what the pre-
vailing prices and values of the public are—and does not question them.
As Stokey and Zeckhauser acknowledge, techniques like cost-benefit
analysis are merely intended to "provide a procedure for infering and
pursuing existing values; their role is descriptive and positive, rather
than prescriptive or normative."
Of course, assuming and describing the prevailing values are not
the neutral acts they pretend to be, for this process lends credence
to those values which happen to be dominant at the time. It presumes
that those public policies which reflect dominant societal values are
desirable and should be carried out. This may seem reasonable until we
consider that societies have been known to be wrong. The values of the
public can be shaped by irrational fears, by biased educational systems,
or advertising or propaganda designed to structure our values, and so
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forth. In such far from uncommon situations, the traditional analyst
is left with little critical moral leverage. If a large part of the
public believed that the space program was much more exciting and worth
much more than a program to aid inner-city ghettos, there is nothing
in cost-benefit analysis which would question this assessment. If the
market puts a high price on the pelts of rare animals, the oil of
whales, and the tusks of elephants, there is little in this traditional
approach which would challenge a policy of hunting them to the point
of extinction. Moreover, if we were to compute the average value of a
human life at $285,000—as has been done by some government analysts
—
and we find a diamond with a market value of $300,000, given the logic
of cost-benefit analysis, we must conclude that the rock is worth more
than human life. No questions asked. Individual analysts could of
course question such judgments on an informal basis; but significantly,
there is nothing in their formal approach which requires or encourages
them to do so
.
Perhaps what is most impressive about this perspective is not its
lack of morality, but the casual way in which analysts often defend not
having to have a moral perspective. Consider, for example, the logic
of Arthur Okun:
I, like other economists, accept people's choices as reasonably
rational expressions of what makes them better off. To be sure,
by a different set of criteria, it is appropriate to ask skepti-
cally whether people are made better off through the production
of more whiskey, more cigarettes, and more big cars . . . Are
there criteria by which welfare can be appraised that are super-
ior to the observation of choices people make? Without defense
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and without apology, let me simply state that I will not
explore those issues despite their importance. That merely
reflects my choices, and I hope they will be accepted as
reasonably rational. 29
A better example of the faults of this perspective would be hard to
find. I see no reason at all to accept Okun's "choice" not to address
such a critical question as being "reasonably rational." Indeed it
seems a highly irresponsible position for a serious intellectual to
adopt—and he probably should apologize for it. This apparently cava-
•
lier dismissal of the analyst's moral responsibilities begins to make
more sense when we realize that techniques like cost-benefit analysis
are designed, in part, as ways for analysts and policymakers to avoid
the messy task of making value decisions. It provides a relatively
painless and automatic calculus for determining the desirability of
policy goals. I believe Herman Daly touched on a central truth when
he described cost-benefit analysis as a good example of the "self-
imposed blinders that economists habitually wear in order to avoid
on
facing up to some hard issues." In short, cost-benefit analysis is
certainly a convenient approach if one agrees with public sentiments,
or if one does not want to have to go through any soul-searching in
recommending certain policies. But it is certainly not a particularly
thoughtful or moral approach. This is not to say that the utilitarian
criterion is an undesirable one, but simply that for it to be a useful
and critical one, we must have a way of rationally assessing the value
judgments that go into it. Sound moral judgments about which policies
are right or wrong depend on sound value judgments about priorities.
Thus, instead of simply assuming that everyone's value judgments are
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equally correct and rational, we need to be able to criticize people's
value judgments, and especially the way in which people rank various
values. We must be able to say whether the environment or human life
are really important values, instead of presuming that this is simply
a matter of opinion. As Robert Dorfman has pointed out, we cannot
truly assess the desirability of a policy unless we can legitimately
make "the assertion that some values are better than other values. "^1
Let us consider one way that might be done.
Evaluating and Ranking Values: The Basic-Needs Approach
One could begin in the spirit of Taylor and Toulmin by asking
whether there is any inherent logic to the way values are commonly
ranked in value discourse. It is clear that values are often ranked,
and that there is some persistent rationale to this process. Let us
consider a simple example. It seems reasonable to say that one's house
is more important than one's television, or that one's health is more
important than one's jewelry. Most people would undoubtedly agree with
those judgments. But why? What is the reasoning that makes those
choices so clear. Basically it is because things like health and shelt
are basic needs, while television and jewelry are conveniences or
luxuries. Health and shelter are human necessities, while TVs and
diamonds are not. It is just this rationale, 1 would contend, that
serves as one of the main ways in which we rank values: the most impor-
tant values are those which correspond to basic needs and thus to the
continuance of human life.
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In a sense, the argument being made here is a transcendental
one: one that assumes that giving a high priority to basic human needs
is a necessary characteristic of any human moral or value system. One
of the fundamental functions of any moral and value system is the pres-
ervation of human existence—it would be non-sensical and self-destruc-
tive for such a system to do otherwise. Values associated with human
basic human needs must necessarily be ranked highly if human life is to
be possible at all. Thus policies which violate this kind of prioriti-
zation could justifiably be deemed irrational. Consider a stylized
policy example, a situation of economic depression where there is wide-
spread malnutrition but where farm prices are so depressed that farmers
can no longer make a profit on their produce and are going out of
business. In such a situation the analyst could legitimately say that
it is irrational for policymakers to put a high value on the preservation
of the market system in agriculture. To be rational, policymakers must
put a higher priority on encouraging food production—a very basic human
need— than on ideological purity, and begin to subsidize prices,
nationalize farms, or whatever it takes to pursue the fulfillment of
that need. Of course, this may simply seem to be common sense—but
that is exactly my point.
Roughly speaking, then, values can rationally be ranked on a
continuum from basic needs to luxurious or frivolous wants. Not all
desires need to be thought of as equal, we can rationally say that
some are more fundamental and important, and this can begin to give us
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the critical leverage we need to assess the priorities embodied in
public policies. We can legitimately criticize national priorities,
for example, when they put wants before basic needs. We can rationally
criticize our nation for spending more every year on jewelry than on
needed decent housing for the poor, or for spending more on pleasure-
3 2boating than on welfare. We need not accept these warped priorities
simply because they are an accurate expression of public preferences,
we can justifiably condemn them for putting luxuries before basic needs.
Likewise, the logic of this basic-needs approach would force us
to admit that there is some moral validity to the complaints by many in
the Third World that the United States uses one third of the world vital
energy resources each year and squanders some of that on conveniences
like electric toothbrushes, big cars, escalators, air conditioning,
excess lighting, and so forth, while many areas of the world have little
or no oil or electricity for basic domestic or industrial needs. Oil
supplies are so tight, for instance, that even if these poor countries
could afford to buy the oil they required for their developmental needs,
not enough would be available due to the way in which the U.S. and other
developed countries monopolize the market. Indeed some have gone as far
to argue that the market system itself is immoral because it allocates
basic resources according to demand instead of according to need. They
point out for instance that there is enough food in the world to allow
everyone a decent diet, but that malnutrition and starvation are present
because food goes to those countries which can generate the money to
33
afford it, rather than to those countries which desperately need it.
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A major advantage of the basic-needs approach is that it allows
the analyst to validly give certain values high priority even though
this is not reflected by the market or in public opinion. For example,
consider the environment. There is hardly a more basic need than main-
taining a viable relationship with our natural environment. Our health
and very existence depend on it. An analyst who adopts the basic-needs
criterion can justify giving environmental values an important place in
policy evaluations without having to show that the public puts a high
value on them and without having to devise some artificial way to put a
market price on them. In a sense, environmental values could be con-
sidered to be objectively important values. In fact, this is very much
the rationale that was finally adopted by the analysts of the Stanford
Research Institute in their search for a way to rationally choose between
the competing perspectives they were considering. Recall that when we
saw them last in the preceding chapter, these analysts had concluded that
examination of the facts was not a sufficient way to choose between the
competing paradigms and that they stood on the very edge of value
relativism, without any apparent way to adjudicate between the paradigms.
Aware of the pressing necessity to choose an energy policy path, the
analysts sought some criteria that could fairly be applied to all of the
paradigms— in their words, "criteria which are relatively independent of
perception, or rather, would seem reasonable in any perception." They
concluded that one such criterion concerned whether the paradigms being
considered "lead toward system adaptability and hence, toward survivabil-
ity."
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Adaptation refers to the process by which living systems
maintain system stability (homeostasis) in the face of
short-term environmental fluctuations and, by transforming
their structures, through long-term nonreversing changes
in their environment as well. Rappaport has discussed the
conditions under which societies maintain adaptability. He
concludes that "as energy flux has increased, the disparity
-between the direction of cultural change and the goal of
biological survival has widened," raising the question of
whether the continuing growth of high-energy industrialized
society is, in the long term, maladaptive . 35
Thus this environmental criterion of adaptability can be seen as
an "objective" criterion which can and should be applied to the assess-
ments of the competing normative/ theoretical perspectives used in energy
policy. In this case, the SRI analysts are suggesting that the per-
spective which assumes and values continuing high energy and economic
growth is irrational in that it neglects this need for adaptability and
could in the long-run threaten our ability to live in our eco-system.
The Human Bias
If it is not evident already, it should be pointed out that this
basic-needs criterion does rest heavily on the assumption that human life
itself is good and desirable. Some people, almost exclusively philoso-
phers, would argue that this is a highly questionable assumption, and
thus that this basic-needs approach is an elaborate castle built upon
sand. There are, however, several acceptable counter-arguments to this
objection. First, in keeping with the transcendental style of argument
developed throughout this chapter, it could be observed that the moral
enterprise itself assumes necessarily that there is value in human life.
The assumption is inescapable. A concept of morality which denied the
value of human life would be inconsistent and nonsensical, for as
Baier
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observed, "a genuine moral rule must be for the good of human beings. "36
One could of course still deny the value of human life, but this would
also require the abandonment of morality itself—a step that few serious
social analysts would be willing to make.
There is also another line of argument which support the assumption
that humans must value human life. It posits that unless we adopt this
assumption, we will inevitably fall into some serious contradictions.
The point of this argument is best illustrated by the following anecdote.
One day, in a very large and prestigious university, a philosophy pro-
fessor was very disgusted with his class. He knew they were bright
students, but they were not making an effort to engage the philosophical
questions he posed. With only a few minutes left in the hour, he
declared that he was going to take a philosophical position and that
everyone would remain until either he was proven wrong or the class
admitted defeat. He adopted the position that there was no real value
to human life and defended it vigorously. Try as they might, the students
could not overcome his arguments and soon became sullen and near to
giving up. At that point a student who had remained silent throughout
raised his hand and made the following statement. "I am prepared to
accept your position that there is no value to human life," he said to
his teacher, "provided that you commit suicide right here and now in
order to prove it." Needless to say, the professor quickly admitted
that the central contradiction in his own position had been discovered,
and class was dismissed.
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Avoiding the Materialistic Bias
There is a more practical problem with this basic-needs approach
to value evaluation. It can tend to exacerbate a tendency in Western
thought to think of basic needs in purely physical or materialistic
terms—food, warmth, physical security, and so forth. Even in the
hierarchy of needs developed by Abraham Maslow, a man who was sensitive
to people's social and psychological needs, material needs are rated as
more basic than those "higher" needs. There is of course some truth
to this ranking, but the degree of difference between physical and other
kinds of basic needs should not be exaggerated. Food may be a more
basic need than, say, a sense of belonging and being loved'; but this
does not mean that a sense of belonging is not a very basic human need
also—one that is essential to human life. Humans clearly have a wide
variety of basic needs: physical, social, emotional, etc.—all of which
are necessary for human life as we know it. We must have, then, a full
vision of what human life consists of. It is not merely biological,
we do not live by bread alone. A purely biological existence, without
emotion, contemplation, friendship, and so on could hardly be legiti-
mately considered a human life. Truly human life could not exist
without some of these values and practices. Indeed, when people see
little or no possibility of meeting their basic emotional and social
needs, they often consider ending their biological existence. Or
consider the fact that people often will forego basic physical needs
like sleep, food, and safety in order to pursue these other non-materia!
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needs. Thus analysts must be careful to consider the full range of
basic human needs in their evaluations.
It is true that it is not as easy to identify basic social and
political needs as it is to identify basic physical needs. But again
transcendental arguments are useful in establishing which non-material-
istic needs are essential to any policy evaluation. The work of the
political scientist Charles Anderson is a good example of how this can
be done. In his article, "The Place of Principles in Policy Analysis, "38
he argues that certain political values must be considered essential to
any rational policy analysis.
As standards of policy evaluation, (some political values) are
not simply preferences. They are, in some sense, obligatory
criteria of political judgment. To justify any policy recom-
mendation, one must argue that it is within the legitimate
powers of government, that it is, in some sense, "in the public
interest," that it is consistent with lawful rights, that it
is fair, and efficient in the use of resources. 39
To justify the necessity of invoking these political values he points
out that "certain criteria of choice are inherent in the activity of
politics itself, that they are part of what we mean by "making a
political judgment, or as Wittgenstein might have put it, that they are
part of politics as a 'form of life.'"^*^ In other words, certain values
are part of what constitutes what we mean by a political decision.
In a larger sense, it could be said that values like legitimate
authority and justice are a necessary part of political life. Much of
the purpose of moral and value systems is not only to make physical
existence possible, but to make political and social existence possible
as well. We literally could not live together in societies without some
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allegiance to notions like fairness, authority, etc. A society in
which those kinds of values and needs were consistently being violated
for instance, an illegitimate dictatorship which was viciously oppressive
and unjust—would be unstable and would ultimately undermine its own
existence. Any ongoing, harmonious society would not only have to meet
its citizens physical needs, but their social and political needs as well.
Normative Rationality: Incomplete but Necessary
For some, the excursion into normative philosophy in this chapter
may have seemed largely a waste of time—for it is clear to even the
casual observer that many of the rational criteria that we have sought
to establish as valid are already being used by most policymakers in
their decisions. The consideration of such criteria as justice or
basic needs is already a matter of common usage and common sense in
policymaking. And indeed this is true—but that is exactly the point.
We need an approach to policy analysis which does not ignore or violate
our moral and political common sense—a form of analysis which does
not endorse, for example, taking money from the poor and giving it to
the rich, simply because there is a net benefit. We need a humanistic
form of analysis which can speak to the kinds of reasoning that policy-
makers often try to use in judging policy options; a form which allows
us to wade into the center of public policy controversies and be
helpful in sorting them out. Including criteria like basic needs,
justice, universality, and so forth in public policy analysis is one
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way to create this more humanist form of analysis. It would help
make this activity less of an abstract intellectual exercise which the
public and policymakers have difficulty relating to, and more of an
activity which speaks to the concerns of those people. Only when
analysis begins to deal with policy issues in the terms that are commonly
used— though hopefully in a more precise and illuminating way—will
policy analysis begin to be fully relevant to the real world of politics.
It should be noted that though these criteria begin to add some
rationality to the consideration of the moral and value questions in
policymaking, they do not add up to a complete ra-tionality . They do
not always unfailingly serve to indicate the one rational policy path
to pursue. On the contrary, they can usually only serve as a rough
guide to solving value problems. This is so for several reasons. First,
like all human notions, these criteria require interpretation; and there
are inevitably some differences in interpretation. Consider the basic
needs criterion. While some physical needs are obviously in the category
of basic necessities, there could easily be legitimate disagreement
over the status or importance of other needs. A final and complete
schedule of human needs is probably impossible to determine.^"'" Further,
sometimes these rational criterion will be in conflict, especially
considering that we have not even touched upon all the different possible
criteria. It is quite possible, for example, that a utilitarian
criterion could favor one policy, while a consideration of justice or
basic needs could favor another. Also, it is not unusual to find
relatively equal values and needs to be in competition. For example,
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how could we decide whether to put more funds into producing adequate
health care or into producing an adequate national defense? Both are
pretty basic human needs. (Of course, it could be pointed out that
such choices between basic values are often more difficult in the
abstract than in practice. For while such values may be equal in the
abstract, they may not be equally fulfilled in reality. Choices between
such values are made more tractable by determining which of those values
is currently in most need of fulfillment and favoring those in policy
decisions. Thus in the case of health vs. defense some have argued
that since we already have the nuclear capability of destroying our
enemies several times over, and since there are still many people with-
out adequate health care in the U.S., we should allocate more of our
funds for health. Of course others disagree, and although consideration
of degrees of fulfillment may be helpful in clarifying our choices of
value priorities, it too is open to competing interpretations.)
However, in spite of these kinds of limitations, I believe that
the rational normative criteria that have been discussed here are an
important aid to concerned policy analysts. And as Kai Nielson con-
cluded, despite our doubts, it is clear that certain important moral
and value judgments can be arrived at by normative analysis:
Social practices which drastically frustrate our need for sleep,
food, sex, drink, or elimination; or practices that pointlessly
diminish self-esteem, appreciation and concern for others,
creative employment and diversion, or practices that seek to
destroy our tendencies to prise integrity, conscientiousness,
knowledge, and the contemplation of beautiful things are
practices which must be said to be morally inferior to social
practices which do not so frustrate us. This is not to deny
the obvious, namely that there are sharp disagreements over
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the value of some things and that there is even considerable
disagreement about the moral priority of those very things we
universally prize, approve of, or admire. But even with our
less than exact conception of human welfare, we can still
show that there are many sets of social practices both
imaginable and actual that intelligent and correctly informed
people judge without equivocation to be morally inferior to
comparable sets of practices . ^-^
The point then is that even though normative rationality is incomplete,
it is very useful, and it is both relevant and necessary to the thought-
ful analysis of public policy choices. The purpose of our excursion
into moral philosophy has been to demonstrate that this attempt to be
moral and political can be a thoughtful and responsible activity, and
that the philosophical excuses which have prevented analysts from
facing up to their moral and political obligations are no longer valid.
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CHAPTER X
APPLYING MORAL RATIONALITY
From Theory to Practice
Given that rational moral analysis is clearly theoretically
possible, what would this element of a humanistic policy analysis
actually look like in practice? In this brief chapter, I will move
from the philosophical arguments supporting a normative policy analysis
to the consideration of how moral rationality can be applied to a
specific issue in energy policy. The issue to be addressed is the
desirability of publicly-owned utilities—a sub-issue in the debate
over public ownership of energy resources and energy production facili-
ties. Currently there are more than 3,000 public power systems in the
United States—including 1,900 municipally-owned systems, 900 rural
electric cooperatives, 100 regionally-owned systems, and a handful of
state and federal systems. In several states there have been movements
toward transforming some privately-owned utility systems into publically-
owned systems.-^ Wherever this attempt has been made, debates have
raged over the desirability of these competing forms of utility owner-
ship. Using the various standards developed in the previous chapter,
I will attempt to pass judgment on the rationality and irrationality
of the value judgments and moral arguments that have been a central
part of these policy debates. I will indicate when criteria like
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universality are correctly or incorrectly applied, when value rankings
are questionable, and so forth. Among the normative areas to be con-
sidered in this analysis are economic values, distributional justice,
political values, and ecological values. The basic intention here is
to demonstrate that it is quite possible for policy analysts to
rationally analyze the normative dimensions of policy issues and to
arrive at recommendations that are both clear and defensible.
.
Economic Costs and Benefits
Much of the controversy over public ownership concerns the
economic costs and benefits involved. Will more people be better off
economically under publicly-owned utilities (PCUs) or under private,
investor-owned utilities (lOUs)? The central question is whether
POUs would mean higher or lower prices for electricity than that
charged by lOUs . A consideration of the facts would seem to support
the notion that public power systems are cheaper. Federal statistics
gathered in 1974 indicated that publicly-owned utilities (municipals
and public utility districts) offered rates that were 29% lower than
those charged by private utilities. The rates charged by consumer-owned
2
cooperatives were 10% lower than those of the lOUs.
lOUs counter these figures by arguing that much of the difference
in rates is due to the fact that many municipal and public utility
districts pay no local taxes and they also benefit from tax exempt
municipal financing. lOUs must pay taxes, and they are financed by
regular bonds and the sale of stock to investors. lOUs appeal to the
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universality criterion and complain that they are not being treated
fairly, and that both public and private utilities should pay the
same taxes. If this was done, it is insisted, the rates would be
closer. Public power advocates retort that POUs should not have to
pay the same taxes as private utilities, that there is a very relevant
difference here: lOUs are profit-making enterprises while POUs are not.
Our government has traditionally considered this to be a relevant
difference, and a legitimate jutification for requiring less taxes for
non-profit, public service organizations. It is also pointed out that
some POUs do in fact make "payments in lieu of taxes" to local govern-
ments, often in amounts that approximate what the lOUs pay in local
taxes
lOUs argue that at least some of the savings experienced by public
power customers may be illusory. They maintain that the tax breaks
given to public power utilities have to be made up by governments some-
how, and that higher taxes on the public will be used to make up for
the lost revenues, though this claim is not supported by any documenta-
tion.^ In a sense, however, much of this tax dispute is beside the
point, because even if POUs paid similar taxes as the lOUs, in most
cases their rates would still be lower because they are not profit-making
enterprises which must pay dividends to stockholders. Much of the
millions of dollars that lOUs pay out in dividends every year would be
conceivably saved in a non-profit, publicly-owned utility. Support for
this is given by an American Public Power Association study which de-
termined that approximately 42% of the lower rates offered by municipals
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can be traced to their lack of profit margins.^
Of course it should be kept in mind that general figures can
mask individual differences between utilities, and that it is quite
possible, for instance, to find publicly-owned utilities that charge
as high or higher rates than some investor-owned utilities. But in
general, the figures indicate the POUs tend to offer substantial
economic savings to their customers, and thus can be considered to be
preferable to lOUs on these economic grounds.
The Distributional Issue
Besides questions of which system produces the most economic
benefits, there are also the moral questions of how those benefits are
distributed and which system provides the most desirable and just
distribution of those benefits. Both public and private systems provide
reliable power to their customers, but there is a basic difference in
how the surplus revenues generated by the utilities are distributed.
The profits from lOUs go to their stockholders, while any profits from
POUs are refunded to the public in various ways. It is important to
note that on the whole, utility stockholders tend to constitute a small,
financially well-off elite. In the United States, only one family in
six is comfortable enough to afford to invest in stocks, and approxi-
mately one-tenth of that small group owns 80% of all the stock in the
country.^ In contrast to this small group, the general public is the
recipient of the surplus profits from POUs. Some POUs return these funds
to the public in the form of lower electricity rates in the future,
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others have a policy of refunding excess revenues by reducing local
taxes or improving community services. One city, Jacksonville,
Florida, has financed the construction of several city buildings with
the help of utility revenues; another, Carthage, Missouri, finances
its fire department with those revenues.
Several of the moral principles that we discussed earlier could
be applied to help indicate which of these distributional schemes is
more just or desirable. For example, the principle of favoring the
public interest over narrow private interests would seem to clearly
support the case for publicly-owned utilities. In addition, the needs
criterion developed in the previous chapter would also clearly favor
the POUs. A system which distributes benefits across the spectrum of
economic classes is more likely to aid in the fulfillment of basic
human needs than a system which diverts benefits to those who are
already relatively well-off. Lower income and even some middle income
families can use every penny they can get in these inflationary times
to meet their basic needs.
Objectivity Criterion
Some of the arguments in this controversy do not stand up to
standards of objectivity. Most notably, private utilities have long
contended that private corporations are more efficient than public
organizations. A specific example of this argument occurred in a 1976
campaign in Massachusetts to create a state-owned utility system.
lOUs contended that such a system would only breed more bureaucracy
and inefficiency, stating that "all are familiar with the inefficiency
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of government. "8 This proved to be a highly effective argument in
the ultimate defeat of the proposal; but the rationality and objectivity
of this argument are questionable. It has little factual basis. First
of all, it could be noted that lOUs require state bureaucracies as
well in the form of the state utility commissions which must be
created to regulate them. Further, experience has shown that public
power systems have had little trouble in attracting the same kind
of able administrators and skilled technicians that are typical of the
private sector. Finally, federal statistics indicate that in 1973,
municipal utilities were actually more efficient than the ICUs, spend-
ing 7% less on operation, maintenance and production expenses than the
lOUs .
9
The Massachusetts lOUs indirectly revealed the non-objectivity
of their efficiency arguments by not backing them up with facts and by
resorting to a kind of guilt by association argument. They argued that
a state-run system would be inefficient because several other state
agencies had been found to be wasteful. Here is their argument in its
entirety:
There is no reason to believe that a Massachusetts government
power authority will be an efficient, well-run operation. The
track record of government operation in Massachusetts is nothing
to brag about. The MBTA, and Massachusetts Welfare Department,
among others, are part of the reason that Massachusetts may be
the only state in the nation requiring new taxes in 1975.
This is clearly a scare tactic, since there is nothing in this
argument to demonstrate why a state-owned utility would be liable to the
same problems as the welfare department. This kind of argument seems
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intended to take advantage of anti-government feelings, and indeed,
ever since the onset of public power systems, private utilities have
sought to equate POUs with a "big-brother" image. In the 1950s, for
example, when there was a push for more publically-owned utilities,
lOU trade organizations took out advertisements in magazines showing a
man with his daughter and son (who is dressed in an Army uniform) , with
the man saying, "Sure, I used to think that it wouldn't do any harm
to have the government run the electric business. But I've changed my
mind. Because when government meddles too much in any business, you
get socialism. And who'd want to leave a socialistic U.S.A. to his
kids?"ll
These kinds of arguments are hardly objective— they are not based
on an impartial consideration of the facts of the situation, but rely
heavily on the individuals fear of socialism, or fear of higher taxes.
They cast serious doubt on the objectivity of the lOUs and indicate that
their own personal interests are biasing their perception of the issue. '
Political Needs
Another area which deserves serious consideration in this moral
analysis is whether basic political needs are given a high priority in
the POUs and the lOUs . Specifically it is important to consider how
these two organizations tend to fulfill the need for legitimacy and
accountability in our public institutions. Increasingly, the American
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public is feeling alienated from the large, centralized institutions '
(both public and private) that control so much of their lives. There
is a very strongly felt need to gain more control over these insti-
tutions so that they truly promote the public interest. Proponents
of public power argue that publicly-owned utilities can be more demo-
cratic and thus more responsible and accountable to the public than
the lOUs. There are good reasons to believe this. The board of
directors of an lOU is not accountable to the public at all, but to
the stockholders of the corporation. Often these directors are not
members of the communities served by the utilities, but representatives
of the large banks which hold interests in the lOUs and from oil and
coal companies which supply them fuel. In the priorities of the
directors of lOUs then, it is more important to be responsive to their
stockholders than the public.
In contrast to this, most directors of public power systems are
elected by their customers and directly responsible to them. If the
public is dissatisfied with the policies of a POU, they can elect
different directors that will carry out their will. For example, in
the West Florida Electric Co-op, officials were under attack because
of rising rates and because they refused to recognize a newly-formed
utilities workers union. Citizens organized a successful campaign to
defeat all nine incumbent board members, and the new board then fired
the co-op's manager and began bargaining with the union. Changing the
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board of an lOU is much more difficult, requiring the cooperation of
the stock-holders, who are often not particularly sensitive to the
complaints of consumer groups. -^-^
lOUs argue that they are under public control, that they are
regulated businesses which are held accountable to the public through
their state utility commissions . 1^ They must hold public hearings to
justify rate increases, and so forth. But in practice, this kind of
regulation is often not a very effective check on the utilities. As
critics have pointed out.
Many private utilities have successfully used their political
clout to influence the selection of the very individuals who
are supposed to regulate them. For example, in 1975,
Pennsylvania utilities successfully pressured their state Senate
to reject the governor's nomination of two strong consumer
advocates to the state's utility commission. 1^
Moreover, even when public hearings are held, well-financed lOUs often
have the advantage in them. They are able to marshall experts and
studies that overshadow the efforts of overworked and understaffed
citizen groups and commission staffs.
It is important to note that not all publicly-owned power systems
are responsive to their customers. Experience has shown that the larger
and more centralized these institutions are, the less responsive they
tend to be. This is most true on the federal level where organizations
like the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville Power Admins tra-
tion have both been severely criticized by citizens groups for their
arrogance and insensitivity to criticism from the public. In contrast
to this, one study found that the public utilities that were more
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responsive and lenient concerning disconnect and deposit policies,
were those "in small towns where the utility officials know many of
their customers. "16 Decentralization may foster more responsiveness,
but it certainly does not guarantee it. Even small publicly-owned
utilities can be unresponsive to the public, if the public does not
seek to take an active part in making and influencing the decisions of
the utility. Professionals on any level tend to resent the "inter-
ference" of the public in their decisions, and often must be forced to
take into account the wishes of the public. However, despite these
problems, it does seem the public utilities, and especially the smaller
ones, offer a better opportunity for responsiveness to the public than
lOUs do.
Ecological Needs
For the utilities, the needs of the environment are usually
embodied in the issue of conservation. Conserving on electricity pro-
duction not only lowers the ecological damages and risks associated with
recovering and transporting energy resources like coal and oil, but it
also lowers the damage caused to the environment and human health by
the burning of these fuels (acid rains, the problems with SO2 and CO2,
etc.). Despite the importance of conservation, there is reason to
believe that private utilities tend to rank profits ahead of conservation.
lOUs place a very high value on making profits, that is part of their
purpose. Profit levels in lOUs are generally fixed by state commissions
as a set percentage ( ~ 12%-13%) of their capital investment in their
facilities. Thus if profits are to increase, they must build more plants
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and sell that increased amount of electricity. Conservation is
obviously incompatible with this built-in drive toward expansion. As
one Florida utility executive said, "If we succeed in getting the public
to conserve energy to the point where our revenues drop 15 to 20 per-
cent, we may all be looking for a job.''^-^ As a result of this logic,
many of the conservation programs adopted by lOUs have not been particu-
larly agressive.
Publicly-owned utilities do not have to maximize profits, and as
a result, many of these utilities have led the way in encouraging con-
servation by their customers. For example, Seattle City Light and Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power are two municipal utilities that
have initiated impressive conservation programs. Facing the serious
need to conserve, Seattle began a Kill-a-Watt program which reduced
electricity use by 7% in the first year, while in Los Angeles the
savings was over 15%. A report by the Rank Corporation attributed
much of the success of the L.A. program to the fact that it was a
municipal facility and could command the full resources of the city
government in its efforts.-'-^
Much of the problem of conservation of electricity can be traced
to a tendency to charge large commercial and industrial customers lower
rates than residential users. Sometimes this takes the form of what
is called "declining block rates" whereby lower rates are charged as
consumers increase their use of electricity. Both public and private
utilties have been guilty of engaging in this kind of wasteful rate
255
structuring. But federal statistics reveal that the differential
between industrial and residential users tends to be more than twice
as small for publicly-owned utilities than for lOUs."*-^ Moreover, while
most lOUs have vigorously opposed proposals to modify their rate
structures, public power systems have been more amenable to change. As
early as 1975, the American Public Power Association maintained that
"new types of rate structures, designed to conserve resources
. . .
should be followed by the industry. "^^ A specific example is the city
of Wellesly Massachusetts, whose municipal utility has eliminated block
rates and designed a system of flat rates. Besides encouraging con-
servation, these rates were thought by most city residents to be more
equitable.
In terms of the environment, a final point against the lOUs has
been their general reluctance to pursue or encourage the development of
alternative, renewable sources of energy like solar and wind power. Not
only do such sources save on non-renewable resources, their environmental
impacts also tend to be less serious. As a rule, lOUs have been apathetic
about these alternative sources, arguing that they can only be viable in
the distant future. A report done for the Florida Energy Committee by
the consulting firm of Booz, Allen, and Hamilton concluded that "the
utility stance is to avoid, and even possibly to discourage, solar energy
development, out of the apprehension that the only result can be a
reduction in utility revenues. Solar energy is viewed essentially as a
threat which the utilities have not yet determined how to turn into- a
benefit.
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On the other hand, some publicly-owned utilities have also had
a record of apathy towards alternative energy sources and hostility
toward their advocates. But again, this problem is most typical of
those POUs that are large and federally owned—like the TVA. Some of
the more decentralized public power system have been more open to these
alternatives. For example, some rural co-ops have been promoting the
use of solar crop dryers as an alternative to ones using electricity or
propane. The head of one solar dryer project run by the East River
Electric Power Co-operative justified their project by arguing that "rural
electric co-operative are interested in far more than just selling
electricity to their members. "^^
Conclusions
In light of the foregoing analysis, it seems clear that a policy
supporting the predominance of private, investor-owned utilities in
the United States is an irrational one. In terms of values, they put
profits ahead of environmental needs, and they put allegiance to special
private interests before responsiveness to the public and the public
interest. This kind of value ranking is warped, and can only seem reason-
able if one is a member of the interest groups that benefit from lOUs.
Even if there is not an economic advantage to POUs, they would probably
still be the most rational form for utilities because their structure
allows for the maximization of important ecological and political values,
that can easily be neglected by the lOUs. A rational assessment of the
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moral and value issues involved, thus clearly favors a policy encourag-
ing the creation of more public utilities
—
preferably on the most local
level possible.
Of course, not all rational investigations of the normative issues
surrounding policy issues will produce results as clear as these. But
this example shows that it is quite possible to make rational normative
recommendations concerning public policies, and that this can help to
ensure that our public policies are morally legitimate.
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CHAPTER XI
POLICY ANALYSIS AS POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Freedom is not merely the chance to do as one pleases; neither
is it merely the opportunity to choose between set alternatives.
Freedom is, first of all, the chance to formulate the available
choices, to argue over them—and then, the opportunity to choose.
That is why freedom cannot exist without an enlarged role of
human reason in human affairs.
C. Wright Mills
The Sociological Imagination
All styles of policy analysis have political implications. This
chapter will explore the political implications of the humanist-non-
positivist/normative approach that has been set out in the previous
chapters. Are there substantial political disadvantages or biases in
this approach? For instance, might it not be argued that the possibility
of a normative policy analysis would only encourage analysts to think of
themselves as moral or ethical "experts?" This would only worsen the
problem of technocracy that is already inherent in policy analysis. We
would not only have policy experts directing technical policy decisions,
but analysts seeking to dictate value decisions as well. It is just this
disturbing possibility— the possibility of encouraging a kind of moral
technocracy— that could make many policy analysts reluctant to embrace
value analysis as part of their craft. Many might feel, and justifiably
so, that they have no right to be making moral decisions for others.
In fact, one reason that techniques like cost-benefit analysis are so
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popular is that they seem more democratic, in the sense that the
analysts are only trying to measure public values and are (supposedly)
not in a position to impose their individual values on the public.
While it might be acknowledged that the moral relativism typical in
cost-benefit analysis has its problems, it could be argued that the
moral dogmatism and moral dictatorship would be even worse.
However, the case can be made that normative analysis actually
discourages the possibility of moral technocracy. Indeed, there is a
much greater danger of moral technocracy in the scientistic approach
than in the normative. For as we have seen, in the scientistic approach
there is a tendency for value judgments to be introduced surreptitiously
in the form of tacit modelling assumptions, objective looking cost-
assessments, etc. It is much easier for analysts to impose their value
judgments on policymakers by disguising them as "value-free recommenda-
tions" than it would be if moral and value judgments were recommended
to policymakers in an axplicit and straightforward manner. Hidden values
biases in policy studies may escape detection by policymakers and the
public, but clear and open value recommendations would not. In this
sense, normative analysis would actually help to undermine the possibility
of moral technocracy by clearly labelling value judgments and thus exposing
them to criticism and discussion for what they are. And while policymakers
might bow to the technical recommendations of analysts, it is unlikely that
many would naively accept explicit value judgments without question. As
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I have continually stressed, policy analysts have little power to
actually impose their views upon policymakers or the public, and
this would be especially true in the area of moral and value judgments.
Furthermore, a correct understanding of the nature of the
knowledge addressed by normative policy analysis mitigates against a
dogmatic or technocratic approach to policy judgments. I took pains
to point out that although one can approach moral and value judgments
rationally, that rationality can never be complete or fool-proof. While
it is certainly possible to label some moral judgments to be irrational,
and to conclude that some value rankings are not justifiable, the
rational status of many moral and value judgments is quite debatable and
there can be genuine disagreement by rational and impartial people. In
this sense, moral knowledge is often tentative, and must be left open to
question. It simply lacks the kind of precision and accuracy that is
needed to justify a technocratic approach. Normative analysis simply
cannot produce the kind of indisputable, objective answers that would
justify letting a moral "expert" make the final decisions on these
matters. Instead, the inherent tentativeness of normative knowledge would
more likely serve to support an argument for a more democratic approach
to these decisions. For it could be reasonably argued that if it is not
possible to arrive at some final, objective answer to policy questions,
such decisions should ultimately be left up to the public or its legitimate
representatives. If knowledge cannot be an unambiguous guide to policy
choices, we must turn to democratic decision-making mechanisms which ex-
press as directly as possible the choices of the entire public— to
legitimize public policy choices.
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Tentativeness is not only a characteristic of moral knowledge,
but of other areas of human knowledge as well. As noted in prior chap-
ters, our knowledge about the socio-economic theories which help to
guide policy decisions is also somewhat tentative. Because of the
nature of social reality, these theories simply cannot be "proven" true
or false in the same way as theories can in the natural sciences. Thus
social theories are another crucial area of human knowledge where our
knowledge is probably not precise or reliable enough to justify letting
experts make the final decisions. As I suggested earlier, it makes
much more sense to encourage a policy research system which produces a
pluralistic variety of socio-economic theories, with the final choice
being made again through some legitimate democratic mechanism.
We might even extend this argument into that most objective area
of knowledge, "facts"; for even in issues of scientific fact, where
clear, undisputable answers are at least theoretically possible,
definitive, unambiguous answers are usually not forthcoming in practice.
More often than not, respected scientific experts disagree about the
facts of the matter in environmental impacts, or nuclear safety, or
the extent of our energy reserves. Scientists are typically found lining
up on both sides of policy disputes, and so are the facts. And so again
it must ultimately be up to the public to choose which expert to believe
and which set of facts is most reasonable and important. All of which
is not to say that we do not need good policy research, but only that
a non-positivist understanding of the limited and tentative nature of
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human knowledge requires that we approach that research with a healthy
sense of doubt, and that we should not rely on "experts" to settle
crucial policy questions. In this sense, while positivistic and
scientistic forms of policy analysis can give the illusion of objectivity
and scientific precision upon which technocratic arguments are built,
a non-positivist approach cultivates a doubt which is anti-technocratic
and pro-democratic. As E.E. Schattschneider was fond of saying,
"Democracy is a political system for people who are not sure that they
are right. "'•
From Pollster to Provocateur
The activity of normative policy analysis is not only compatible
with democracy, it may even do more to encourage it than traditional
forms of policy analysis. For example, the normative approach implies
a much different—and probably more helpful—role for the policy analyst
in the democratic political process. The traditional public choice/cost-
benefit analysis approach fosters what could be termed the "Pollster"
model of the analyst's role in the democratic process. In this model,
the job of the analyst is to enhance the democratic process by attempting
to gather up whatever the public's individual value judgments are—either
through use of market prices, questionnaires, or observation of previous
choices—and to try to use them as a standard for recommending certain
public policy choices. In essence, the analysts serves as a pollster for
the policymaker. But one of the problems with this approach is that there
is no guarantee that what is collected is the public's best or most
thoughtful judgments. It is simply assumed that since moral and value
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judgments are essentially subjective, the individual's choice must be
accepted as rational. But in practice, most peoples' buying habits and
value judgments are affected by all kinds of irrational and unconscious
factors. Those choices can be shaped by advertising, socialization,
irrational fears, propoganda, personal prejudices, and so on. A pollster
approach does little to make people conscious of these factors or to
encourage more rational and thoughtful judgments on their part.
In contrast, the assumptions contained in normative analysis
encourage the analyst to bring forth the best judgments by the public. If
it is realized that some degree of rationality in moral and value judgments
is actually possible, then the task of the analyst is not merely to try
to collect individual opinions, but to encourage and enable those citizens
to make the most thoughtful and rational judgments possible. Thus in-
stead of assuming the legitimacy of the individual's priorities, the
analyst might actually challenge and even criticise those priorities.
The analyst could use the criterion of rational normative judgments to
analyze and critique the judgments and lines of argument being made in
the public realm. In this sense, the role of the analyst changes from
pollster to provocateur; and the public policy analyst becomes a public
policy analyst who is interested in making his or her analysis public in
order to stimulate more informed and rational public judgments. This is
exactly why it is important for the normative policy analyst to take
reasoned stands on policy issues and to make those stands as public as
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possible, through publications of studies, press releases, talk show
appearances, or whatever. This needs to be done, not because these
stands should be considered to be the final answer to a particular
policy problem, but because such stands are an effective way of stimu-
lating critical public thought on policy issues.
Furthermore, despite its democratic pretensions, the traditional
pollster approach to policy analysis does very little to encourage
the public to actually become engaged in democratic processes of
policymaking. Indeed, the thrust of this approach is to attempt to
devise elaborate ways to discern the policy preferences of the public
without their ever having to become involved in the political process
at all. Now besides the fact that many of these elaborate "polling"
techniques are of questionable accuracy, this approach totally neglects
the fact that the essence of a healthy democratic system is an intelli-
gent and actively involved public. It also somehow neglects the fact
that one of the best ways for the public to express their policy
preferences is to do so directly—by becoming actively involved in
influencing policymakers and the policymaking process. Thus it seems
that if an analyst is truly interested in promoting democratic choices
of policies, he or she had best adopt the role of provocateur, and
attempt to stimulate more informed and thoughtful public participation
in the policymaking process. Let us consider several ways in which this
can be done.
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Friedman, Commoner, and the National Issues Forum
We needn't consider hypothetical examples, for there are several
real example people and programs that have adopted this more publically
oriented, provocateur role. On an individual level, analysts like
Milton Friedman and Barry Commoner, though they are of very different
political persuasion, share a passion for provoking public thought. Both
are deeply interested in our pressing policy problems and are committed
to specific and sometimes provocative recommendations to solve those
problems. Both have written extensively for the public, both in popular
magazines like Newsweek and the New Yorker
,
and in books that have
enjoyed large public readerships. To be sure, each of these men speaks
to a different public, but they have sought to get their arguments heard
by anyone who would listen to them, and have made significant contri-
butions to the public debates over economic, energy, and environmental
problems. Not all analysts can become national figures like these two,
but it is surely possible for most analysts to become more publically
active in their local political areas.
A more institutional example of this approach is the National Issues
Forum on energy policy called "Energy and the Way We Live." This
ambitious program was carried out during February, March, and April of
1980 by the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges with
funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the U.S.
Department of Energy.^ The program was an effort to use the mass media
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and public forums to facilitate a "serious and thoughtful examination
of past, present, and future dimensions of the energy issue""^ by the
citizens in several hundred communities nationwide. In each community,
the local newspapers ran a series of 15 weekly newspaper articles on
various aspects of our energy problem that were written by a number of
different energy policy analysts and experts. On Saturday afternoons,
the National Public Radio station in each community ran a series of
seven consecutive weekly broadcasts on related energy issues. Com-
munities ran Energy Fairs and tours of local energy facilities and solar
houses in conjunction with this media campaign. And finally there was
a series of forums or town meetings in which local energy experts,
humanists, and city and county energy planners discussed the nature of
the energy problem with each other and the public audience who attended.
This kind of coordinated effort served as an excellent opportunity for
both local and national energy planners and analysts to share their
information and recommendations with members of the public.
How successful are such programs? Unfortunately it is very diffi-
cult to say; for although these programs are obviously desirable, it is
quite difficult to measure their exact impacts. For example, it is hard
to have any clear idea of how many people read the articles, or listened
to the radio shows, whether they learned anything, or how it will affect
their future actions. One of the only significant figures available on
this particular project is that approximately 150,000 people took part
in the community forums nationwide. This is a figure that some program
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officials considered disappointing. Others argued that this poor
attendance was due to cases of poor publicity, or the fact that by
1980 many of the public have already been able to familiarize them-
selves with our energy problems/ In any case, even though results of
such programs are difficult to measure, it seems clear that such public
education programs can only be a positive contribution to raising the
level of critical public understanding of complex issues like energy
policy.
A Dialogical Approach to Policy Analysis
It should be emphasized that critical public thought on policy
Issues is best stimulated not by public education—a one-way transfer
of views from the analyst to the public—but by the analyst engaging
in give and take dialogue with the public. Critical thought is best
cultivated not in individual isolation, but in public, by participating
in arguments and discussions. One learns to question one's own theories
and assumptions by having other people do so.^ One learns to be more
thoughtful about one's values by having one's moral inconsistencies
pointed out by others. Paulo Friere, the respected Brazilian philoso-
pher/educator has argued that "authentic thinking does not take place
in ivory tower isolation, but only in communication . . . Only dialogue,
which requires critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical
thinking."^
This suggests that the role of the analyst is not only to make
recommendations, but to engage the public and policymakers in analytical
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discussion, to share with them the analytic process itself. This
could be called a "dialogical" approach to policy analysis. Such an
approach could serve as a viable middle path between the twin pitfalls
of merely letting superficial public opinions determine public policy
and allowing an intellectual elite to make those decisions in an
undemocratic manner. By engaging the public in analytical policy
dialogue, the analyst can put his or her expertise and knowledge to
good use, but in a manner that is consistent with democratic processes
and values. Unfortunately, however, initiating such discussion is not
always an easy task. For example, even policymakers, who are often
relatively accessible to staff analysts, sometimes prefer only brief
written summations of policy studies (Robert MacNamara was fond of
saying, "I can read faster than you can talk,"); and most policymakers
are not eager to critically discuss their own values and assumptions,
especially with analysts they consider their subordinates. It is even
more difficult to engage in dialogue with the public at large. The
public is not readily accessible to the analyst, and so they must take
responsibility to create opportunities for discussion. This may
involve things like attending or even helping to organize meetings with
civic and community groups. Staff policy analysis should try to take
advantage of the public hearings held by most government bodies, and
attempt to turn them into an opportunity to engage in dialogue with the
public. Let us consider how this could be done.
Creating Interactive Public Hearings
Several important changes would have to be made in the way that
public hearings are approached and structured if they are to become
situations where true discussion and exchanges with the public can take
place.
1. Instead of being attempts at one way communication, with
either the staff analysts overwhelming the public with
long "educational" presentations or various spokespeople
reading long-winded, formal statements, hearings should be
made as interactive as possible, with give and take ex-
changes between the public and policymakers and analysts.
In part, this means that the public must have the oppor-
tunity to ask policymakers and analysts questions, to
Identify Issues to be discussed, and to be generally treated
as equals in these situations.
2. To facilitate discussion, policy proposals should be in
non- technical, non-bureaucratic language that is easily
understood by the general public. Also, scholars of citi-
zen participation techniques uniformly agree that public
participation in helping to analyze and formulate public
policies is most effective when the value Issues involved
8
in the policy are emphasized. This suggests that analysts
should spend less time on the technical issues involved
and more on provoking discussion about the various moral
and value judgments Imbedded in the various policy
proposals, a topic that people usually feel more comfortable
and confident about addressing.
3. Most traditional public hearings are dominated by special
interest groups who have both the time and money to take
part in these meetings. If the analyst is truly interested
in a dialogue with the whole public, or a representative
sample of the community, they must take steps to ensure
that this is possible. Hearings notices must be adver-
tised where the public is likely to see them, not, as is
typically done, by simply inserting a small notice in the
legal sections of newspapers. Also, hearings should be
held at convenient times and at places that are readily
accessible to the public—for example, holding a hearing
in the evening at a neighborhood school. Finally, analysts
should support programs to give various public groups
financial assistance to enable them to prepare for and
attend important public hearings.^
Those few government agencies which have begun to experiment with
this kind of interactive approach have produced some promising results.
For example, Barry Checkoway, a perceptive critic of traditional public
hearings, has cited an innovative hearing approach used by the North-
eastern Illinois Planning Commission in their consideration of the
9
Chicago regional transportation plan. In order to reach the most public,
they conducted the hearing at a local television station. Sixty tele-
phones and tape recorders were staffed by volunteers in the studio to
enable viewers to submit testimony and to ask questions which the
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planners answered during the broadcast. The commission found, unsur-
prisingly, that many more citizens expressed their view and suggestions
than at any previous hearing, and more importantly, those suggestions
resulted in 23 changes in the final plan.
Another promising example is a series of experimental, interactive
style hearings that were held by the Virginia Department of Health in
order to get citizen input for a porposed state health plan. Before
each of the hearings was to take place, the department staff analysts
made every attempt to notify people who might be interested in or affected
by the proposed policy. They used the mass media, posters, and even
direct mailings to announce the meetings. Instead of using the usual
courtroom or auditorium-like set up, the staff searched out large access-
ible rooms with movable tables and chairs— like school cafeterias. At
the hearing, the public was presented with written summaries of the policy
proposal and was given a brief and lively presentation by staff analysts.
The presentation included, among other things, the steps followed in
developing the proposal, the key individuals involved in defining the
problems and solutions, and the definition of the problem and solution
offered by the proposal. Participants were then broken down into small
discussion groups (6-8 people) and a discussion of the policy plans was
conducted with a staff person acting as a facilitator. Each group ana-
lyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the proposals, and developed a
prioritized list of suggested modifications which was eventually pre-
sented to the whole group. At the end of the hearing, individual
questionnaires were handed out and collected, and the staff made itself
available for informal discussion.
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According to Bryan Tomlinson, Director of the Department of
Health Planning, such an innovative approach was not easy to set up.''"^
He had to spend much time "selling" this approach to the Plan Develop-
ment Committee, and finally had to agree to abandon it quickly if any
problems were encountered. He also pointed out that such a format
requires a staff that is enthusiastic about this kind of participatory
experiment. They must be willing to be trained as discussion facili-
tators, and to stay with this difficult and sometimes frustrating
task. But the pay-offs were even greater than expected. As Michael
Appleby, a professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute who was instru-
mental in designing and Implementing this format, observed,
Hearings, which were previously a form of the theatre of
cruelty, became productive. Staff analysis of the hearings
showed a huge increase in the quantity and quality of comments
over traditional hearing formats. The process often Involved
angry doctors who, upon becoming engaged in the review,
decided not to formally present a prepared speech and instead,
became involved in a constructive give and take .... The
staff still speaks of the hearings as the best event of the
year and recounts the tense moments in attempting a new process
.
Not only were the citizen's comments more detailed and of better quality,
but as Tomlinson pointed out, because of face-to-face contact with those
citizens, the staff analysts were better able to understand what the
comments meant. "Staff people came out with a very strong sense of
what the public wanted. One-on-one discussions gave them a better feel
for what was being said. They not only got to know a person's view,
but why they held it. They got to know where a person was coming from.
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No question it was a great leap over the traditional format." Citizen '
evaluations were equally enthusiastic; they were mostly 8 to 10 on a
10 point scale.
Tomlinson's staff also made a unique attempt to let the public
know what happened to their suggestions and criticisms. They drew
up a lengthy document which listed each suggestion, how it was ranked
by each hearing throughout the state, its rationale, the staff's
analysis of the suggested change, and what the Planning Committee
finally decided. According to Tomlinson, the process of ranking the
suggested changes was one of the most important parts of the experiment,
for it proved quite helpful in indicating which of the many suggestions
made by citizens were considered most important by most of those at
the hearings. This combined with the discussion yielded a very good
sense of what changes were crucial to make—and why. Tomlinson's only
regret was that these hearings did not take place earlier, so that
citizen Input could have been used at the very beginning of the develop-
ment of the policy plan.
An important point here is that not only did this dialogical
approach foster a better informed and more involved public, but it also
produced a better policy. Over 230 changes were made in the final stat
health plan as a result of those interactive hearings. We tend to forg
that policy analysts can learn much from encounters with the public.
But Bryan Tomlinson stresses that the interactive hearings "were a very
educational experience for the staff." As Paulo Freire maintains, one
person can only have a partial view of reality; and analysts, like all
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specialists, tend to become isolated and narrowly focused on their
areas of expertise. Dialogue with the public can perforin the vital
service of pulling the analyst out of that narrow perspective, it
can sensitize them to issues, perspectives, and arguments that they
may not have considered seriously. To give only one example, in many
cases it is the public— those who actually live with the effects of
public policies—who are the experts on how useful or effective those
politics really are. As one of the earliest policy analysts, Aristotle,
argued, "[a house] is something which can be understood by others
beside the builder: indeed the user of the house—or in other words
the householder—will judge it even better than he does. In the same
way, a pilot will judge a rudder better than a shipwright does: and
the diner—not the cook—will be the best judge of the feast. In
other words, policy analysts would be negligent in their duty to produce
the best public policies if they did not take advantage of the unique
knowledge that can be gotten from direct encounters with the public at
large
.
Integrative Policy Analysis
Interactive hearings are basically a way of including more of the
public in the very process of policy analysis and planning; and the
reasoning behind this that the more input and dialogue we have in this
process, the more it will enhance that chance of producing more rational
public policies. To take off on Schattschneider 's earlier comment:
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democracy may be the best political system for making sure that we
are right—in the sense that policy rationality is enhanced by free
and extensive democratic dialogue.
But a dialogical approach to policy analysis may also prove
helpful in improving the effectiveness of public policies in another way
as well. One of the main obstacles to the solution of some of our
current social problems is not the lack of good policy studies and
recommendations, but the substantial gap that exists today between the
policymakers and the public. Even when policymakers are democratically
elected, there is no guarantee that their policy decisions will actually
reflect the will of the public, and in those cases where it does not,
public resistence can inhibit public policies. As we say in Chapter 4,
the temptation in these situations is to resort to methods of manipula-
tion in an effort to impose the "right" policy upon the public.
Policymakers and analysts seek the correct independent variable which
will produce the desired public behavior. But efforts to manipulate or
control the public often only increase the alienation between citizens
and lawmakers. Dialogical policy analysis may offer an alternative to
this. Interactive public hearings, for example, could help to ensure
at least some public input before policy decisions are made, and this
could enhance the chances that these policies will gain public acceptance
and support. This is especially likely if citizen input is present from
the very beginnings of the policy planning process.
This approach is a good example of what "policy as promising"
could look like. "Policy as promising" was a notion based on the ideas
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of Hannah Arendt that was briefly discussed in Chapter 4 as an alter-
native to "policy as control." This alternative posited that truly
effective public policies were not those which were imposed on the
public from the top-down, but those which embodied the public's under-
standing and agreement as to the correct policy action to take in a
given situation. Activities like interactive hearings are one mechanism
by which policies can begin to be designed by those who are ultimately
responsible for living them out— the public.
Of course, one of the main problems' with the viability of this
approach is that we don't currently have a public in the United States;
we have many different publics, many different interest groups which
are often in conflict. Indeed, these basic disagreements between these
publics are probably a much more serious obstacle to effective policies
than the alienation between policymakers and the public. We live in a
deeply divided society, where serious conflicts and stalemates between
interests groups can prevent the development of coherent policy solutions
to our social problems. And even if rational plans are developed, power-
ful interest groups can block their passage, or their effective imple-
mentation. In a society where these kinds of conflicts and deadlocks
exist, even the most thorough and thoughtful policy analyses, even the
best normative/non-positivist analyses are insufficient, because the
central problem is not an analytical or intellectual one—it is a
political problem.
Standard forms of policy analysis are of little help in these con-
flictual situations, for they too only attempt intellectual solutions.
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For example, analyses based on economic theory usually take competition
and conflict for granted, and merely attempt to calculate the most
efficient policy— the one which best maximizes the satisfaction of the
conflicting groups. Given a conflict between coal operators and
environmentalists, for example, the rational economic approach would be
to attempt to split the difference and discover that policy produces
the most coal and the most environmental protection. But often it does
little good to simply calculate the "best" policy, if the basic con-
flict is left intact. For, in practice, the result is that the conflict-
ing parties usually continue to inhibit policy agreement in the legis-
lative branches, and to block implementation through court challenges,
intentional misreadings of the policy, and so on. And this in fact has
been the case in coal policy, with both environmentalists and coal
companies adopting obstructionist tactics against policies they oppose.
However, a dialogical approach to policy analysis could begin to
provide a way around these kinds of problems. Instead of seeing their
role as being purely intellectual, policy analysts could begin to get
involved in the political conflicts and negotiations between competing
interests groups. And instead of simply assuming that competing values
are purely subjective and must be taken as given, the analyst can
attempt through rational argument and persuasion to change the value
positions of the conflicting parties and bring them more into harmony.
It is certainly possible, for example, that by engaging in authentic,
critical dialogue, conflicting parties could become aware of unconscious
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assumptions or disguised motives which are irrational or questionable.
Or they could be made aware of previously unknown rationalities in
opponents positions. After all, rationality rarely inhabits only one
side of an argument. Dialogue between parties could also help to
eliminate distortions, or to reveal previously hidden common concerns.
All of these possible effects of dialogue could produce changes in
opponents positions and bring them closer together in terms of values
and policy proposals. Thus, by encouraging reasoned dialogue not only
between analysts and the public, but among differing segments of the
public as well, the analyst could help to undermine the conflicts which
are interfering with effective policy actions.
This dialogical approach is similar to what Paul Diesing has
termed an "integrative approach" to social problems. In his book. Reason
in Society .-^-* Diesing argues, like many non-positivist theorists, that
all societies require shared values and consistent beliefs to exist and
prosper. Persistent conflicts over beliefs and values weaken and de-
stabilize societies and lead to continuing deadlocks and stalemates which
inhibit effective social action. In such situations, he argues, "social
rationality" dictates that an attempt be made to mend those social splits
and to integrate divergent value positions. In the integrative approach,
"the competing desires and habits of which all problematic situations
are composed" are not simply taken as given, but are perceived as "symptoms
of a . . . social system in conflict." One attempts to resolve such con-
flicts by an "integrative process in which the desires are changed rather
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than satisfied. And according to Diesing, an essential part of this
integrative approach is the establishment of "discussion relationships-
talking and listening, asking questions and answering them, suggesting
courses of action and adopting them."-'-^
-
Admittedly, this dialogical/integrative approach to policy prob-
lems could easily be labeled optimistic, or even idealistic in terms
of the amount of faith it puts in the human capacity to settle con-
flicts through reason. Obviously, some conflicts are too basic to be
solved in this way. And Diesing is careful to point out that even
when this approach is effective, it is a laborious and time-consuming
process.-'-^ It could take years for entrenched positions to change
to any degree. And yet despite these problems, I would argue that we
must have faith in the potentialities of human reason—not a naive faith,
but a reasoned faith. A reasoned faith is one based upon the notion of
self-fulfilling prophecy that was discussed earlier. The success or
failure of rational discussion is in part a matter of self-fulfilling
prophecy—it depends partially on the beliefs that we bring to it. If
we assume, like some, the inevitability of conflicting values, dis-
cussion has little chance of success. Conversely, if we enter into
discussion with some faith in our ability to resolve those conflicts,
our chances for success are heightened. Faith in our ability to reason
together certainly does not ensure success, but it is a necessary pre-
condition. In this sense, such faith is not simply a naive hope, but
a deliberate political act. In any case, we need not base our evaluation
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of the potentials of dlaloglcal analysis merely on theory, there
are some concrete examples of this approach which can be examined.
Dialogue in Practice; Environmental Mediation
One example of a dialogical/integrative approach is the relatively
new phenomena of environmental mediators. These mediators enter into
situations of conflict over environmental standards and attempt to
negotiate a compromise policy that the various parties can agree upon.
One successful example of this approach involved the attempts of the
New England Electric's Brayton Point, Mass., power plant to convert from
oil to coal. The Department of Energy was insisting on the conversion
and also requiring the installation of costly scrubbers needed to
prevent an increase in air pollution, a requirement also endorsed by
area environmentalists. The utility insisted it could not afford the
scrubbers. The conflict intensified until David O'Connor, an environ-
mental mediator, convinced all sides to come together to exchange
information. One year and eighteen meetings later a compromise settle-
ment was accepted by all parties. It was agreed to allow the utility
to install less costly environmental equipment that would keep emission
levels comparable to that of an oil fired facility. Harold Keohane,
a regional DOE official estimated that the conversion would lower fuel
costs by $20 million a year, while "nothing was given away on the
environment."-'-^
A more ambitious example of this approach was a project which
attempted to bring together environmentalists and coal companies on a
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national level. Needless to say, coal policy has been one of the
most controversial and frustrating areas of our national energy plan.
On the one hand we have enormous domestic potential in coal—some say
over 300 years worth at current consumption rates. Exploiting these
reserves could mean decreased dependence on foreign oil and large
profits for those companies involved in coal production. On the other
hand, there are the numerous health and environmental impacts that
would come from increased coal use. This is a classic policy problem
of conflicting values and interests—with the coal companies and
utilities on one side and the environmentalist on the other. And as
might be expected, the fight over coal policy has been characterized
by vilification, ad hominem attacks, and oversimplification by both
sides. The intensity of the feelings in this situation would seem to
make it one of the least promising for a dialogical/integrative approach
to analysis of these issues.
18And yet an undertaking called the National Coal Policy Project
demonstrates how useful this approach can be even in difficult areas
like coal. The project, jointly headed by the corporate energy manager
for Dow Chemical Company and a former president of the Sierra Club, was
a yearlong series of meetings between leading conservationists and top
and middle-rank executives from coal-mining and coal-consuming industries,
Many of the participants themselves were cynical about the possible worth
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of such encounters, and more than a few expressed skepticism when it
was announced that the "rule of reason" was to be the principle govern-
ing the approach to resolving the disagreements. For the purposes of
the project, this rule of reason consisted of the following guide-
lines : 1^
1. All pertinent facts should be shared.
2. There should be no misleading by the use of unfair tricks
.
3. Each other's motives should not be lightly impugned.
A. Dogmatism should be avoided.
5. Complex concepts should be simplified for communication
to lay persons
.
6. Subjective considerations should be identified and isolated.
7. Distinctions should be clearly drawn between facts and
value judgments .
For antagonists used to battling each other in no-holds barred courtroom
fights, this kind of "reasonable" approach would be a novel one indeed.
The project was divided into five task forces, each responsible
for a different area of interest: Mining, Coal Transportation, Air
Pollution, Fuel Utilization and Conservation, and Energy Pricing. In
addition, an Ad Hoc Task Force was established to deal with the Issues
of emission charges which overlapped several of the other task forces'
areas of interest. Each of these groups was composed of equal numbers
of environmental and industrial members. Likewise, each group had an
environmental and industrial co-chairman. In this particular experi-
ment, there were no separate, neutral mediators which ran the meetings.
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As the participants settled into a series of meetings, punctuated
by actual visits to coal operations, they found much to their surprise
that there were numerous areas of policy in which agreement could be
reached. In the projects draft report, released in February of 1978,
the groups professed "80 percent agreement," and cited a list of
literally hundreds of specific policy recommendations on which they
concurred. Both sides made serious modifications in previously held
positions. Industry representatives, for example, accepted the principle
that several coal bearing regions of the U.S. should be placed virtually
off-limits to mining operations. These areas included scenic areas in
Appalachia, valuable farm land in the Midwest, difficult to restore arid
areas in the Southwest, and areas with groundwater aquifers or springs
that would be disrupted by raining. For their part, environmentalists
made a surprising retreat from their long standing insistence that every
new coal-burning plant install the "best available technology" to reduce
emissions, agreeing with industry that some flexibility in this require-
ment could help to encourage the development and use of more experimental
and cheaper ways of meeting emission standards. Although at the end of
the project, there remained several areas of basic disagreement, virtually
all the participants expressed astonishment at the degree of their success.
Assessing the Success of Dialogue
Despite this kind of enthusiasm by the project participants, this
particular project has been less than a success in real policy terras.
Interviews with project directors and participants reveal that few of
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the mutually agreed upon policy recommendations have been implemented
or even seriously considered by Congressional policymakers. When asked
what the real policy effects of this project were, the typical re-
sponses were, "Not much," "Not enough," "Not very many," and "You
really go for the jugular, don't you."^^ This lack of impact seems
largely due to the fact that many of the recommendations have failed
to get the support of the powerful coal and electric industry trade
organizations—like the Edison Electric Institute. Without such
backing, the recommendations have little chance of being enacted into
22
law. Also, some environmental groups, like the Environmental Policy
Center, have also been critical of the projects recommendations, arguing
that few "real" environmentalists took part in the project and that
the recommendations represent a sell-out to the industries involved.
Thus in terms of concrete policy pay-offs, this particular attempt at
dialogue might be called a failure.
But we should not be too quick to label such "failed" projects as
a waste of time. As Hannah Pitkin has argued, just because attempts
at dialogue do not produce agreements which effectively deal with the
problems being addressed does not mean that they are total failures.
Her analysis, again informed by the work of Wittgenstein, of the nature
of moral and political dialogue suggest that there are several purposes
served by dialogue besides that of reaching possible agreements. She
points out, for example, that one of the benefits of dialogue is that it
encourages antagonists to see each other more as human beings. As we
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saw in Chapter 4, there is a real tendency in modern, large-scale
politics to view other human beings as abstractions, as objects to be
manipulated. But dialogical encounters can begin to undermine this
tendency by actually bringing people together in face-to-face situations.
It is much more difficult to see people as objects or abstractions when
one is having prolonged conversations with them. As Pitkin argues, the
whole activity of persuasion tends to require one to view the other
person as a human being.
Moral discourse is precisely the kind of exchange which Martin
Buber calls an "I-Thou" relationship, in which the other is
addressed and conceived of as a human being, a person basically
like oneself
. It is a relationship that requires mutual identi-
fication and empathy. Thus, one can say following Hannah Arendt,
that moral discourse is a mode "in which human beings appear to
each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men."^'^
Again, this kind of humanization is not a guaranteed product of a
dialogue—but again, the experience of many in the National Coal Policy
Project demonstrated that it is possible for adversaries to move from
scorn to mutual respect. Journalist Tom Alexander relates an example
of one such experience:
At first, the indusrial members of the mining task force were
horrified when they heard that one of the members picked for
the environmental side was Robert Curry, professor of geology
at the University of Montana. In the past, Curry's biting
testimony before courts and hearings had often lacerated the
technical competence and the motives of his industrial op-
ponents. But by the time the mining task force had completed
its first field trip through the lignite fields of the Gulf
States, Curry's expertise and evenhanded attitude had earned
the industry men's profound respect. "If I wanted to open a
mine in the West," says lawyer John Corcoran, co-chairman of
the mining task force and a former board chairman of Consoli-
dated Coal, "Bob Curry is the first man I would go to about the
environmental problems. "^^
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Pitkin also points out that one of the main purposes of dialogue
is to increase understanding, even if final agreement cannot be reached.
"The point of moral arguments," she explains," is not agreement on a
conclusion, but successful clarification of two people's positions
vis-a-vis each other. Its function is to make the positions of the
various antagonists clear—to themselves and to others. "^6 xhus one
of the benefits of even "failed" dialogues is that they can help both
sides better understand their own assumptions, values, and arguments,
as well as those of the opposition. At times, this dialogue may only
intensify disagreement, as when the parties discover more basic or
previously obscured reasons to disagree. But even this helps in the
sense that the conflict will now be a more clear and straightforward
one—not one based on misconceptions or distortions of other people's
positions. For example, it could be that an environmentalist going
into a discussion with a coal company operator might believe that much of
the problem with coal companies has to do with the insensitivity of
their owners and managers. They may be seen as greedy corporate ogres
who almost enjoy despoiling the environment. But after several en-
counters the environmentalist would most likely see that these managers
are people much like himself and that they are not ogres and are not
totally insensitive to the needs of the environment; but rather, that
it is the requirements of their business which encourage them to avoid
their environmental responsibilities. Being profit-making enterprises,
it is simply rational for them to ignore environmental requirements that
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would lower their profits and thus threaten their ability to compete
and survive in the market-place. Thus the environmentalist can realize
that the problem here is not so much a function of the individual people
involved, but is a function of the structure of the industry itself.
This may mean that the problem is even more basic and intractable than
previously thought, but at least now the real nature of the problem
and disagreement is clear. Thus one need not be naively enthusiastic
about the prospects of possible agreement to pursue this dialogical
approach, for even if one believes that most policy disagreements are
too basic to be solved by rational dialogue, dialogue can still be
seen as a way to make those conflicts more well-defined. Dialogue may
not be able to eliminate political fights, but it can make them better
ones
.
The Policy Analyst as a Political Actor
It could be argued that some of these activities implied by a
dialogical approach cross the line between policy analysis and political
activity; that an effort at integrative analysis, for example, puts
the analyst more in the role of a political actor intervening in the
process of political disputes than that of a neutral analyst. This
is true—but I have contended all along that policy analysis is not
an apolitical, intellectual activity, but a political activity with
real political effects. All this dialogical approach does is to make
this more explicit, and seek to delineate how the analysts can act
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politically to enhance the rationality and morality of public policies.
This alternative perspective sheds the illusion of apoliticism and
not only acknowledges but embraces the fact that in order to ensure
the production of the best public policies, the policy analyst must
sometimes become a political actor. Much of this chapter has been
concerned with showing that a new, more humanistic approach to public
policy analysis involves more than using different kinds of theoretical
assumptions and writing different kinds of policy reports—it also in-
volves redefining how an analyst acts in the political system. A commit-
ment to more rational and moral public policies is also necessarily a
commitment to certain kinds of political action. In particular, it
implies a commitment to the creation of the kinds of genuine dialogue
and discourse which fosters more policy rationality in the political
system. And this commitment in dialogue in turn implies a commitment
to the creation of the kind of democratic and participatory political
system in which that kind of interaction is maximized.
These kinds of commitments mean that the policy analyst must
sometimes become an advocate of change in the political system. For
example, changes in our political system may be necessary to ensure that
fair and open policy discourse takes place, to ensure that policy debates
are not structured in a biased way or that certain participants are
excluded arbitrarily. While few people in the United States are actively
prevented from taking part in policy debates, the structure of some of
the institutions in which debate takes place can work to indirectly
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favor certain speakers and exclude others. In particular, the
mass media is structured in such a way that access to it is very
directly related to financial clout. Newspapers, television, and
radio constitute the central means by which policy issues are debated
in public—but the ability to take out advertisements in these media
which promote and argue certain policy positions is directly a function
of the financial resources of the particular interest group. This means
that policy debate can often be dominated by well-financed interest
groups i which should be a matter of concern for analysts committed to a
fair and rational dialogue on the important policy decisions that are
facing us.
This kind of defacto bias in the media can have real effects in
the policy. Consider the debate which took place over Proposition 5 in
the 1978 California election. That proposition attempted to ban smoking
in most public areas. Polls taken in August, two months before the
election, revealed that the public favored the measure, 58% to 38%.
Sensing a threat to their interests, the big five tobacco companies
(Brown & Williamson, Liggett and Myers, Lorrillard, Phillip Morris,
and R.J. Reynolds) poured nearly $5.6 million into a massive and high-
powered media campaign against the measure. (This was more money than
Governor Brown and his opponent spent together on their campaigns.)
Public groups supporting the proposition could only raise one-tenth
as much, and spent $512,000. By November, the polls revealed a voter
switch to 56%-42% against the measure, which was eventually defeated
? 7
in the election. Establishing causality is obviously difficult in
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these situations, but undoubtedly some of this turn-around can be
attributed to the massive political advertising campaign by the tobacco
interests, and the one-sided policy debate it produced. Thus if an
analyst is concerned with promoting more open and rational policy
debate, he or she must inevitably come face-to-face with a number of
current political issues—namely the ability of wealthy interest groups
to dominate public policy debates, and to exert an undue amount of
power in the policymaking process in general. To ensure fair debate,
the policy analyst must logically get politically involved in elimi-
nating at least the inequalities that are present in our present policy
discourse system. Since little can be done on an individual level,
fostering these changes would probably require the analyst to become
allied with the political groups that share these concerns— for example,
citizen groups who are promoting equal time provisions for political
ads, and other solutions to this problem.
There are other political issues which also naturally fall into
the analyst's area of concern. For instance, an analyst committed to
more dialogical and participatory forms of policy planning and analysis
could quickly become involved in the current campaign for more citizen
participation in the public policy process—especially on the part of
those poor and powerless groups who have been traditionally disen-
franchised from the planning process. In particular, an analyst advo-
cating more participatory policy analysis might also have to advocate
more participatory forms of making policy decisions. Participatory
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analysis means little by itself if the participants have no real
ability to effect policy decisions. There would be little reason for
citizens to devote their time and energy to a dialogical process if
they have no real power to ensure that their contributions are taken
into account. Indeed, it could be argued that without any access to
real power, many of the promising participatory approaches to analysis
and planning that have been discussed here are largely a waste of
time—or even worse, merely a way of co-opting those citizens who take
part in them. An interactive hearing for example might only function
to give the illusion of participation, while policy decisions are
actually largely structured by the influence of powerful special interest
groups working behind the scenes in the policymaking process.
As Sherry Arnstein pointed out in her new classic study of public
participation in policy planning, most forms of participation are
routinely used to either propogandize, placate, or co-opt the public.
Hearings are often used purely as ways to further the plans of the
agencies which hold them, either by using them as a way to defuse public
discontent by allowing criticisms to be aired in a harmless way, or as
a kind of tokenism which gives the appearance that the agency has taken
into account public desires when in fact the policies had already largely
been decided. A specific example of an attempt to use participatory
techniques to further agency ends can be found in an 1978 Department of
Energy Task Force report on the problem of nuclear waste disposal.
Waste disposal is one of the most difficult problems facing the nuclear
industry. There have been technical difficulties with finding a suitable
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storage method, but also there have been serious political obstacles
'
as well. In particular, there has been stiff public resistence in
various states against the idea of making their town or state the
nation's nuclear dumping ground. Several members of Congress have
supported legislation that would require state referendums before dis-
posal sights were approved but the DOE has been reluctant to support
such measures. But curiously enough, the task force report emphasized
the importance of holding public hearings in areas being considered as
disposal sites. The reasoning became clear however when the director
of the task force said that he thought the government could convince
the people near those waste disposal sites that it would be safe by
29discussing concerns with interested citizen groups in the area. It
is difficult of course to assess the motives of policymakers in the
DOE, but it seems reasonable to conclude that some sought to use public
hearings to diffuse dissent on their waste disposal plans, and to create
an opportunity for government technical experts to come into a local
area and "educate" the citizens about how safe these disposal sights
really are.
In her study, Arnstein concludes that an interest in public partici-
pation in policy planning must also logically lead to a concern over how
political power is distributed. As she explains, "without the redis-
tribution of power, participation is an empty and frustrating process for
the powerless. It allows power holders to claim that all sides were
considered when only a few will benefit. "3° She argues that participation
can only be meaningful when it takes the form of direct citizen
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participation in making policy decisions, as in the case of coiranunity-
controlled schools and neighborhood-controlled city programs. This
notion that the concerned policy analyst must become involved in
questioning the nature and structure of political power in our society
is also supported by the work of Roger Kasperson and Myrna Breitbart.
In their essay, "Participation, Decentralization, and Advocacy
Planning,"-^-'- they conclude that analysts must become more concerned
with eradicating the large inequalities in economic and political power
that bias the making of public policy decisions in our country. They
also suggest that we begin to cautiously explore the benefits of de-
centralized governmental structures—structures which are accessible
and allow citizens to be more directly involved in analyzing and deciding
upon the policies which affect their lives. One move in this direction
might be the creation of more of the small publicly-owned utility
systems that were discussed in the prior chapter. Instead of citizen
interests being represented by remote, politically appointed state
utility commissioners, or by citizen groups which can only testify at
rate hearings, a small co-operatively-owned or municipally-owned utility
where the directors were directly elected from the ranks of its customers
would offer a much more direct avenue of public control over these
important institutions.
As Kasperson and Breitbart point out, analysts who pursue these
kind of political changes are not in for an easy time; and this is
especially true for analysts who work within government agencies.
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Analysts will find themselves going against the ingrained values and
procedures of the centralized, bureaucratic institutions in which
they find themselves. Commenting on the uncomfortable position that
advocates of public participation sometimes find themselves in,
Kasperson and Breitbart observe that
Program development in government stresses efficiency, program
results, minimization of manpower and resource expenditures,
and rapid decision-making. But any genuine participation
process is, at least in the short-run, inefficient, costly,
time-consuming, and uncertain. Effective participation calls
for a commitment of sufficient depth to override these other
values
.
Admittedly, this kind of commitment is difficult to maintain in a
hostile environment, and that is one reason why it is important to link
up with people and groups both within and outside of the government
which can provide aid and support for these kinds of changes. And even
though efforts to change the nature of the policy planning and policy-
making process can be a laborious and frustrating endeavor, the experi-
ence of people like Bryan Tomlinson and the staff of the Virginia Board
of Health Planning shows how even small innovations can be quite
exciting and very rewarding.
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CHAPTER XII
ENERGY GROWTH AND HUMANISTIC ANALYSIS
Up to this point, my discussion of humanistic policy analysis
has been largely theoretical, concentrating primarily on develop-
ing the methodological, philosophical, and political justifications
for such an approach. While this development was important, the
question remains of just how practical and useful this method of
analysis can be in illuminating the policy issues which face us
as a nation. I believe that the approach can be extremely useful,
and I will attempt to demonstrate this in this chapter. To do this,
I will again turn to the issue of energy growth, an issue touched
upon repeatedly throughout this work. This time, however, the focus
will be primarily upon the substance of that issue, and on what new
insights into this subject a humanistic form of analysis has to offer.
The choice of this policy is a timely one, for the issue of energy
growth is again high on the national policy agenda. The cornerstone
of the Reagan administration's energy plan in the assumption that vig-
orous energy growth is the basic solution to our energy problem.
In my consideration of this issues, I will first give a brief
account of the history of the debate over energy growth, and then
describe the current state of this debate. The rest of the chapter
will explore how the various techniques of humanistic policy analysis
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— in particular moral analysis and multiple-scenario analysis— can
shed light on this important issue. It will be shown that a human-
istic approach can play a vital role in encouraging a more serious
and democratic debate in this controversial policy area.
The Early Debate Over Energy Growth
Before the early 1970' s, there was no debate over the necessity
and desirability of energy growth. As noted in Chapter VII, virtual-
ly all energy and economic analysts assumed that energy production
must continue to expand in order to meet the requirements of an ever-
growing economy. There was believed to be an "iron-link" between ener-
gy and economic growth. Even as late as 1976, the Chase Manhattan
Bank's Energy Report confidently claimed that "there is no evidence
that indicates that the long-lasting, consistent relationship be-
tween energy use and GNP will change in the future. There is no
sound, proven basis for believing a billion dollars of GNP can be
generated with less energy in the future."''' Thus is seemed that one
could not question energy growth without also questioning economic
growth, and there was little sense in that.
Throughout the 1970' s the energy industry seized upon this as-
sumed one-to-one relationship between energy and economic growth to
promote increased energy production and the weakening of environmental
constraints interfering with this development . The effectiveness of this
line of argument was heightened by the declining state of the economy
during that decade. Particular emphasis was placed on the issue of
unemployment, and the prospect for there being loss of jobs if new,
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reliable energy supplies were not developed quickly. A report from
the Westinghouse Energy Office illustrated this aspect of the indus-
2try's argument. The report consisted almost entirely of quotes noting
the unemployment caused by the energy shortages of 1973 and 1977.
The sudden curtailment of the energy supply in the fall of 1973
(OPEC oil embargo) resulted in unemployment of approximately
500,000 people.
U.S. News and World Report
February, 1977
...a 2% shortfall in energy production could mean the loss of
900,000 jobs.
Rep. Mike McCormack
^U.S. House of Representatives
Based on this evidence, the report concluded that there is a
provable, one-to-one correlation between energy growth and .job growth.
Again they quoted Representative McCormack: "The phenomenal correlation
between energy consumption and employment cannot be ignored with impun-
4
ity." And the report included the figure belox^ to prove its point.
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However, throughout the 1970' s, these arguments met with increasing
skepticism from independent energy analysts. One of the first major stu-
dies to cast doubt on the iron-link assumption was the Ford
Foundation
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report, A Time to Choose
, released in 1974.^ A good example of the
multiple-scenario approach described in Chapter VIII, this report
was able to construct a plausible Zero Energy Growth scenario. The
scenario demonstrated that while conservation through curtailment
might cost jobs, conservation through increased efficiency of energy
use would not harm employment at all. By using increased energy effi-
ciency and investment in less energy intensive sectors of the economy,
the United States could sustain economic and job growth and still main-
tain energy consumption at a constant level. This report with its
scenario approach, was very instrumental in beginning to generate a
true debate over the necessity of continued energy growth.
This notion that the link between energy growth and economic
growth was more flexible that once assumed became increasingly popular
among non- industry analysts during the 1970' s. Analysts from as diverse
perspectives as environmentalist Amory Lovins and the Harvard Business
Chool became equally fond of comparing American energy consumption per
unity of GNP to that of other advanced industrial countries.^ As the
Harvard study pointed out, "West Germany consumed less than three quar-
ters as much energy for each dollar of gross national product as the
United States, and France only half." The study went on to conclude
that there was so much massive waste and inefficiency in the U.S. ener-
gy system, that "if the U.S. were to make a serious commitment to con-
servation, it might well consume 30-40% less energy than it now does,
9
and still enjoy the same or an even higher standard of living."
By the late seventies, the arguments for conservation and slower
energy growth had begun to make serious inroads in to the public policy
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debate over energy. Even energy industry analysts began to admit that
the iron-link was probably more flexible than previously thought. "We
have found we can decouple the two," announced Shell U.S.A. in a 1978
report.''"^ And indeed, there seemed to be empirical evidence which de-
monstrated an unprecedented reduction in the growing demand for oil
and electricity. During the 1970' s the average GNP increased by 2.9%,
but energy consumption only grew by 1.9% each year; and between 1978
and 1979, U.S. energy production actually declined slightly from 78.15
quades (quadrillion BTU) to 78.02 quads, while GNP rose by 2.3%." The
1977 Carter administration energy plan also formally acknowledged the
possibility of decoupling energy and economic growth, stating that
"there is no fixed relationship between energy and GNP." Unfortunat-
ely, despite this encouraging rhetoric, there was no fundamental change
in policy away from the emphasis on energy growth. In spite of the
Carter administration talk of conservation, the details of his energy
plan actually called for a 26% increased in energy consumption by 1985—
most of which was to be met with increased development of coal and
nuclear power. The plan advocated only a 2-3% energy savings due to
conservation measures, far less than the potential cited in studies
13
like that of the Harvard Business School. However, despite this
disappointing lack of action, it was clear that at the end of the de-
cade of the seventies, conservation and slow-energy growth were at
least present on the public agenda.
305
The Current, Stalled Debate
In contrast to the lively debate that took place in the late
1970' s over the question of energy growth, the 1980 's began as a
decade in which this debate would be sacrificed in an attempt to re-
commit the U.S. to a policy of all-out energy growth. The coming
of the Reagan administration heralded the revival of the notion of
a strong link between energy and economic growth. To be sure, no one
is returning to the discredited iron-link hypothesis, but it is argued
by administration analysts that there is still a significant link be-
tween energy and economic growth. It is acknowledged that some con-
servation can be helpful, but it is thought that conservation can only
loosen the link between energy and the economy, not decouple it. In
fact, energy policy spokesmen for the administration, like Secretary
of Energy James Edwards, have argued that too much conservation will
only threaten the prospects for economic recovery. As he stated at
his appointment hearing before the Senate, "I wish we could conserve
ourselves into full employment in this country, but I don't believe
we can."^^ This stance is a reflection of Reagan's contention during
the 1980 campaign that "arbitrary reductions in America's energy use
would slow economic growth.
"^^
The Reagan administration has done away with the Carter's mis-
leading rhetoric of conservation and has explicitly embraced increasing
supplies as the only basic answer to our energy problems. Among his
policy proposals has been the abolition of the Solar and Conservation
Bank, and the cutting of the government media campaign encouraging
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conservation by $66 million in 1981 and $210 million in 1982. Reagan
has also encouraged increased use of coal and nuclear power for elec-
tricity generation. In order to increase exploration for more oil
and natural gas resources, Reagan has decontroled oil, opened up more
federal lands to development, and allowed increased off-shore drilling.
By hooking up energy policy to the train of economic recovery
and growth (if only loosely), the Reagan administration has succeeded
in leaving conservationists sitting at the station. This strategy
has been very effective in limiting the scope of the debate over energy
policy. Opponents to this massive push for energy growth find that
their reluctance to endorse energy growth can be perceived as being
only weakly committed to economic recovery — and economic recovery
is currently the highest national priority. Any talk of serious con-
servation or environmental protection is likely to be quickly attacked
as undermining the possibility of creating more jobs and a healthy
economy. Thus as long as energy remains coupled to the all important
goal of economic recovery, it seems that the debate can hardly be
more than minimal.
The Reagan administration has not only been successful in putting
ideological limits on the energy debate, it has also attempted to
create an institutional environment that will inhibit public dis-
cussion over energy growth policies. It has taken several steps to
ensure that parts of the energy policy-making structure are redesigned
in order to discourage true democratic debate over policies. For
example, in early 1981 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposed
regulations that would have significantly reduced the ability of the
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general public to gather the information they need to participate
effectively in nuclear plant liscensing hearings. Before, individ-
uals or groups involved in liscensing proceedings could require the
NRC staff to produce documents or answer questions relating to these
cases. This process, called "discovery," permitted the public to
gather detailed information about a power plant before a formal hear-
ing opens. But under the NRC's proposal, the formal discovery pro-
cess would have been abolished, and the NRC staff would have decided
whether to respond to inquiries for information or documents. The NRC
would have furnished the information on a voluntary basis "wherever
practicable." Richard Pollack, director of the Critical Mass Energy
Project, noted at the time that without the discovery process, citizens
groups would be unable to get the technical information need to pre-
pare for a hearing. "Basically, they will take away the tools citizens
have in a democratic proceeding. "^^
Besides trying to eliminate this discovery process, the NRC
requested at the same time the authority to issue interim operating
liscenses for nuclear plants before hearings on safety requirements
18
have been completed. These kinds of policies represent attempts
by the Reagan administration to further limit the debate taking place
over the issue of energy growth by circumventing democratic procedures.
At best, such efforts can have a chilling effect on public discussion
of this important policy issues; at worst, they constitute a disturb-
ing threat to the viability of democracy and free debate in the 1980' s.
es
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Applying Humanistic Analysis
How can one begin to question the pro-growth vision that dominat
energy policy? How can one begin to promote a more vigorous democrat
debate of the full range of options open to the United States? Unfor-
tunately, traditional positivistic analysis offers few ready answers
to these questions. Indeed, there is little in positivistic analysis
that is incompatible with the current. non-debate in energy policy. As
I pointed out in Chapter II, most policy analysis in energy has tradi-
tionlly focused on examining the various means to encourage energy-
growth. Little attention is paid in value-free, positivistic analysis
to questioning the end of energy growth itself. In addition, the top-
down, technocratic perspective found in much of policy analysis is
very compatible with restricting public debate over issues like nuclear
energy. It is often argued that such complex questions should best be
left up to qualified policy experts.
However, the current effort to limit debate over energy growth
is surely not compatible with a humanistic approach to policy analy-
sis. As we have seen, this approach seeks to maximize rather than
minimize rational public debate over important policy issues like ener-
gy. Moreover, the humanistic approach offers interested analysts the
analytic techniques to help open up the discussion over energy growth.
Two techniques in particular would seem helpful in encouraging a more
criticial and broad debate over energy growth. First energy growth
should be seen more clearly as a moral issue -- not just a technical
one. Increased debate over current policies would be logically required
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if it could be demonstrated that growth is not an unmitigated bless-
ing, but a path full of moral problems that are serious and not
easily solved. Secondly, multiple-scenario analysis could be use-
ful in constructing alternatives that would serve to further open
up debate over this issues. If it could be shown that a no-growth
or slow-growth energy path is a plausible possibilitiy
, this would
undermine the atmosphere of necessity that supports the dominance
of current growth policies. Let us consider in more detail what
these two approaches to the energy growth issue would look like.
Energy Growth and Basic Societal Needs
If a true debate is to take place over energy growth, the auto-
matic desirability of energy growth would have to be directly questioned.
One would have to penetrate the normative mystique that surrounds the
notion of energy growth; for most Americans seem to believe that in-
creased energy growth would be an unmitigated boon to society. There
are however many moral issues contained in energy growth which can be
used to cast doubt on this assumption. Indeed, there are too many
such issues to deal with all of them in this limited space, but we
can at least sketch out what several of the most productive lines of
moral argument would be. There are several morally problemmatic areas
that, if sufficiently emphasized, could serve a levers to open up the
debate over the desirability of energy growth.
For example, it was shown in Chapter IX that the basis of many
moral judgements is the notion of basic human needs, and that policies
can legitimately be evaluated in terms of how they succeed or fail in
meeting these needs. It is useful to ask, therefore, how effective
current policies of energy growth are in meeting the basic needs of
Americans. The basic needs that would be most useful to focus on
for our purposes would be (1) the physical need for a healthy envir-
onment; (2) the social/political need to reduce inequities in Amer-
ican society; and (3) the pressing economic need of increased employ-
ment. It is safe to say that this set of needs does embody many of
the most basic and important needs of our society today. And yet
energy growth turns out to be a very ineffective way of meeting
those needs.
Clearly energy growth is an extremely poor way to encourage a
healthy environment. Indeed, energy growth has been consistently
singled out by environmentalists as one of the most fundamental
threats to the health of the human and natural environments. In-
creasing energy growth, as advocated by the current administration,
would necessarily require increasing use of coal and nuclear power
—
both of which exhibit serious environmental problems. To mention
but a few: (1) increased coal development would encourage more mine
deaths from accidents and occupational diseases like black lung; (2)
increased coal burning means increases in gaseous and particulate
pollution which are known to be harmful to human health; (3) coal
combustion also contributes heavily to acid rain and acid dust which
are detrimental to natural ecological systems; (4) the C02 created
by coal combustion threatens to raise the mean temperature of the
earth, which could cause destructive climatic changes; (5) mining
of uranium has been shown to cause low-level radiation threats to
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human health; (6) nuclear plant accidents could cause potentially
devastating and long-range destruction to human and natural popula-
tions; (7) nuclear waste disposal presents health hazards which have
not yet been solved; and (8) the export of nuclear technology encour-
ages the proliferation of nuclear weapons and increases the probabil-
ity of nuclear war. One could go on— but the obvious point is that if
a healthy environment is a good, then increased energy growth is mor-
ally questionable on those grounds.
It can also be argued that increased energy production and its
environmental costs also undermine the basic moral principle of equity.
All of the health risks generated by increased energy production and
consumption are not shared by the population equally. Instead what
we usually find is that a small portion of the population is expected
to bear the risks and the costs, while another portion of the popula-
tion reaps most of the benefits. As David Orr discovered, decisions
about the development and use of energy sources produce specific
groups of winners and losers: "The winners are cooled, coiffured,
and entertained electrically, while the losers are strip-mined, irrad-
19
iated and polluted." And as Orr points out, it is these inevitable
inequities of current energy growth policies that have fueled many of
the attempts by public groups to slow-down or block the expansion of
energy production. The emergence of anti-nuclear groups, farmers
protesting high-voltage lines, and Indians protesting desecration of
holy land by coal developers are all due in part to the failure of
current growth policies to fulfill the moral criterion of equity.
Current attempts by the Reagan administration to limit the ability
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of such groups to take part in the policy-making process may be some-
what effective in obscuring these moral problems — but such problems
will continue to exist and grow worse as energy development procedes.
Energy Growth and Jobs
Even if energy growth undermines the values of equity and envir-
onmental health, it might be argued that growth is still necessary to
ensure increased employment — currently one of our most pressing eco-
nomic needs. And if there were indeed a trade-off between employment
and the values of equity and the environment, then it is clear that a
moral case could be made for increased growth. One would simply ar-
gue that the need for a healthy economy with increased jobs must cur-
rently take precedence over the other values. However, it is ques-
tionable whether such a trade-off actually exists, for many analysts
have argued that there may not be a direct link between energy growth
and increased jobs. Let us consider two versions of this argument.
The first version posits that it is misleading to suggest that
increased energy production and utility expansion will m.aximize job
20
production. The energy industry is not very labor intensive, and
it can be shown that capital invested in the energy industry will in
facte create substantially fewer jobs than the same capital invested
in other kinds of business. As the table below indicates, a job in
the petroleum industry requires about 21 times the capital investment
as a job in textiles. In other words, investing in textiles produces
20 times more jobs than investing in the petroleum industry. Figures
for the utility industry are almost equally discouraging. It would
seem then that the expansion of the energy industry would be a poor
way to promote increased employment.
Table 4
CAPITAL INVESTMENT PER JOB'
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Industry Capital Investment
per employee
petroleum
public utilities
chemicals
primary metals
stone, clay, glass
all manufacturing (average)
food and kindred products
wholesale and retail trade
services
apparel and other fabricated textiles
$108,000
105,000
41,000
31,000
24,000
19,500
18,000
11,000
9,500
5,000
It is sometimes argued that while investing in increased ener-
gy production produces relatively few new jobs directly, it does cre-
ate indirect increases in employment. And indeed, invested money
respent in the economy (the multiplier effect) and stimulates increas-
ed output and employment. But this phenomenon in itself is little
reason to invest in energy specifically — for any investment has this
multiplier effect. Even unemployment benefits have a multiplier ef-
fect. Thus this indirect employment argument gives us no strong rea-
son to invest in the energy industry over any other.
The second version of the attack on increased energy as neces-
sary for increased employment is illustrated in the work of Herman
Daly.^^ Daly questions the assertion that there is a direct, positive
correlation in the economy between more energy and more jobs as ar-
gued by the Westinghouse report cited earlier. He points out that
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energy often serves as a substitute for labor, not merely as a comple-
ment. As the push for increased automation substitutes energy for labor
in industrial processes, the total number of workers would naturally
tend to decrease rather than increase. Daly argues that the only rea-
son that the total numbers of workers have increased in some indus-
tries is because of increases in demand that have accompanied a grow-
ing population. Thus while it has appeared historically that energy
expansion has been causing increases in jobs, it was actually con-
stantly expanding demand which led to constantly expanding employment.
Daly's arguments are supported by the fact that very few new
jobs are produced by the energy intensive sectors of the economy. It
is the service sector— including such things as banks, hospitals, re-
tail stores, schools, insurance companies, etc. — which have accounted
for nearly all new employment in the U.S. and this service sector is
the least energy intensive sector of the economy. As Daly points
out, of the total net increment of fourteen million jobs between
947 and 1965, the service sectors accounted for thirteen million,
while industry accoundted for only four million, and agriculture ac-
counted for a decrease of three million. He concluded that "to al-
lege that large increases of in energy input are needed to provide
new jobs seems to presuppose that the average new worker will work
in a steel or aluminum plant, a counter-factual presupposition, in-
23
asmuch as it is likely he will work in a service institution."
This line of argument would seem particularly relevant to the
attempt to question the Reagan administration's effort to link ener-
gy growth to the goals of reindustrialization and greater employment.
The
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link between reindustrialization and energy growth is clear— reindus-
trialization focuses on revitalizing the basic industries (automobiles,
steel, etc.) — which already constitute the most energy intensive
sectors of the economy. Reindustrialization would make these indus-
tries even more energy intensive because the plan calls for increasing
amounts of technology and automation. Greater automation is seen as
necessary in order to increase the labor productivity of these firms,
and greater labor productivity is seen as the key to stemming infla-
tion. Increased industrial production can only be anti-inflationary
if greater labor productivity makes those goods relatively cheaper.
But while it is clear that such a plan could require greater energy
production and comsumption, it is less clear that it would produce
substantial increases in employment. If Daly is correct, such an
economic approach might not be effective in producing the large
amount of jobs the society requires. In that case, increases energy
production will not only produce greater environmental degradation,
it may also fail to produce the jobs which are supposed to make the
degradation worth it — the worst of both worlds.
Of course, the potential failure of this energy- intensive re-
industrialization program to produce a substantial increase in em-
ployment might not be perceived as a failure at all — it depends on
whether this was in fact its original intention. It could easily be
that the primary aim of this program is not to increase employment
at all, but to increase the productivity and the profits of our basic
industries. Despite the Reagan administration's rhetorical bow to
the goal of greater employment, the nature of its reindustrialization
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program could suggest that this important goal is not their highest
priority.
A Conservation Scenario
While a normative critique of the assumed good of energy growth
can be useful for casting doubt on our current energy path, little
real debate over energy policy can be expected without a plausible
alternative path. A clean environment and higher employment are ob-
viously desirable goals, but it must be shown that slowed energy
growth makes both possible. The task of laying out the complete
details of such an alternative energy path is a complex one; but
enough work has been done in this area that it is relatively easy to
identify the important elements of such a scenario.
First, increased energy conservation would have to have high
priority. By energy conservation I do not mean curtailment of ration-
ing of energy, but increased efficiency of energy use — higher-mileage
cars, insulated houses and other buildings, more efficent lighting
and appliances, etc. If the Harvard study is correct, we can easily
run our economy on 30-40% less energy that we use today. This kind
of conservation would be a much more effective way to meet the basic
needs discussed earlier. The potential threats to the human and na-
tural environments posed by a strong conservation program are very
minimal compared with a policy of increased growth. Serious conser-
vation would also mean less need for more off-shore drilling, nuclear
plants, and coal plants, and thus would avoid all of the potential
health risks that these projects would inevitably entail. It is also
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clear that a conservation program would eliminate many of the equity
problems discussed earlier. As environmental costs and risks are
minimized, so too is the potential for inequitable distribution of
those costs and risks.
Further, conservation as increased efficiency would not cause
increased unemployment. It would simply mean doing the same jobs
with less energy. In fact, some analysts have argued that a con-
servation scenario would actually create a substantial increase in
jobs due to the expansion of a labor intensive conservation indus-
try. For example, Richard Grossman's analysis concludes that "con-
servation policies yield more jobs and a more stable economy than
25does our present energy policy." To support his point, he cites
a study by the Bonneville Power administration that found that "high
impact conservation programs create more jobs than would be created
by building new power plants to generate an equivalent amount of
26
energy." Grossman also notes the optimistic findings of a study
done for the state of Colorado:
The State of Colorado has estimated that 17 million private
homes in the nation need ceiling insulation; 20 million need
clock thermostats; 20 million need caulking and weatherizing;
10 million need storm windows. In addition, millions of mul-
tiple-unit dwellings, apartment houses, commercial and indus-
trial buildings are inadequately insulated and weatherized.
If 487,000 jobs are generated by only three simply conserva-
tion procedures in a small fraction of the buildings which
need work, the potential obviously exists for millions of
jobs. Employment for energy specialists, construction of
more energy efficient equipment, jobs for architects and en-
gineers will be increased, along with jobs in the field of
insulation, heat pumps, electronic controls and systems ana-
lyses, communications and transportation. 27
Given this potential for employment, there is clearly no real
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trade-off between conservation and jobs; and it is equally clear that
if increased employment is a valued goal in our society, that con-
servation policies should be highly valued on those grounds. Thus
an energy policy scenario which emphasized strong, across-the-board
conservation measures would seem to be both desirable and plausible.
The Next Step: Questioning Economic Growth
An effort to focus more attention on the moral problems of
continued energy growth, and on the plausibility of the intensive
conservation scenario could be useful in opening up the currently
stalled debate over energy growth. Indeed, just such an approach
(as exemplified by the Ford Foundation Study and the work of Amory
Lovins) already proved useful in the first effort to widen the de-
bate in energy policy during the seventies. It is possible that
such an approach could be effective again, and such a path is cer-
tainly worth pursuing. However, new analytic and political devel-
opments suggest that a new kind of challenge to current energy poli-
cies might also be called for. In particular, it might now be nec-
essary to question more directly the notion of economic growth un-
derlying the push for stronger energy growth. There are two reasons
for this. First, the current administration has been relatively suc-
cessful in tying together energy and economic growth — in spite of
evidence that the link is questionable. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, it may be that conservation can only decouple energy
and economic growth temporarily and that in the long-run increasing
economic growth will necessarily require increased energy growth.
Let us consider these two arguments.
One reason it may be necessary to focus more explicitly on the
issue of economic growth is that the Reagan administration has made
it an issue in current energy policy decisions. And despite that
fact that this attempt to recouple energy and economic growth may
be questionable on empirical grounds, Reagan has nevertheless been
successful in linking the two issues in the public's mind. Thus in
order to gain leverage in the debate over energy policy, it may be
necessary to criticize Reagan's current economic growth policies.
If the logic and the desirability of these policies can be undermined
then it would be much easier to question the necessity of energy
growth as well.
The other reason a challenge to economic growth policies might
be necessary is related the analyses that indicate there actually is
a very close link between energy and economic growth — at least in
the long run. For example, the work of William Ophuls in his much
praised book. Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity
,
suggests that de-
28
coupling energy and economic growth can only by done temporarily.
He argues that when most energy waste is eliminated and energy ef-
ficiency is maximized, then once again there will be a very tight
link between energy and economic growth. Insulating houses now may
lessen demand in the short run; but if one continues to build houses,
even insulated ones, eventually energy demand must again begin to
rise.
While a possible 40% gain in efficiency may at first seem a
very large amount, Ophuls demonstrates that if economic growth con-
tinues at current rates, such a "conservation program can buy no
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mare than a decade or two of time" before we again face serious de-
9 Q
mands to increase energy production. He concludes that while con-
servation can be "extremely useful over the next few decades in help-
ing to alleviate the impact of fuel shortages and reducing dependence
of foreign oil, ...energy conservation can never be more than a short-
term palliative. ""^^
For several reasons then, any plausible, long-range alternative
to the problems created by endless energy growth may have to eventual-
ly question the viability of the continually growing economy. Needless
to say, this is a very difficult line of argument to develop. Econo-
mic growth is one of the most deeply entrenched values in American
society — but nevertheless, the challenge to current economic growth
policies is probably a necessary one if there is to be any hope for
an alternative approach to energy policy.
Again, humanistic analysis can point the way and indicate what
the general outline of an effective challenge to economic growth would
look like. The attempt to generate a serious debate over the viability
of continuous economic growth would take the same basic form as the
attempt to widen the energy debate. First, one would need to focus
on the cost and moral problems generated by current economic growth
policies, and second, one would have to construct a plausible alter-
native vision of a healthy economy.
The moral challenge to economic growth is obviously a necessary
one; for if one cannot demonstrate that current growth policies create
more problems than they solve, then no alternatives will ever be taken
seriously. Several lines of moral argument suggest themselves here:
1. As with energy growth, one should emphasize the destruction
of human health and the natural environment caused by the
resource exploitation and inevitable pollution that must
result from an economy dedicated to increasing levels of
production and consumption.
2. It should also be pointed out, as William Ophuls does, that
there are basic ecological limits to economic growth— lim-
ited amounts of land, water, energy etc., which make con-
tinued growth not only undesirable but impractical.
3. In terms of social values, one should emphasize the current
suffering created by policies (like the cutting of food
stamps, school lunch programs, unemployment benefits, etc.)
which are intended to encourage growth, but impact most se-
verely on those least able to afford it.
4. Also, it would be relevant to demonstrate that despite all
of its promises, economic growth has been unable to elimin-
ate poverty in the U.S. or to mitigate the vast inequali-
ties in wealth and income that exist in the U.S.
5. Special attention should also be paid to the arguments of
those like Fred Hirsch (cited earlier in Chapter VII) who
demonstrate that economic growth will never be able to pro-
vide universally the kinds of scarce social values that all
32
citizens increasingly seek.
In short, a moral challenge to economic growth policies would
develop two fundamental lines of argument. First it would be argued
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that growth as currently pursued, has failed to meet a whole range of
basic human needs
— environmental, economic, and social. Second,
and equally important, it must be argued that economic growth cannot
in principle ever meet some of these needs. As analysts like Ophuls
and Hirsh have pointed out, some of the goals of growth are simply
physically impossible to meet -- and thus continuous economic growth
is morally irrational. Recall that in the discussion of moral ra-
tionality in Chapter IX, it was seen that one of the essential fea-
tures of an effective and rational moral argument is that the desir-
able act be "practical, " that it be possible to accomplish the act.
Demonstrating that economic growth fails this practicality criterion
can be an effective way of dampening the natural moral appeal of
growth. This is an extremely important kind of argument to make,
for as long as economic growth continues to be seen as the most
practical way to solve many of our country's problems, no alterna-
tive will be taken truly seriously.
No-Growth or Different Growth
As in the case of energy, the second thrust of any challenge to
economic growth would necessarily be the development of an alternative
vision of a healthy economy— one which did not require continuous
growth. This is a large and extremely problematic task. One of the
few economists who have attempted to take on this task is Herman Daly.
Daly has spent considerable time working on a model of a no-growth or
"steady-state" economy. According to Daly, a steady-state economy is
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one in which "the total population and total stock of physical wealth
33are maintained through-put." Translated into more easily understood
terms, a steady-state economy would require that: (1) we have a constant
population in order to ease that most basic source of pressure for
growth; (2) we have a constant rather than increasing level of physical
stock (houses, cars, consumer goods, etc.) on which that population de-
pends; and (3) we maintain those stocks with the minimum amount of re-
sources being put through the economy. This last concept of minimum re-
sources through-put is in many ways the key one in a steady-state econ-
omy, and the most relevant to the consideration of energy policy. If one
of the basic problems with constant economic growth is acknowledged to be
the ever increasing amount of non-renewable natural resources (including
energy) that such a production system requires (and the inevitably in-
creasing pollution this process creates), then the only viable long range
solution is a production system which uses a constant minimum amount of
those resources to maintain the standard of living of the constant popula-
tion.
Minimum through-put would imply several basic changes in our
energy and production systems. In terms of energy, it implies a move
away from non-renewable energy resources and an emphasis on renewable
sources such as solar. In the production system, there would be a
shift in emphasis from goods that require frequent replacement to
goods which are durable or easily repairable. As Daly explains, this
simple shift would have fundamental impacts of the quality of Amer-
ican life:
324
For the stock of wealth, a low rate of through-put (low production
and equally low consumption) means greater life expectancy or dur-
ability of goods and less time sacrified to production. This
means more "leisure" or non-job time to be divided into consump-
tion time, personal and house-hold maintenance time, cultural
time, and idleness. 34
Such a low-production/ low consumption society might first
appear to not offer the necessary number of jobs for the population.
But Daly points out that low resource through-put also implies minim-
izing energy use, and this would encourage the substitution of labor
for energy in many production processes. And there is a neat com-
patibility between the emphasis on industries which are labor and
skill intensive and the need in a steady-state econom.y for high
quality goods which will be durable.
Obviously, such a short description of the steady-state economy
cannot do justice to the rich vision that is present in Daly's books.
However, it is possible to see that his is a provocative vision that
deserves attention from those concerned about the problems of econom-
ic and energy growth. In practical political terms, however, Daly's
vision may simply be too radical to appear plausible to most Ameri-
cans. And indeed, one finds that Daly's work has recieved little
serious attention. This is a serious political deficiency. In the
short-run— while the growth ideal is still alive in America— those
interested in pursuing alternative energy policies might find it
more advantageous to advocate different visions for growth, rather
.than the no-growth ideal itself. Until the normative attack on
growth is felt more strongly by the public and policymakers, it might
make more sense to simply emphasize the need for different kinds of
economic growth. One could promote policies — such as a policy of
growth in the development of non-renewable resources, or a policy
of growth in the labor intensive sectors of the economy— which not
only have current relevance, but also lead in the direction of a
steady-state economy. Support for these kinds of transition policies
may be the only viable tactics, given the present political realities.
Any attempt to put the no-growth alternative on the national policy
agenda now would most likely be premature and ineffective.
Conclusions
The foregoing discussion has clearly not been detailed enough
to provide any concrete answers to our current energy and economic
problems — but it was not intended to do so. My intention was more
humble: to demonstrate that the humanistic approach to policy analysis
can indeed be relevant and yield some insights into these crucial
policy issues. And I believe that it has been shown that these anal-
ytic techniques can be useful, especially in the attempt to provoke
a more serious democratic debate over energy and economic policy.
Such a debate would necessarily involve developing and promoting
lines of argument similar to those just described. And to this
extent, the effort to promote a more humanistic approach to policy
analysis can be seen as a desirable one.
However, the humanistic approach demands that one last point
be made: it is naive to assume that any new analytic approach would
be sufficient in itself to open up currently narrow policy discus-
sions. As I have continually stressed throughout this work, policy
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decisions are political decisions. Policy paths are set for political
as well as moral and rational reason. The dominance of the all-out
energy growth scenario in the Reagan administration must finally be
understood not simply as a function of an overly narrow and conserva-
tive analytic perspective, but also as a function of whose interests
are represented most strongly in this administration. Whose inter-
ests dominate energy policy decisions was made clear even before the
1980 election when Reagan chose his Energy Task Force — the group
who designed the approach which serves as a blue-print for current
Reagan policies. Of the 17 signers of the task force report, seven
were chairman, vice-chairman, or presidents of oil, chemical, utility
or nuclear companies. No women, no environmentalists, no experts in
arms control, nor experts in energy efficiency or conservation were
represented on the panel. It is hardly surprising, then, that the
panel recommended the growth policies long advocated by the energy
industry.
Thus, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, any attempt
to ensure rational debate and policy choices in areas like energy
policy must be a political as well as an intellectual task. At-
tempts must necessarily be made to broaden democratic participation
in our policy-making institutions. Without a more representative
cross-section of people, interests, and views in the policy-making
process, there is little hope that a serious debate over current en-
ergy policies will take place.
This realization of the central importance of political change
should not be taken to mean that encouraging a more humanistic
approach to policy analysis is irrelevant or secondary. Indeed,
this approach remains a necessary and useful element in any attempt
to encourage more wide-ranging and rational policy debates. It can
serve as an invaluable tool for undermining the conceptual con-
straints and biases which help to unduly limit our present policy
choices — and this in itself is an important contribution to the
cause of democracy and good policy.
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